"Unprofor Go Home''

It has been clear for some time, having in mind the dissatisfaction voiced by different Croatian political leaders in the state media regarding the inefficiency of UNPROFOR, that the next mandate of the peace-keeping forces will not be as easily prolonged as the previous one. It has been obvious for some time that such a mandate was untenable from the Croatian point of view, starting with the announcement by Vladimir Seks, the head of the State commission for relations with the UNPROFOR, that the extension of the mandate would be conditional to three elements (a global cease-fire, the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions and the separation of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia), and the endorsment of these conditions by a simple majority in the Croatian Parliament (otherwise, a two thirds majority is required by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia for the ratification of international treaties).

In the meantime, protest rallies against the peace-keeping forces were organized in Zagreb and Osijek and support was given to the Government, Parliament and President of the Croatian State. Refugees form Vukovar, Slunj, Baranja and other places in UNPA regions were finally given a chance by the state to state their demands for returning home. Those familiar with Croatian affairs, believe that public opinion has slipped President Tudjman's control, thanks to a difficult economic situation and war weariness. Instead of being able to form it, as before, public opinion now forces Tudjman's moves concerning UNPROFOR. This is significant, since the peace-keeping forces cannot claim that they have fulfilled a single task for which they had been sent: traffic communications have not been reopened, instead of demilitarization, there are more weapons than ever in the areas they patrol, and not a single refugee has returned homeon the contrary, new ones have arrived.

Speaking at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, Tudjman emphasized that ``after all that has happened, there are no just and clear-cut solutions in Bosnia and Hezegovina.'' This statement shows Zagreb's fears that the international community might, sooner or later, come to the conclusion to resolve the conflict in Croatia in a similar way, and against its better judgement. Fear of a repetition of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian pattern, i.e., the drawing up of borders by force and internal political turmoil, have forced Zagreb to adopt a neck or nothing stand. The fact that Croatia is capable of turning a deaf ear to the international community's peace-making efforts, regardless of the consequences, should act as a reminder to the world that the war in the former Yugoslavia has more than one master, and that nothing will be gained if, in the search for peace, concessions are made only East of the Drina River.

It is evident that Croatia insists on the implementation of three UN Security Council resolutions: no. 743 (demobilization and demilitarization of Krajina), no. 815 (Krajina as an integral part of Croatia) and no. 769 (control of the borders of Krajina with the Serb Republic in Bosnia and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). All this is very difficult after the offensives of the Croatian Army on January 22 (Maslenica) and on September 6 and 9 (Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk). The Serbs in Krajina, suspicous of official Zagreb and unwilling to make concessions, have become intrasigent. They believe that the introduction of Croatian authority will inevitably result in the same fate as that of eleven villages at the foothills of Velebit mountain. French general Jean Cot said that he did not find any living thing when he entered them. The leaders from Knin were thus given the opportunity of declaring resolutely that they would not agree to any change in the mandate of the peace-keeping forces.

As things stand now, Croatia's threat to demand the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR has proved to be one more example of fishing in muddy waters. On returning to Zagreb, Tudjman declared that Croatia's views had been partly accepted by the UN. The key of his statement was the demand to link economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the situation in Krajina, in the hope that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic would thus acquire a strong argument for pressuring Knin. In the meantime, the media campaign against UNPROFOR subsided. It seems that Tudjman was forced to make concessions in New York, namely, to agree to a more or less unchanged mandate of UNPROFOR, in exchange for the promise that the UN would pass a resolution confirming all the earlier ones.

In the meantime, Krajina's status will continue to be dealt with as it has been so far: Zagreb and Knin will continue as before. In all this, UNPROFOR's role is of marginal importance.