The Taste Of Pride

On Wednesday evening (October 20), we learned from the revamped TV news program that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was sure that not many citizens could be found in the whole of Serbia who would approve the current state of affairs. The ``current state of affairs'' referred to the scandalous behavior of the deputies in the Assembly, or ``last week's circus,'' as leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) group of deputies in the Federal Assembly Nedeljko Sipovac put it, and not the results of a criminally bad policy.

When Serbian PM Nikola Sainovic, during a debate on confidence in the government, dares call on ``state interests'' and ``high patriotic ideals,'' this hypocrisy only serves to illustrate the well known fact that the Socialists place their authority above all other interests. The laughing stock calling itself an Assembly, cannot be held solely responsible for ``spreading despair among the people and doubts that a way out of difficulties will be found.'' It is more likely that the despair and doubts are the result of a society riddled with crime; the fact that the Minister of Police continues in office; that there is a general shortage of everything; that chaos and hyperinflation reign; that the VicePrime Minister under whose government all this has been happening is being proposed as the new National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ) Governor. The first victim of the new balance of forces, following the disintegration of the RadicalSocialist coalition, was Serbian VicePrime Minister Dragoslav Jovanovic who failed to be elected NBJ Governor (57 for and 64 against) in the Federal Assembly. This happened an hour before Milosevic announced that ``certain political parties and their representatives were blocking the process of decisionmaking in the National Assembly.'' The Socialists could not hide their embarrassment over the fact that they had started losing vote after vote in the Federal Assembly.

There was even a comic moment, when seeing that the majority of deputies were voting against their proposal, they also put their hands in the air, so that it wouldn't look like they were losing. Nikola Sipovac repeated what the opposition had been saying earlier, that the majority could, if they liked, ``vote on the fact that the world was not round.'' No one interpreted this as an introduction to an important TV news program. No! Milosevic could not allow them to bring up one scandal after another.The deputies were debating in the Assembly, so they didn't know that Milosevic was signing a decision on dissolving the Assembly in front of TV cameras. (Knotted eyebrows, a decisive flourish of the pen, and standing in front of his wife Mirjana's black and white photographlow on the wall, not where Tito's picture had once stooda brief explanation to the people.) He said that early elections were scheduled for December 19, and that the citizens of Serbia would elect a new Assembly, one which ``Serbia would be proud of.'' Belgrade TV editors were informed of the President's decision an hour and a half before the announcement. The presentation of the news left the impression that the people, without exception, were delighted with the President's decision.

One viewer said shortly: ``A manly move!'' Serbian Liberal Party leader Milan Bozic said that same evening, that elections suited the Socialists most, and that their behavior was quite logical, since they wished to hang on to power by scheduling elections suddenly and carrying them through quickly. He described Milosevic's move as ``an energetic blow, in accordance with his temperament.''Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS) Federal Assembly deputy Pavle Nikolic said that the President's move was formally in accordance with the Constitution which had been drawn up in the first place with the idea of promoting personal power.

Milosevic does not take defeat easily, nor does he sacrifice those loyal to him, no matter how compromised they may be. In fact, even at the risk of further complications, Milosevic did not wish to see his opponents score a point by toppling the government, even one as incompetent as Sainovic's. Some analysts say that Milosevic made the move because he wished to avoid humiliation. Milosevic probably noticed that the opposition was taking heart when it saw that the Socialists were losing and he tried to nip in the bud the contagious idea that his government could fall, regardless of his willpower.

Milosevic knows that the people's perception of who yields power will decide the elections. Ahead of the last elections he stormed the Federal Ministry of the Interior. He is now entering elections as someone who has dismissed the Assembly and is calling on good manners and pride.

The Radicals carried out their attack on Sainovic's government by stressing social and economic disasters, hunger, poverty, crime. Milosevic's attempt at revising his war policy was the main target of their attack. One of the possible reasons why Milosevic dissolved the Assembly was in order to have a free hand in the final negotiations. It is no coincidence that the crises in the Serbian Assembly and Krajina have been running parallel. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said that during elections Serbia could find itself faced with the signing of important international agreements. Nonparty DEPOS member and intellectual Zivorad Stojkovic told independent TV Studio B that Milosevic's move was a ``circle of frustrating defeats,'' and asked how he could stand it all. DEPOS nonparty members recently asked that early elections for a constituent assembly be called, but demanded that they be carried out by a transitional government of national unity, something Milosevic has refused for nearly two years. Ljubomir Simovic said that the regime did not need a better Assembly, and quoted Milosevic's words that they needed an ``absolute majority, through which they would rule as they pleased.''

Parts of the opposition challenged Milosevic's war policy and were demonized, just as its other parts which discreetly supported this policy were also demonized, but could have had motives for allowing Milosevic's new (negotiating?) option to defeat Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj's war option. However, they couldn't stay neutral and had to join the debate started by Seselj. Perhaps Seselj has been manoeuvered into bringing up the issue by Milosevic who didn't want the democratic opposition as an ally, but once he had started attacking Seselj verbally, tried to press the pillow over the whole of the opposition, relying on an authoritative mentality, and that he would reap what Seselj and some SPS deputies had sown, and finally lay the blame on an Assembly compromised under his guiding hand. Svetozar Markovic who founded the Socialist movement in Serbia in the last century, wrote that in Serbia, a ruler can always introduce a dictatorship with the help of the people. A move which will impress the uneducated people, could boomerang and give the opposition the opportunity to go ahead and talk about the arbitrariness of an authority defending itself with all means. The fact that Milosevic prevented the fall of a bad government should not be reason for the opposition to go to war against Milosevic. There were no quarrels in the Assembly and Milosevic could become the opposition's tactical ally. The opposition should hold him to his word and demand that he use his authority to secure conditions which would ensure that Serbia has a more representative Assembly.

This would be a partial victory for the opposition. Naturally, in such an atmosphere, the opposition could show to what extent the apparatus it was saving, was compromised.Milosevic has managed to hypnotize the voters with his despotic resoluteness, he has created the impression that his authority cannot be challenged. As always, these moves of his result in complications. The dissolving of the Serbian Assembly will probably tie the hands of the Federal Assembly.

The Federal Assembly has not continued its interrupted session, and it is not known when it will do so, since the mandate of the deputies in the Chamber of Republics is given them, and Serbia does not have an Assembly which can do so. Montenegrin Liberals and Novak Kilibarda's People's Party fear a state of emergency and the eventual dissolving of the Federal Assembly, and the adopting of a new Federal Constitutionsomething which has long been talked about. The Radicals bragged that two hours after Milosevic's decree, they had launched an initiative for a vote of confidence in the Federal Government and that they had thus prevented the dissolving of the Federal Assembly, since under the Federal Constitution such a government cannot propose the dissolving of the Assembly.Before the interruption of the Serbian Assembly's session last Friday (October 16), the opposition had information on the matter, but didn't want to believe it.

Readers of VREME knew that regardless of the outcome of the vote on Sainovic's government, elections would be scheduled before the opposition had time to blink, and a little after elections in Moscow. In the shadow of elections called by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Milosevic will have a free hand in trying to consolidate his rickety authority. He has retained a faithful government which will prepare elections and find itself an appropriate Assembly with the help of statecontrolled television. Milosevic dissolved the Assembly so quickly perhaps fearing the adopting of a law on television which the opposition wanted to push through more than it wished to topple Sainovic's government.Technically viewed, Milosevic chose to schedule elections before a final score had been drawn up, and when in spite of an uncontrollable catastrophe his party is the favorite in an arena where all the opponents are weak, at loggerheads and weakened by sanctions more than the regime.

During the autumn only the Socialists hid their internal conflicts, even when it was obvious that they existed. Conflicts broke out between the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), between nonparty members of DEPOS and its member parties, within the SPO, and in the Democratic Party. When the Seselj Milosevic conflict broke out and when new elections were a certainty, VREME's question about the chances of certain parties, was answered angrily: ``Its not as if elections will be held tomorrow.'' The government claimed that ``the patience of the people was coming to an end'' and blamed the institution of parliament, disclosing perhaps, that the Socialists had decided on early elections because they had received signals that the plane was plunging towards the ground. Young Socialists bragged that they weren't ``worried about the elections.'' On the other hand, senior SPS official Borisav Jovic was more cautious and said that the Socialists had reason for fear, because the crisis had caused a lot of dissatisfaction among the people. Even though many think that the Socialists have a great advantage over the others, perhaps greater than ever, long term statistics which make it necessary to take into account the inertia of the electorate, do not confirm this (see box).

Milosevic's hasty move could mean that the Socialists have estimated that their campaign against Seselj has not succeeded, that their deputy group acted anemically and passively and that they did not make the people understand that Milosevic no longer supports Seselj; and that they failed to motivate the democratic opposition in the ``antifascist struggle'' against their former ally.

Speaking of the RadicalSocialist coalition, it need be recalled that Seselj won his first mandate in Rakovica in 1991, while opposition voters were at the seaside (he didn't have a sufficient number of votes, but the competent committee looked the other way), and that a year later, in 1992, the Radicals entered the Assembly after the rigged May elections when the opposition abstained. The Socialists were happy then to have created an enemy for the opposition after the March pressures on Milosevic (800,000 signatures calling for his resignation). The opposition later boasted in vain that the St. Vitus Day demonstrations forced the December 1992 elections. The elections were dominated by two ruling socalled ``patriotic parties.''

It is dangerous to leave the enemy empty space. After Milosevic's latest decree SPO leader Vuk Draskovic reacted hastily saying that his party would not participate at these one party elections. In the beginning the opposition's reactions echoed Draskovic's words, with their justified complaints which have become somewhat tiresomenamely those concerning the pitiful conditions in which the opposition is operating without access to communications, the media, without cars, money, oil and imagination. The Socialists like to make fun of the opposition's threats, and started doing so through Zivorad Igic (leader of Kosovo SPS branch). The SPS knows that in May 1992 when the democratic opposition boycotted the elections, the number of abstainees increased by only 15%, which was equal to the election results of the powerful SPO in 1990. They also know that they can't hold the elections without the democratic opposition.

The SPS knows that the democratic center does not have much influence on 664,000 voters whose votes have been lost to small parties which the Socialists with the help of the state security, have no problems in persuading to participate in the elections. Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan is founding the Party of Serb Unity. This is not a small number of voters, the whole of DEPOS along with the Church, the Crown and the national intelligentsia won only 133,000 more votes (797,000) at the last elections. The opposition cannot stage an efficient boycott of the elections.

On the other hand, with this motley company, the Socialists cannot ensure international legitimacy, but they can use these elections, such as they are, as a social safety valve at home. After his calvary at the hands of the Belgrade police, Draskovic has made notable contacts in the West. The Western media haven't shown any interest for these elections yet, just as they haven't shown any understanding for claims that sanctions are also destroying democracy in Serbia.

The government seems to have been greatly irritated by Draskovic who was first beaten up, after which legal proceedings against him were discontinued twice. In its announcement the government mentions ``political blackmail for the gaining of political concessions,'' which is a clear allusion to the SPO. It is possible for all the opposition groups to unite in their battle for better treatment by the media. Seselj is now openly accusing Milosevic of having lost his head, of being too nervous and of having violated the Constitution, and says that there is no point in participating in elections which will be blocked by statecontrolled television. Seselj offers a joint approach in the battle for capturing some space on television and for ensuring the control of the elections.

Seselj said publicly that he feared that his SRS could be banned and announced that he would not be calling mass rallies in order to avoid incidents, opting as he did last time for the strategy of an ``invisible party.'' At anonymous surveys, the Radicals did not identify themselves. Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica received Milosevic's move with equanimity and said that with this move the Socialists had admitted that they had been defeated at the 1992 elections and that they weren't capable of putting together a stable government. Some DEPOS members, like Dragoljub Kavran have concluded that it wasn't the Assembly which was being dissolved, but a certain policy.

Member of the DSS political committee Leon Kojen (who guessed the results of the previous elections) said for the first time that the opposition should not fear these elections. Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party (DS) continued in the same vein the next day, saying that the opposition had wanted early elections and had forced them.This is partly true, even though the opposition needed time as an ally to erode the Socialistsbut now they will have to do the job on their own. In fact, early elections were forced by Milosevic who needed them because of international circumstances, because of an exhausted war policy, and because he had estimated that it was the last moment to save his party and its image before the onset of bleaker times. Sometimes circumstances crop up and the authorities can do nothing to improve the situation.

For the third time, and in very difficult circumstances, the democratic opposition will have to find out if this crucial moment has arrived, and if it hasn't, then to grab as much as possible for themselves. So far the opposition has been in a ``oneshot'' psychological state of mind, wanting a clear and spectacular victory and has easily passed the ball to its opponents, not even disciplining its sympathizers to the extent of going to the polls for the second round of voting. In the middle of this winter of our discontent, we should not have to watch them once again, pale, frail and depressed as they were the night after the elections.

They have nothing to lose. If he is not forced by the international community, and this does not seem likely, Slobodan Milosevic will certainly not wish to ensure good conditions for the opposition. The opposition on the other hand, should not waste much energy in fighting for them, since it will get very little. Former President of the Serbian Assembly Zoran Arandjelovic, currently SPS campaign chief, the man who could not hide his smile when he told the citizens of Serbia that the Assembly had been dissolved and that elections were scheduled for St. Nicholas' Day, said that the elections would be held according to the 1992 Law on the election of people's deputies, and which cannot be changed anymore.

Milosevic has been conducting the election campaign for a month, influencing voters via the whole TV program and not just nasty comments in the news hour. A minute more or less on television does not mean a thing if the hungry and the frozen haven't yet read that ironic slogan left over from the last elections and which referred to the previous ones: ``Voteand starve!''’

Transfer

Viewed statistically, the SPS has been losing voters since 1990. At the first elections it won 2,320,585 votes (33% of the electorate), in December 1992 they won 1,359,086 (20% of the voters), which is a loss of 960,000 votes in two years. Graphs drawn up by the prestigious Institute of Social Sciences show that the number of SPS voters dropped even when only they and the practically invisible SRS were in the running in May 1992 (27% votes). The Institute's last survey carried out last spring shows that the SPS improved its rating because of the usual identification of the voters with the winning side, but at the time the citizens weren't faced with as great a crisis as they are now.

On the other hand, in December 1992, close to 40% of the SPS voters opted for the SRS (``the other party I would vote for'') and approximately the same number of Radicals opted for the SPS. This spring however, only 20% Radicals showed any affinity for the Socialists, while 40%odd Socialists continue to show an affinity towards the SRS. If this diagnosis proves correct, it could point to the conclusion that the Radical voters had consolidated their number and moved away from the Socialists before their leader's split with powerful SPS official Radmilo Bogdanovic.

During the summer, and especially during the autumn, Seselj had started using social demagogy, and has probably won over voters from the ruling party.