Milosevic Flushes Seselj Out

The formal reason for the clash between the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by Vojislav Seselj, is the SRS demand for a vote of confidence in Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic's government, a government nobody really cares about. The fall of a Socialist government in Belgrade is not without precedent, since, thanks to the will of the powers that be, the government led by Dragutin Zelenovic fell, even though the Socialists had a majority at the time. After the elections the Socialists were relatively safe because the Radicals upheld their every move. Now they can't choose their government, but this is not such an insurmountable problem. On the contrary, this could allow the President of the Republic to dissolve a parliament whose reputation has been besmirched by the SPS-SRS coalition. Why was such a merciless campaign launched against a former ally? The Socialists accuse Seselj of war profiteering and war crimes. Before they used to proclaim the very mention of war crimes, a treachery. Some believe that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is sacrificing his ``Red Voivoda,'' in order to improve his position at international peace negotiations. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has distanced himself unequivocally from ultra-right Croatian Party of Rights leader Dobrosav Paraga. Socialist parliamentary group leader Zoran Arandjelkovic criticized Seselj's formations, saying that their image had helped create a negative impression of Serbia in the media. The Socialists took the opportunity of condemning chauvinism, of advertising national tolerance, and of trying to prove that they, contrary to Seselj, wished to negotiate with the world.

Influential SPS deputy and Serbian police eminence grise Radmilo Bogdanovic said in an interview to the independent TV Studio B that one of the main reasons for the break with Seselj lay in the fact that Seselj had accused the Socialists and Bogdanovic personally, of masterminding the rebellion in Banja Luka dubbed ``September 93'' which was staged against war profiteers.

Serbian PM Nikola Sainovic said that the Radicals' demand for a vote of confidence wasn't just a criticism of the government, but of its foreign policy and the negotiations being conducted by Milosevic. Sainovic accused Seselj of spreading stories across the Drina River, to the effect that Milosevic had ``sold out on the Serbs.'' SPS official Radovan Pankov was being ironical when he said that ``The Serbian lands are where the Serbian Radicals can be found;'' SRS parliamentary group leader Tomislav Nikolic replied, that ``where the SRS was to be found'' there was no SPS, even though they had tried to set up a party network in Bosnia.

Tomislav Nikolic criticized the Socialists, saying that they had forgotten their election promises, that they had accepted the Vance-Owen plan, that they were blackmailing the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership and Assembly, that they had written letters to the people of Krajina in the night, gone to Pale (political center of Serb Republic in B-H) during the night, and attacked the Radicals during the night. The cards are now in the open. The majority of these events, forced moves aimed at bringing the war to an end, did not take place in Sainovic's, but in Milosevic's cabinet.

Seselj never attacked Milosevic directly in Serbia when he started criticizing the Socialists, and he distanced himself from Milosevic's Geneva negotiations. The Socialists led the Radicals on, so they would continue with criticism (Nikolic: ``It is expected that you will sign all ceasefires...'') in order to unmask the SRS more easily as a warmongering party.

Milosevic, who is a past master of power battles, realized on time that Seselj was showing greater ambitions than he (Milosevic) was prepared to tolerate and that there was foul play afoot in Bosnia, so he waited for an opportunity to break Seselj. This is confirmed by the fact that the Socialists now criticize Seselj of showing open ambitions in trying to establish a base in the Army, of flirting with the police and some military circles with the aim of introducing a dictatorship. Pankov says that Seselj had praised the President and fed on his popularity, ascribing to himself Milosevic's decisions: ``Seselj doesn't like a general, and the general must fall.''

The way things stand right now, the Radicals will have a difficult time in toppling the government, and there is little reason to believe that their leader will succeed in getting the better of Milosevic.

Fearful of giving Milosevic an opportunity to intervene, as could be discerned from the Socialists' statement, Seselj ordered his party members to practice restraint, and has often repeated that his party will use parliamentary means in their struggle for power. Following Seselj's systematic destruction of parliamentary authority this sounds cynical, to say the least. In his attempt at softening up Milosevic, Tomislav Nikolic said that the Radicals would once again save the Socialist's bacon, and that the ``other opposition'' would ``withdraw its support and instigate disturbances.'' He went on to say: ``In that case we will help prevent a conflict between Serbs, but after that we will not wish to talk with you, or them.''

The Radicals wished to gain points by attacking a government which all are criticizing, and make it look like they were doing the Socialists a favor. Nikolic tried to steal the theme from under the opposition's nose, by describing very precisely the misery, the destruction of the economy, criminal activities in the economy etc. He listed all the criticism of the government made by the opposition so far. The government was exhorted to ``start rescuing the inhabitants of Serbia from the threat of hunger on an Ethiopian scale.'' Ivan Kovacevic (SPO) believes that the Radicals have decided to attack because their ratings have dropped thanks to a two-months-long coalition with the SPS, during which the crisis culminated. Kovacevic believes that the SPS has reached the conclusion that its links with Seselj are affecting its ratings, too. This is quite probable. Seselj based many political campaigns on gossip on whom the Socialists were going to dismiss, and then kicked up a fuss.

In calling for the government's dismissal, Nikolic cautioned the Socialists to beware ``of those bringing gifts,'' alluding to the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), even calling for the demonization of the SPO. He practically begged those present: ``You who tried to topple authority in the streets must take this democratic parliamentary opportunity of toppling this authority which you don't like.''

At the start of the campaign the SPO decided not to join Seselj's initiative in toppling the government, saying that the SPO wasn't going to get involved in a ``marital squabble'' and that the one asking for the dismissal of the present government, could only make up a worse one, and that therefore, the SPO would not act as a go-between the two, and that the scab of Fascism must be removed from the Serbia's face. In Valjevo, his first public appearance after being arrested, SPO leader Vuk Draskovic proposed that Milosevic call all party leaders together and propose a transitional democratic and expert government of unity which would be headed by an opposition figure, a government in which the majority of ministers would come from the democratic opposition, but which could also include Socialists. Seselj's votes however, would not be taken into account because of Serbia's honor. Leader of the SPO parliamentary group Milan Mikovic later explained the SPO's stand on why Nikola Sainovic's government must fall and why it must answer for the situation in the country. He added that SPO deputies and those of the New Democracy would not vote against the government. ``In democratic societies, a government such as this would have resigned long ago, or it wouldn't have been chosen in the first place. Legislative authority in this country has been in the hands of two parties, and we express our stand with regard to the two ruling parties, equally responsible for the political chaos and moral hopelessness.'' It is true, said Mikovic, that Seselj's party proved to be a warmongering one, but it is also true that the SPS proclaimed him a patriot. It is true that Seselj's party has paramilitary units, but they were formed in front of the SPS-sponsored TV cameras. He recalled that December 31, the deadline for the coordinating of the law with the Constitution of Yugoslavia, could result in a constitutional crisis. That is why he invited Milosevic to call all parliamentary parties together, to set up a transitional government. After this, Aleksandra Jankovic reiterated the SPO and the New Democracy's stand that they would not let Seselj and his Fascist party lead them by the nose and repeated the proposal for the forming of a transitional government. With these moves the SPO seems to have traded its passive and inferior position, one which could have irritated those opposed to the regime, for an interesting political initiative.

Along with criticism of the SPO, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Democratic Party (DS) will vote against the government. They favor an interim government, but not immediately.

DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica recalled that four months ago there had also been reason for calling a vote of confidence in the government because of the hunger, misery and poverty which were endangering the dignity and the survival of the people. Responsibility for this situation cannot be ascribed to sanctions only, but above all to the authorities, which are directly responsible for hyperinflation, which has been profitable only for those in power, those speculating with money and criminals. It has all ended in a general disaster, and the authorities are pretending that nothing has happened. There is no reason for this government to continue in office because its irresponsible policy has imperilled the survival of the entire nation. ``This government cannot do anything, it's impossible to go on with it.'' Kostunica believes that a vote of no confidence in the government is the first step for the necessary political changes in Serbia, and that responsibility will lie with those who try to save the government.

The Democrats have trodden warily, not wishing to increase Seselj's popularity for toppling ``the last Socialist government''--by laying the bill at Sainovic's door. The greater part of the opposition have approached the issue in a more relaxed fashion, since Draskovic has taken on the burden of distancing Serbia from Fascism, leaving Sainovic's government sitting pretty for the moment. Some estimate that the Radicals' demagogy will fade fast and that Milosevic needs less than a month in which to deflate Seselj's balloon. In a situation in which they are not capable of forcing more serious changes, leaving an unpopular government in power, need not be the worst thing in the world, because the question of its survival will continue to linger on. There is not much that another government could do right now, and the elections which seem to be before us, would be conducted in a less chauvinistic atmosphere.

Even if SPO deputies were to disregard their party's recommendations, and if sufficient votes were to be collected for passing a vote of no confidence in the government, it could continue in power, until the time became ripe for a transitional government. Consultations on this matter with parties of the center have not yet shown visible results. The recent, anti-Fascist verbosity of the SPS could open up space for the opposition, in the event that the Socialists continue putting down chauvinism in Serbia. Seselj cashed in on the SPS slogan: ``Serbia will not bow down.'' This could create a chance for the setting up of circumstances which would allow for a more normal political life. However, after all that has been said and done, many consider this cynical. Nonetheless, the Socialists' change of vocabulary could have long-term beneficial results for democracy in Serbia, burdened as it is now with warmongering and xenophobia.

Frustrated by continual defeats, the Serbian opposition will find it difficult to realize the idea of a transitional government even if Milosevic agrees, not so much because of the embarrassment of crossing the red line (this is just a transitional government which will prepare for elections), but because the opposition, such as it is, might now find it difficult to agree over the composition of such a government. Without the police and without finances, such a government would face insurmountable social difficulties, and if it were to show any ambitions, the fate of former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic, would await it. If the opposition wishes to defend the democratic option, it must negotiate with Milosevic, and squeeze guarantees out of him--but without pressing him too much, so that he won't introduce a state of emergency. The galloping crisis does not favor such a protracted strategy. The way things stand now, the Socialists could avoid committing themselves for some time, and continue to rule with a minority government, avoiding the adoption of laws, or forcing their adoption with constitutional deadlines. There is a lot of leeway in the government's decrees.

During the adopting of the agenda, ahead of the debate on a vote of confidence in the government, the votes of the Socialists and the Radicals, showed the Socialists what it was like to be in a minority, something they obviously don't like. It was agreed that Seselj's proposal for the annulling of the law of an obligatory TV tax for electricity consumption would be debated. It will be interesting to see what the Socialists will do in order to ensure that such a law might not be passed. They have a number of possibilities: to dilute the law with amendments; Milosevic can refuse to sign it with the explanation that television is not just a political but a public institution in which expert non-party figures should sit; and means can be found for challenging the law through the Constitutional Court... Even though he uses social demagogy in his appearances, Seselj does not have the strength to oppose Milosevic. Even if he were to transfer a part of his strength from Bosnia, this would only serve to make the clash fiercer, and the introduction of a state of emergency more imminent.

It may sound paradoxical, but the most favorable option for Milosevic would be a Parliamentary crisis or a serious blocking of the parliament's work, after which he could dissolve parliament and call elections, which he would probably win again, since the democratic opposition is still licking it wounds after last year's defeat. Seselj wouldn't be promoted as he was at the last election, nor will the winds of war be blowing in his back this time, as was the case in December 1992. The public is tired of the war. The situation remains fluid, with time as the most important factor.