Vanity Prevents Opposition Leaders From Unity

The whole atmosphere resembled the silence which ensues after an earthquakethe clashes within the Democratic Party (DS), the final schism in the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS), the definite end of cooperation between the Radical Party and the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)... The winners of neither of these conflicts were then known, and, therefore, nor were the partners who might form future alliances. And then, Milosevic slammed shut the hard covers of the decree on dissolving the Assembly and with that one move changed everything. The dissensions within and among parties were pushed to the background, appeals for joint action began coming in. Former Yugoslav PM and last year's presidential candidate Milan Panic decided not to send his letter urging the opposition to stop its ``squabbling.''

``I am a sceptic, but one should give it a try,'' DS leader Dragoljub Micunovic told VREME, commenting the latest calls for the unification of the opposition. He said he hoped that Milosevic's latest move would also put an end to the inopportune developments in his party.

``It would be natural if it (the dissolution of the Assembly) stopped them. They would be crazy to go on,'' Micunovic said.

DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica still does not believe in the ``euphoria of unity.'' He thinks some kinds of alliance are possible, but not an alliance which would rally the whole opposition. He can see his party in a coalition with Babic's Farmers' Party of Serbia (SSS), while all other ones will depend on what he calls ``rallying round common issues.'' He gives priority to the following issues``democratic, socialeconomic and national.'' Although Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) leader Vuk Draskovic had openly called for and announced the opposition's united stand on election conditions, it seems that not even this first step will be taken. Draskovic has already set these conditions (free state RTV and permitting independent TV Studio B's and TV Politika's broadcasts to reach all of Serbia, not just Belgrade), and it is quite unlikely that most of the other opposition will agree with him.

An eminent member of the opposition has already qualified Draskovic's conditions as ``dilettante'' and recalled that they remarkably resemble the ones the opposition had ``agreed to'' last year: nine electoral units, a proportionate election system. Something else lurks behind this ``initial disagreement'': Draskovic has already threatened to boycott the elections (as he had ahead of the previous two elections), while the rest of the opposition has, judging by informal comments, decided to join the battle.

That is why Draskovic's concept of expanding Studio B and TV Politika and ``liberating RTV Serbia'' is expected to be countered by much more moderate requestsproportionate TV time to parties (the number of hours on TV according to the number of representatives in the Parliament), guarantees that the whole election campaign will not be commented and the accurate enforcement and interpretation of the existing Electoral Law, which some opposition leaders qualify as ``not bad.'' ``How can they reach agreement?,'' wonders Srbobran Brankovic of the Political Sciences Institute and cites the opposition leaders' almost unbelievable vanity as the major obstacle to any concurrence. Brankovic also believes that the greatest chance for the opposition to win the elections is to form a kind of alliance.

Here is his reason: ``All of them have individually lost to Milosevic, they do not have a new figure to bring to the fore and it is clear that no other than Milosevic will again lead the enemy block.'' Neither Brankovic nor many others believe that Milosevic will this time win the elections for the Socialist Party of Serbia. Not even the most optimistic predictions give the SPS more than 30% of the votes (some fifty MP's), so that many expect that the Socialists will start looking for a new coalition partner.

Kostunica thinks the SPS will this time opt for a ``quiet coalition,'' not for ``an open alliance like it had with (Radical Party leader) Seselj,'' while Brankovic sees the Alliance of CommunistsMovement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ) as SPS' potential partner. His opinion concurs with the rumor the SPS has been leaking for some time now, and according to which the work on the project of the ``unified left'' has been intensive for a month now.

The idea was launched by SPS ideologist, professor Mihajlo Markovic, and VREME learned from circles close to former President Dobrica Cosic that the decrepit academician has already invited Cosic to join their forces. Cosic refused, although it is unlikely that he would find himself among the ``chosen'' even if he had agreed. Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj is one of those who is currently not thinking about coalitions, either of own party or between others. He has more pressing issues to address, ``We will discuss coalitions when and if the elections pass,'' he says. His greatest problem is how to avoid something he is convinced is being prepared for him. ``Milosevic was rash to call the elections, he got panicky,'' Seselj says, believing this to be the chief reason why the elections might not be held at all.

``They are doing everything to compromise me and my party members. I even suspect that they will soon dress their own people as Chetniks and commit a massacre in the Serb Republic in Bosnia Herzegovina or the Republic of Serbian Krajina. That is why I have ordered my men to take care that not one incident breaks out. It would be enough to proclaim a state of emergency.''

Seselj cites as proof that a state of emergency is more probable than the elections the fact that the SPS cannot find a more serious coalition partner with whom it could win the elections. He maintains that neither the SKPJ nor Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan's new party can help SPS win the necessary majority in the parliament. ``They'll have to come up with something!,'' Seselj told VREME.

No matter what else is on their minds, the Socialists are definitely thinking about the elections. They called a meeting with SPS district chairmen on Friday to discuss the election campain and drew up certain ``programs of measures and activities'' ahead of the major developments. One of the recently rumoured programs, for instance, says that it is necessary to ``immediately set up election headquarters to enable an aggressive election campaign,'' ``adapt the programs of RTV Serbia and dailies loyal to SPS,'' ``secure the regular distribution of products in short supply,'' ``standardize the salaries of the army and police to a 100, the stateowned firms to 75 and the pensions to 50 DM,'' ``propagate SPS' aid to the Serb Republic in Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republic of Serb Krajina,'' ``in case of large scale unrest, secure special competences for the Serbian Interior Ministry,'' ``in case of large scale unrest, eliminate and isolate the organisers,'' ``rigourously tighten the control of trade and services...''

According to this document, the SPS (more precisely, its leadership) is also contemplating the measures and activities of the Republican Interior Ministry and is demanding ``the control of private businessmen in opposition ranks,'' ``daily publishing of information regarding the confiscation of illegally acquired goods and money,'' ``the control of radical extremists in the ranks of other parties and the confiscation of weapons,'' ``deployment of special forces in Belgrade (between six and seven thousand people)...''

Another unknown ahead of the elections is whether former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic will take part in them. Or, more precisely, it is unclear with whom and in what role he might show up in the campaign. ``It is true that Panic is waiting to be invited but it is also true that he would sell all he has just to run against Milosevic again and beat him,'' claims one of Panic's acquaintainces.

What hinders Panic the most is the opposition leaders' doubts in his ``abilities.'' They have gotten over him him a long time ago and most of them are convinced they can achieve much more without him than with him. On the other hand, Panic's chances would definitely increase significantly if the Western powers backed him (not as clumsily as last December) and force the opposition to rally round him.

``If they (the West) pledged to lift the sanctions and restore peace in Bosnia, Cosic would publicly support Panic,'' one of Cosic's former advisors told VREME. If all of the above does not happen, the most probable way Panic will reenter the political stage is through New Democracy, which is already preparing to launch his campaign in early and mid-November. One should not, however, exclude the possibility of Milan Panic suddenly withdrawing from the race. One of his associates sees the reason for this in Panic's wish ``to be something big the President of Serbia or the President of Yugoslavia with the powers of the President of Serbia.''’