What's Love Got to Do with It?

Seselj's time was then measured in days, even moments. An opposition leader said at the time: ``Seselj is just balloon blown up by RTV Serbia and he'll be deflated when Milosevic approaches him with a lighter.'' Seselj has, in the meantime, practically disappeared from the screen, if we discount live sessions from Parliament, but his balloon hasn't deflated. On the contrary. It proved that he was a much more serious player than the opposition thought (to their detriment), and that only Milosevic was aware of this fact, and was waiting for an opportunity to trip him up.

After a period of hyper-patriotism, Serbia has walked into Radicalism, xenophobia and intolerancethe direction taken by Seselj with the help of the Socialists. According to some surveys, as much as 40% of the population is latently Radical. Faced with such a situation, Milosevic was forced to cut short the rise of the Radicals and their leader, and stop the increasing spill-over of SPS members to the SRS. Democratic Party (DS) top official Zoran Djindjic does not think that Seselj is being serious, and believes that he entered the fray against Serbian PM Nikola Sainovic's government knowing that nothing would happen because the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) would be opposed; and that is how he swallowed the baitMilosevic had been waiting for him for some time. It seems that in this case stubbornness and the logicI made you, I'll break you, motivated Milosevic.

First reactions to the Socialist-Radical conflict have offered numerous explanations on why Seselj, who proved himself to be so patient, decided on such an incautious move. Perhaps he was encouraged by the results of two recent public opinion polls, which say that all he need do is wait five-six months before taking over from Milosevic. Both surveys show that Seselj's influence and power and that of the SRS are growing all the time, while Milosevic is where he was before, or is progressing slowly, while the SPS is showing a downward trend, and that in spring, the SRS could have a much greater number of followers. According to one survey, the SPS currently enjoy the confidence of 23.7% adult citizens in Serbia, and the Radicals 17.5%. According to another, the SPS have 28.1% of the voters on their side, and the SRS only 11.4%. Trends in both surveys show that it would take only a few months for the two parties to change places.

Even without these indicators showing the Radicals' rise in popularity, a conflict was probably imminent because much had piled up in a short period of time.

The SPS-SRS ``delicate relationship'' started immediately after the first multi-party elections in Serbia in December 1990 and lasted until last week. Just before that, in the summer and autumn of 1990, Seselj had often walked the streets of Belgrade with a group of bearded young men wearing caps and the Serbian four S sign, waving black flags with a skull and the words ``Freedom or Death'' on them. The media controlled by Milosevic described him at the time as a ``deranged person,'' ``an extremist and chauvinist.'' Before the 1990 December election, Milosevic had Seselj locked up in the jail in Padinska Skela. There are some who claim that on leaving jail, Seselj vowed: ``The next prisoner will be Slobodan Milosevic.'' Very soon after this Seselj, who was leader of the Chetnik movement at the time, started a ``delicate relationship'' strategy with the SPS, and until recently chose his words carefully when speaking of Milosevic. In return Milosevic became more considerate towards Seselj, and with the start of the war, less alergic to Chetnik ideology. Surveys conducted by the Belgrade Institute of Political Studies show that from that moment, i.e., with the start of the war in Croatia, Milosevic and Seselj were in absolute harmony as far as the political public was concerned. Whenever Milosevic's popularity among the masses rose, so did Seselj's.

In March 1992 Milosevic uttered the famous sentence which inflated ``Seselj's balloon,'' when he said: ``I hold Seselj in esteem most because his party is the only one not receiving aid from abroad, and because he is independent in expressing his political views. He does not waver like some of his colleagues among the opposition, who say one thing today and another tomorrow.''

That was the time when Voivoda Seselj showed his revolver on TV, made threats, confirmed that he had his channels for acquiring arms, explained the destructive power of ``Thompson'' machine guns and how ``eyes popped out,'' urged for the retortion of Croats in Vojvodina, etc. Milosevic summed up all his activities with a broad compliment about being ``consistent,'' disclosing, at the same time, the dogmatic side of his own character. He was bothered by the fact that some opposition leaders changed their views, even if they did so for the better. Later, when Seselj became the leader of the biggest opposition party, he and Milosevic met ``approximately once a month'' in order to exchange views. This functioned very well in parliament later on, especially when they attacked former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic and former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic.

The Socialist's metamorphosis in their treatment of Seselj can best be seen through what Serbian police eminence grise Radmilo Bogdanovic said about Seselj. In spring 1991, Bogdanovic told the Zagreb weekly ``Danas'' that Seselj was under control. ``The Voivoda can only rant and make empty threats.'' Another statement made during the same period: ``I keep fighting with Seselj and arresting him. Whenever we can, we file a complaint against Seselj...'' Two years later, a journalists working for the weekly NIN asked Bogdanovic to explain how Seselj had become a SPS coalition partner and de facto take part in authority in such a short period of time. Bogdanovic said that ``relations were changing with an unusual speed,'' and added:

``As far as a coalition partnership is concerned, I must correct you, and I speak for myself. Seselj is not our coalition partner. It remains to be seen who will profit from all this. We have the biggest number of deputies in the Serbian Parliament, but we don't have a majority. Therefore, the decision will always depend on whoever decides at a certain moment that they can accept our proposal. Many underestimate Seselj and the Radical Party. He is not as tame as he looks, and he is not all that acceptable as a long-term partner. He has his program and can be very unpleasant over cooperation on something that is not to his liking or that of his party.''

From the very beginning the ``love'' relationship between the Socialists and the Radicals has been worrisome to many in the SPS leadership. Nebojsa Covic, who had been a stronger contender than Nikola Sainovic for the post of Serbian Prime Minister, lost the race because of his obvious coldness towards the Radicals before and after the elections, when this was not the right attitude to take. Many were not happy to see the Socialists quiet while Seselj was gathering points among the increasing number of those frustrated by those responsible for the economic hopelessness. Seselj took every opportunity of underlining that his program did not have anything in common with the Socialists, only patriotic interests. He repeated insistently that he had saved the current authorities on several occasions, starting with March 9, 1992 when he claimed that his party had ``tipped the scales which had led to a stabilization of internal affairs.'' Seselj explained in a similar manner SRS results at the last election: ``Last year, when a U.S. spy was infiltrated amongst us (Milan Panic), the SRS's contribution in preventing this man from taking over power was greatest.''

Seselj promised Milosevic similar help for as long as he ``protected Serbia's national interests.'' He expressed doubts about Milosevic publicly only in May this year when Milosevic agreed to the Vance-Owen plan. ``He made a big political mistake,'' said Seselj at the time. ``I'm in a dilemma as to whether to attack him personally, and force him into making an even bigger mistake. I'm trying to understand his position, because he was threatened and blackmailed into making this move. He wasn't blackmailed personally, but his people. I don't feel triumphal: he succumbed, I have remained. A crack has been made in the patriotic bloc. Apart from patriotism, we don't have anything in common with the Socialists...''

After all that has happened in the last few days, it could easily happen that Milosevic's and Seselj's popularity ratings go their separate ways. TV Belgrade has started working on this. Telegrams of support to Milosevic and the SPS have started arriving, accusing Seselj of ``primitive chauvinism,'' and we can expect other reactions. Milosevic has suddenly become allergic to someone, whom until yesterday, he seemed to like. The conflict had become inevitable because it was obvious that the end of the war was close, and with it times in which it is necessary to stop with evil, and show the world a peace-loving face and clean hands. Members of the self-proclaimed patriotic bloc have remained alone, with the growing misery and hunger, without a surplus of values, but with a surplus of nationalism. The time has come to pay the bill. Their fear of each other is suddenly greater than their love.