The Taming Of The Radicals

``What do you think, what are my chances?,'' asked Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj, talking to journalists. Seselj's later claim that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic ``had not been informed of the contents of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) announcement,'' were described as ``pathetic'' by an opposition party leader. The main question after the eventwhy it all happenedhas remained unanswered to this very day. Various possibilities are being mentioned: according to the first, Seselj was promised to the international community, as one of the war criminals whose ``delivery'' would help the lifting of sanctions. ``It's a possibility,'' said Seselj, adding: ``Any court that tries me will be a mockery. Politically speaking, it would even suit me in the long run.'' According to another version Seselj has simply gone too far. Not by attacking Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, but top players such as Serbian police eminence grise Radmilo Bogdanovic (Democratic Party leader Dragoljub Micunovic's old claim: ``After you pass Bogdanovic you get to Milosevic himself''), and Serbian Television chief Milorad Vucelic.

Other reasons being mentioned are Bosnia and the Republic of Serb Krajina. Deputy director of the Federal Statistical Bureau Srdjan Bogosavljevic recalls that all surveys conducted recently show that Seselj's popularity ratings are growing fast and that whenever Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's name crops up in a survey in Serbia, he always comes out on top. In other words, if the wished-for unification of the Serb lands were to take place, Milosevic could find himself toppled by a Seselj-Karadzic coalition.

On the other hand, it seems that Seselj also believes that he is suffering because of his strength and links with the other Serb states. He is convinced that it all started after the putsch in Banja Luka, and accuses the SPS of having sold out on Knin, Lika and Western Slavonija (``in return they are getting Eastern Slavonija and Baranja''), and claims that he is in the way of such transactions.

Even though this idea, just like the others, makes sense, it is also true that neither Karadzic, nor any of Seselj's ``kindred spirits'' in the Serb Republic in B-H and the Republic of Serb Krajina did not lift a finger to help him. Those who follow developments here say: ``They know over there who is the boss over here.'' This diminishes Seselj's chances in a showdown with Milosevic.

One of the possible reasons for the conflict lies in Seselj's increasing strength in Serbia. According to as yet unpublished public opinion polls by the MF agency, since December last year, Seselj has managed to ``steal'' a third of the voters who have decided in the meantime, that they will not vote for the SPS (the other two-thirds of the SPS deserters either won't vote, or will be undecided). Surveys also show that Radicalism is gaining in popularity here, so that speculations about stopping Seselj on time, are logical.

The last of the variants being mentioned these days, also has to do with trading. Brieflyas a favor to the Montenegrin leadership Milosevic is getting rid of Seselj, and in return the Montenegrins will stop making problems over the drafting of the new Federal Constitution and let Milosevic be as strong a President of Yugoslavia as he is Serbian President. In other words, omnipotent.

To all the variants we have considered so far, we should add Micunovic's brief comment: ``They just don't need him anymore,'' and the view of some opposition members who consider the whole issue ``a fight over the spoils.'' And that sums up the reasons for the conflict. The consequences are more important and more difficult.

``I expect anything,'' said Seselj, talking to VREME. He wished to leave the impression of a man who is sure of himself, ``and why not, I never make wrong moves.'' Seselj hopes that the Socialists will not do all they intend to, because ``winter is coming'' and because ``time is on his side.'' He is convinced that Sainovic will survive the attack, because ``we won't have enough votes,'' but that he will fall soon after. Seselj believes that the Socialists will go for a coalition government, (a government of experts), with the Democrats and a part, or the whole of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO).

``We will ask for a secret ballot,'' said Seselj. Micunovic believes that the Socialists don't want a ``secret'' vote of confidence in the government. Seselj does not believe in the possibility of elections being called. There are many who think that with a settling down of the situation in Bosnia, and the alleviating of sanctions, the chances of the Socialists winning the elections and of finally consolidating their power, would be foolproof.

Seselj disagrees, and says that peace and the alleviating of sanctions will not happen in the near future. This is where his hopes lie, because Serbia would then be heading for a situation which can only be described as ``unbearable,'' forcing the Socialists to call elections, and that's where Seselj, with his increased popularity would be waiting for them.

The majority do not believe in this theory. Micunovic thinks that there won't be any elections (he agrees with Seselj's claim that the Socialists don't want them right now). Srdjan Bogosavljevic says that the Socialists can call elections whenever they wish, they aren't threatened by them. ``As a rule, Milosevic's rating always drops a month ahead of elections. This is followed by the kind of campaign nobody else can dream about. One week of TV campaigning, and that's it.''

Young SPS members are canvassing these days and telling the people what Seselj has done wrong (SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic cut short his vacation in order to deal with the Seselj case). For the moment they are not talking about elections or a new government (SPS or a coalition).

Seselj, however, is most concerned over the possibility of the introduction of a state of emergency. He has been worried by such an option since Banja Luka (many believe that Seselj lost his nerve then and made some wrong moves), and that is why he keeps harping on the topic. (When VREME's journalists talked to him, he was checking in the Constitution on who can proclaim a state of emergency). The other opposition members do not believe that the Socialists have need for such a serious move, but they have no doubts that Milosevic will go to the end in the case of Seselj, ``even arresting him,'' says one of them. He goes on to mention one of the possible scenarios concerning the future of the SRS and its leader. ``To clean up the state and political structures of Radicals, to keep them down in Krajina and Bosnia, to challenge them via television and finally to disarm them. Disarming could result in incidents, which would naturally be followed with arrests.''

That Seselj is fully aware of all this, is indicated by the fact that after a few brave and fighting statements at the beginning, he started toning down, saying that there must not be any ``incidents'' or anything like that.

On the other hand, the surprise appearance of the state television team at the Hungarian border crossing at the precise moment when Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) leader Vuk Draskovic arrived, shows that the Socialists need a helping hand right now, above all, in preserving Sainovic's government from falling, even though the motives are not clear to anybody.

Flirting with Draskovic is unnecessary because he said publicly that he wouldn't take part in a ``marital squabble.'' The Democrats could join him in this, at least over the vote of confidence in the government. When asked ``Will you vote against Sainovic?'' the Democrats answer ``probably.'' They are, however, also negotiating with Draskovic over all opposition parties adopting a single stand in the matter.

The reason is quite logical. If, by attacking Seselj, the opposition were to succeed in squeezing out of Milosevic a part of what Seselj got by attacking the opposition, they would achieve somethingthey would manage to strengthen their position and to weaken Milosevic.

The whole set up is spoilt by Seselj, who in the end seems to be getting away with what looks like a beating. A Democratic party member said out loud what is bothering the opposition: ``How can we manage it all without being taken advantage of, and without strengthening Milosevic?'' Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica is not thinking about this, nor is Draskovic, who said magnanimously that he would not join in the persecution of Seselj (but then again he might, if he reaches an agreement with the Democrats). Kostunica remains firm in his decision to vote against Sainovic, and in rejecting all links with the Radicals.