Unsettled Accounts

This was the amount of time needed by the players on the political scene here to overcome their initial confusion and even fear that something similar could happen in their yards tomorrow. This fear is not unfoundedthe largest amount of the money and goods ``liberated'' during the three years of war have reached Belgrade, and in the general plundering no one has remained innocent.

Before any official statements were made, gossip about a conspiracy and of someone backing the rebels, made the city rounds. It turned out later that everybody was wrong. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) sent conflicting signals, as it always does in unclear situations. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's former advisor and current Federal Vice-Prime Minister Zeljko Simic supported the rebels indirectly, saying that the events in Banjaluka did not have ``anything in common'' with Croatia's offensive against the Republic of Serb Krajina and the upcoming negotiations in Geneva. In this way he was directly opposed to the stand of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership which claimed that the rebellion was a threat to all-Serb interests and was undermining Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's negotiating position. After some people had reached the conclusion that Milosevic personally was behind the ``putchists,'' SPS frontman Goran Percevic spoke up, cautioning that crime must be countered ``in an organized fashion, by strengthening legal and state organs in the young Republic of Serb Krajina, and not through anarchy and arbitrariness.''

Opposition leaders did not rush to give their stands, at least not until they were sure that the matter wasn't just another Socialist-Radical hoax. The Democratic Party (DS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) supported the action dubbed ``September 93'' in principle, adding that they were the first to caution of such a possibility. Only Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica publicly condemned the rebellion and so stirred up gossip of a rapprochement between the DSS and the SRS.

The first to be suspected of masterminding the rebellion, SRS leader Vojislav Seselj, was initially rather restrained, in order to come close to panic in the end. On Monday (the fourth day) Seselj said that it was still early for political estimates and that the situation in Banjaluka was ``very confusing,'' and that he ``didn't like what those people had done.'' This was followed by something he liked even less, the arrest of the Serb Republic in B-H SRS branch leadership, which threatened to bring to light connections between the SRS leaders in Banjaluka and some SRS deputies in the Serbian parliament with business interests across the Drina River.

On Tuesday Seselj hit back from all guns, firing intermittently against his military and civilian enemies who were branded as ``Communist rabble.'' According to Seselj, the rebellion was organized jointly by the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, chief of military counter-intelligence Colonel Aleksandar Vasiljevic and Serbian police eminence grise Radmilo Bogdanovic. Bogdanovic's reaction to the accusations was one of surprise rather than anger. ``I'm surprised that the SRS should make such a mistake... Such imputations are the last thing I would have expected of them,'' said Bogdanovic on RTS, speaking in the tone of a teacher disappointed in his best pupil.

Without going into the truth of Seselj's claims on who had ``ordered'' the rebellion in Banjaluka, there is no doubt that his interpretation of the events is deeply sincere and reflects feelings felt by many of the players on the political scene here. Fear is contagious, and the bill is not always paid by those who have eaten and drunk the most, at least not in this part of the world.