Milosevic Is A Modern Dictator

Former Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis is one of those politicians and diplomats whose actions have left impact on the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. De Michelis had first for months tried to convince Slovene leaders Milan Kucan and Dimitrije Rupel to postpone Slovenia's secession. He urged a single, then a confederate and finally any kind of Yugoslavia and at the end suggested to the European Community to recognise Slovenia's and Croatia's independence.

During our talk in Venice with de Michelis, now a Socialist MP in the Italian Parliament, we tried to shed light on some points of our recent dismal history. (Excerpts)

VREME: You have had many contacts with Yugoslav politicians over the past twothree years. What is your opinion of them? For instance, what was Milosevic like when you met him?

De Michelis: Normal.

* When we talked a year ago, you said Milosevic was a rational politician. Are you still of that opinion, after everything that's happened?

It is normal that politicians differ in character. I have never met Croatian President Tudjman, but during the EC threesome's visit to Yugoslavia in July 1991, I had the opportunity to talk with Milosevic. He is a very tenacious, difficult collocutor, but a rational and intelligent politician. Also, over the past few years, he has successfully shifted from one political orientation to another, adopting even the ideas of his political opponents that were totally contradictory to his previous ones.

* It seems you agree with Milosevic's policy?

What I said about him as a politician definitely does not mean that his policy is correct. Milosevic has made many mistakes, which were probably a result of our mistakes, but the EEC probably has not given enough thought to the protection of the interests of Serbs during the disintegration of Yugoslavia... However, one cannot say that the road Milosevic has chosen is the right one. Because of the ways he tried to achieve his goals, Milosevic today ranks among the defeated in the Yugoslav crisis. The conquered territories mean nothing because of the sanctions, the starving people and the economic collapse. That is why we might say that the Slovenes are the only ones who have in the long run come out of Yugoslavia's disintegration as winners. As regards the other Yugoslav politicians I met while I was the Italian Foreign Minister, the most rational were Kucan and Kiro Gligorov (now Macedonian Presidented.), even Izetbegovic, at least at the beginning of the crisis, when he was not the leader of the Moslems alone.

* How true are the speculations that Milosevic's American experience accounts for his antiEuropean stand?

There is no doubt that during the last stages of postTitoism, the USA had economic interests in Yugoslavia; it is well known that Milosevic's past is linked with US circles. I remember when I was visiting Yugoslavia for the first time in the early eighties, they were showing me big, tall, modern glass buildings in the heart of Belgrade, explaining that their construction was funded by money from the US, from Chicago. This was probably thanks to Eagleburger, the then US Ambassador in Yugoslavia, who had strongly supported Milosevic while he was in Belgrade. Although I do not believe Milosevic is a priori against the West. Milosevic is simply a typical example of a postSocialist leader, who relies on a nationalistic policy since he lacks other arguments. A transition to democracy requires of a postSocialist leader to secure for himself widespread, mass support in some way. If we wished to describe his policy by one word it would be the wordKosovo. That's where it all began and that's where it'll all end. However, his rule cannot be simply qualified as dictatorship, it more resembles Caesareanism. It is no accident that, at the time Kucan and some other leaders were strongly adhering to communist positions, it was Milosevic who first leant on the support of the people. And on the police and army, of course, but much more on the monopolised electronic media. This is another point in which Milosevic is more modern than ordinary dictators.

* How do you view the process of recognising the former Yugoslav republics today?

I always claimed that this issue should be addressed with a lot of attention. The EEC had made a lot of mistakes in that process. For example, it recognised Slovenia's and Croatia's independence at Germany's insistence a long time before the Badinter Committee submitted its report on human and minority rights in Croatia. As for me, I always advocated a global resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, because I knew partial solutions would only mean plunging into new wars.

* Should BosniaHerzegovina be divided?

I think a kind of confederation would be the best solution. This solution is in principle similar to the alternative I urged in the case of Yugoslavia, for Bosnia is actually a small Yugoslavia. However, the developments in Bosnia are now not even permitting the realistic contemplation of this solution. Simply, after a year and a half, you have the Moslem authorities in Sarajevo disarming units of the Croatian Defence Council. This means that they are not disarming the Croats in Mostar or Herzegovina, but the people who had suffered together with them for a year and a half. Now they are killing them. How can one even imagine life together now?

* A lot of commentators assess that something like this could happen also in Macedonia and Kosovo. Do you see the danger of Greece being sucked up into the whirlpool?

I think that despite everything, Greece would not wage a war over territories. But I do see a danger of the creation of a strong and of another, less strong coalition in the Balkans. I am above all referring to an Orthodox coalition round Serbia and Greece, which would be opposed by an Albanian Moslem coalition. These tensions could actually erupt in new explosions.

* Do you urge the lifting of the sanctions?

No, I have never urged that, although I frequently explained that Serbia was not the only one to blame for the war and that the attempts to resolve the crisis should bear in mind the vital interests of Serbs. As regards the future, unfortunately, quite a dismal one awaits Serbia. The sanctions will undoubtedly remain for the time being, because there is no reason to lift them. That is why the only solution I see is compromise. Even the worst compromise is better than war.