Interpretations Of The Resolution

Those who read and compared two statements made by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in the space of two days, and on the occasion of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 871, must have remembered the old Russian joke which makes fun of journalistic lack of seriousness and superficiality. In the joke, a Russian newspaper carried the information that a certain Nikolai Nikolayevitch from Moscow had won first prize at the lottery--the latest model of the ``Volga'' car. The very next day the paper carried a denial--the man was called Sergei Nikolayevitch, and lived in Petrovgrad, not Moscow. He hadn't won the car in a lottery, but had been knocked down while crossing a street. The car wasn't a ``Volga'' but a ``Lada.''

In his reaction to Resolution 871 in New York, Jovanovic practically surpassed the superficiality and frivolity of the Russian paper and its denial. After the vote by the UN Security Council, Jovanovic told Tanjug News Agency correspondent that by ``adopting the resolution which prolonged UNPROFOR's mandate on Croatia's terms in Krajina and Croatia, the UN had decreased chances for peace.'' In the same statement he mentioned ``additional conditions for the lifting of sanctions,'' which only served to push us further away from the possibility of resolving the Yugoslav crisis through political means.

After sleeping on the UN decision, and probably having received instructions from Belgrade to ``change the tune,'' (there was talk behind the scenes at the UN, that the link between the lifting of sanctions and the situation in Krajina was not all that strong), Jovanovic gave a new interview, this time to Radio Belgrade. In this interview everything was different. The only thing in which Jovanovic's first and second interviews agreed, was the number of the resolution in question, and that it was all happening in New York. ``The UN resolution has not fulfilled Croatia's expectations,'' said Jovanovic, underscoring that ``little had remained of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's ultimatums in the final text of the resolution.'' In his later explanation Jovanovic says that sanctions are not mentioned by name, nor does any part ``refer to them specifically.''

However, Jovanovic's second interview came too late for many. Before announcing his final view on the resolution, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) media machine had already gone full speed ahead--describing a new planetary conspiracy against the Serbs. Some commentaries called Security Council members: ``East River warmongers, who were fanning the fires of war'' and ``using the rumble of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's tanks'' to enforce Tudjman's war ultimatum. SPS top official Borisav Jovic (President of the Committee for Foreign Policy and Economic Relations with the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Citizens) went fartherest in his accusations of the international community when he claimed during talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Belgrade, that the resolution was the result of an international conspiracy against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that it was inspired by the great powers. Without batting an eyelid, Jovic informed the Ambassador of a country, which, as a member of the Security Council had voted for Resolution 871, of his stupendous discovery. He underlined that Yugoslavia held in high esteem China's stands in international politics, ``especially those concerning the resolving of the crisis in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which are identical to Yugoslavia's.'' (!)

After the first reading, the Security Council resolution was assessed in a similar way, although with more nuances, by practically the whole of the Serbian opposition. Rare comments said that the latest resolution had brought things back to the beginning, that is, to the root of the Yugoslav drama--the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats. Without the solving of this problem there can be no peace, and no lifting of sanctions. Cynics might ask how many dead people were necessary for a full circle to be made, in order to get back to the beginning.

Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj said, with regard to the matter, that Western forces continued playing games with the fate of the Serbian people and that they intended to force the Serb Krajina into becoming a part of Croatia. Seselj took the opportunity of underlining that Serbia faced new challenges, while the ``regime in Belgrade had been conducting an erroneous foreign policy for years.'' In its official statement the Democratic Party (DS) cautioned that the resolution did not bring peace, but encouraged Croatia's bellicose illusions.

Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica said that the resolution meant additional pressure against the Republic of Serb Krajina and Yugoslavia. ``Let's not forget that neither under Vance's plan and factually even less, is Krajina a part of Croatia. That is why any attempt by the Croatian forces at ``returning'' it to Croatia would only result in new and greater clashes, that is, a new war.'' Yugoslav Foreign Minister Jovanovic's second statement that there is no mention of sanctions in the resolution was described by Kostunica as ``infantile.'' It is interesting that only one day before Kostunica made these remarks at a press conference, DSS vice-president Radoslav Stojanovic, talking to the Belgrade daily ``Borba'' on Vance's plan for Krajina, said something entirely different: ``I still don't understand why all the surprise today over this resolution. It was adopted by the Security Council because under Vance's plan which was signed nearly two years ago by President Milosevic, Krajina goes to Croatia,'' said Stojanovic. Kostunica and Stojanovic will probably harmonize their stands on the Vance plan, which, since its adoption (January 1992), has always been interpreted rather arbitrarily, and with a lot of ``wishful thinking'' by both Belgrade and Zagreb. It was often forgotten in Belgrade that the Vance plan does not deny that the ``pink zones'' and all the controversial territories are part of Croatia.

This time the reactions to the resolution differed greatly in Knin and Zagreb. In its official statement the Knin government mentioned a scenario made by world power brokers and assessed that the road taken by the Security Council led to a continuation of the war, while Republic of Serb Krajina President Goran Hadzic claims that total war has never been closer. The resolution has come at a time when the politically charged atmosphere in Krajina has been heightened with stories, that in the final outcome, this territory would be sacrificed. Republic of Serb Krajina Assembly President Momcilo Krajisnik said on Radio Knin that these stories were just a lot of hot air. An attack on the Republic of Serb Krajina would be tantamount to an attack against the Serb Republic in B-H, and in that case Yugoslavia would have to react, said Krajisnik.

In the meantime, Zagreb spoke only of the ``great victory'' won by Croatian foreign policy, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman underscored that all his demands had been met. In the general euphoria, Tudjman's statements made in January 1992, at the time of the adoption of the Vance-Owen plan were forgotten. At the time Tudjman had said that ``Knin must fall,'' and on being asked how long it would take Croatia to return its sovereignty over Krajina, he would answer: ``It's a matter of days and weeks.''

The initial disappointment with which the resolution had been received in Belgrade, forced the Russian Foreign Ministry to say that the Yugoslav side should not take Resolution 871 too dramatically and tragically. In an official statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, and a verbal message carried by Russian Ambassador to Belgrade Gennady Shikin, it is underscored that the Security Council adopted all Russian criticism concerning the text of the resolution, and that the question of sanctions against Yugoslavia was not conditional to the implementation of the Vance plan. It is hard to say if Belgrade felt any better after this, but the next day the Federal government issued a positive assessment on the UN Security Council's decision to prolong UNPROFOR's mandate for another six months. ``The decision confirms the principles of Vance's plan aimed at resolving the conflict between Croatia and the Republic of Serb Krajina, which, Yugoslavia, along with the top representatives of the international community accepted right from the start of the crisis,'' said the Federal government's statement.

Ljubivoje Acimovic a leading Yugoslav expert on international law was asked by VREME to comment Resolution 871 and say if it was really possible interpret the resolution ``as it suited those involved.'' Acimovic said that with its latest statement on the resolution, the Yugoslav government had finally acted wisely. ``So far they have always insisted stupidly and crudely on the fact that the whole world is against us, and that they want to harm the Serbs at any price, which was extremely unproductive,'' said Acimovic. ``Tones to this effect could be heard at the beginning, from both the authorities and the opposition. To put it mildly, the reactions were hasty and rash. Sometimes these reactions are based on ignorance and superficiality, but often it is a matter of inertia and the habit of interpreting everything with the world's hatred of Serbs.'' Acimovic views the text of the resolution as the UN's attempt at supporting UNPROFOR's mission. The final outcome of this zeal is for the mission to yield some results. The main motive is the salvaging of Vance's plan and not a wish to spite the Serbs. The text is the result of many compromises, said Acimovic. As a rule, such texts remain, by and large vague and ambivalent, since they are trying to satisfy various stands and interests. That is why certain parts can be interpreted differently. The majority of the points in the resolution are not controversial, claims Acimovic. The text condemns the prolongation of military attacks (which according to experiences so far, could only refer to Croatian ones). Yugoslavia's cooperation is sought in the implementation of the Vance plan (which was never a controversial issue here), the resolution insists on a ceasefire (this is also urged by official Yugoslav policy), it demands cooperation with UNPROFOR (not controversial either), and insists on giving UN troops competencies allowing them to use force (this has often been sought by the Serbian side).

``The majority of the points in the resolution are absolutely positive for us,'' said Acimovic, ``and there is no reason to fear something we ourselves have sought.''

Acimovic cautions that the decrees which foresee the demilitarization of the ``pink zones'' and the setting up of local Croatian authority in these spaces are no novelty. All this is written down in Vance's plan, and those who signed it know this very well. Resolution 871 only reminds of these obligations. What happened in the meantime is another thing. ``All in,'' said Acimovic, ``the resolution is not against the Serbs and Yugoslavia. The main thing now is to insist on what is positive for us and to try and move things out of a stalemate, and reach a final solution in the next six months.''