Passing The Buck

The Muslim rejection of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace plan on Wednesday was hailed by Serbian grenades: the center of Sarajevo instantly fell under a rain of artillery fire and for a moment those who believe that a renewal of combat lay ahead and that ``hopes for peace'' were dissipated seemed to be right.

The American president is seemingly not among them. ``I think that the price of passing up this peace may be very high and I think that they will probably consider that within the next few days'' he said in response to the news from Sarajevo. Clinton did not fail to mention that he ``thought'' that the Muslims were entitled to the territories that they demand from the Serbs, but did not omit to add that he ``did not know'' if they could get them. To this feeble support of the Muslim right to additional territorial concessions (compared to his earlier statements) and the quite openly expressed doubt that there would be any new concessions, Clinton added that he would personally ``hate it'' if all those there had to face another winter, but that ``it is their country and their lives: they will have to make the decision.''

The Muslim leadership has to respond somehow to Clinton's open demand to see if it can afford to reject the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, particularly bearing in mind that a number of elements of the Bosnian mosaic lead to the conclusion that the Muslim refusal was not made in the hope that an additional ``four percent'' would be obtained from the Serbs in a new round of talks. The Bosnian Assembly did not even specify what territories it considered to be the absolute minimum under which it would not go, although even without this, it is well known that under the peace plan the Serbs get to keep 11 communities which had had a majority Muslim population before the war.

Izetbegovic now probably hopes that Clinton will make him an offer he can not refuse. Before they sign the plan the Muslims want firm American guarantees that it will be implemented, including the promise that American soldiers will come to Bosnia to oversee its implementation. This idea has failed to materialise. Izetbegovic's interlocutor at the next round of the Geneva talks would therefore, be Bill Clinton himself, who has so far deftly avoided the trap that Izetbegovic has set for him. What's more, Clinton did not make any public statements calling on Muslims to accept the plan, since in that way, he would be taking responsibility for its acceptance and the consequences. Like most Western leaders, he would be glad get rid of this uncomfortable issue, imbued with the West's guilt for not coming up with results. On the other hand, on several occasions Clinton has made explicit remarks, such as the latest one when he said that it was their country and that their skins that were on the line, and that they would have to make the decisions themselves.

It seems highly probable that the Americans will ultimately get involved in Bosnia, if for no other reason, than to find something for NATO to do in the post-cold-war period (if possible before January 10, 1994 when Clinton comes to Europe for the NATO summit). Therefore, Izetbegovic's counting on Clinton, could yield results.

The Muslims have rejected the plan because they are still discreetly flirting with the Americans, and not because they want to get something out of the Serbs with hard negotiating tactics. There is no great danger of the war spreading and the entire Balkans erupting. What happened in Sarajevo is not ``the victory of the hard liners'' and even less the result of the ``utopia that Bosnia can be preserved as a unified country'' as interpreted by the commentator of ``Deutche welle.'' The Bosnian Muslim leadership would gladly have kept the whole of Bosnia, together with the government institutions which employed mostly Muslims, considering that they are majority population. What they will now get, was the Muslim leadership's reserve option right from the beginning. This is why they agreed readily to the terms (judging by numerous statements made by Muslim leaders at a gathering which preceeded the Parliamentary session and signaled what was to be followed).

Events in the Cazin area can be viewed in the same light. Fikret Abdic's analysis has shown that the end of the war is approaching fast, and the ``Financial times'' are very wrong when they claim that Abdic's proclamation of the autonomy of ``Western Bosnia,'' coinciding with the Bosnian parliament meeting, was intended to weaken Izetbegovic. Abdic, in fact, made a fast move because he knows that peace is coming and that the period of power consolidating will follow. And for Muslim Bosnia this will be Izetbegovic's power. Fikret Abdic, who holds authority over his region has found himself pressed for time. When the peace agreement is signed and power is consolidated it will be too late for him. In the excitement over the rejection of the plan, some important changes in the field have remained unnoticed. The British press has, however, noted them: the London ``Independent'' quotes Stjepan Siber, the deputy commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as saying that the Serbs no longer prevent Muslims from sending troops from Sarajevo to help their brothers in the fight for Mostar, and ``The Guardian'' writes that the same was said by Bosnian Serb Republic Vice-President Nikola Koljevic. The Serbs would certainly prefer Mostar to fall into Muslim hands than to remain in those of the Croats. The loss of Mostar makes the Muslims the heaviest losers in this war. Recovering this loss would change a lot of things. On the other hand, such a Serbian-Muslim arrangement, if it exists, prolongs the war and thus disrupts Slobodan Milosevic's plans.