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November 29, 1993
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 114
Army and Elections

Between Fear And Habit

by Stipe Sikavica

In the interview given to the weekly ``Vojska'' (translates as Army) on November 18, 1993, Zoran Lilic, the President of Yugoslavia and of the Supreme Defense Council, made references to a legal definition, according to which the Yugoslav Army (VJ) is ``a depoliticized and deideologized state institution where all party and political activities are banned.'' No sooner did he finish saying it than he again repeated the sentence which is already wornout by frequent usage, ``Like in most countries worldwide, the Army here does not conduct politics, nor can it be involved in it...''

It seems logical that a nominal supreme commander of an army would speak for a military organ. But, the public immediately reacted by raising a question, Why haven't Mr. President and the editorial staff arranged an interview much earlier? Or, couldn't they put it off for after the elections are over? Lilic also paid a visit to the Military Academy Hospital and made rounds of garrisons along the length and breadth of the country. Moreover, Milan Dimitrijevic, the Federal Minister of Science and Technology, was received at the Rectorate of the Yugoslav Army's University on November 10.

One should recall for a moment the spring of 1991 and the multiparty elections in the northwest of the then Yugoslavia when both military and Milosevic's propaganda competed in reviling multiparty pluralism as ``an imputation from the west,'' i.e. ``the source of all evil.'' Newlyformed political parties were anathematized at the same time. Hardly was there a party leader in Serbia and outside Serbia who escaped unscathed in military press (and military propaganda in general). On the other hand, not one opposition leader in Serbia was so feverishly and thoroughly vilified as was Vuk Draskovic, although one must admit that Draskovic's low political rating and some of his extreme statements contributed. The socalled army's depolitization, which is still underway and is said to be continued, was announced at about the same time when Milosevic finally and at least formally accepted multiparty rules in the election race, after having ignored them for quite some time. The announcement implied that the then Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) would distance itself form any sort of involvement in the parties' election rivalry. However, with is numerous threats that the Army ``would not allow'' this and that and that it ``would undertake'' such and such measures, which is how the famous interview of General Kadijevic given to military commentator Miroslav Lazanski December 6, 1990, sounded, the military leadership sided with Slobodan Milosevic and his policy. ``A military double scull with coxswain'' (Kadijevic and Adzic) sealed this on March 9, 1991, when they saved the current regime in Serbia with tanks, and thus won themselves and the coxswain the place in history of Serbian democracy.

Following a rather clumsy launch of the Communist Leaguethe Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ) on the political scene, military pros (including those in active service and soldiers under contract) ``froze'' their party memberships until they retired since they were denied the right to appear as candidates on the parties' electoral lists. According to our information, this group of voters gave most of their votes to the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its leader in the previous multiparty elections in Serbia. Why? Firstly, because even back at the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration the current President of Serbia and the military leadership had similar or identical views as to the way of solving the Yugoslav crisis and its outcome. Secondly, and most importantly, the officer corps concluded relying on Milosevic's clear signals that he would see to it that they keep a high standard of living and social prestige, which was seriously brought into question in the late 1980's. And, finally, military professionals, just as military pensioners, opted for an easier path.

Military also failed to respect ``sanctity'' of political neutrality in the election campaign last December. There's a whole lot of individual violations of previously set rules of conduct and promises made by high ranking officers. One instance worth remembering is the way, Milan Panic, running as a candidate for Serbian Presidency, was disqualified from a neck and neck race with Slobodan Milosevic. Disqualification was masterminded and carried out in a couplike fashion by the then and theso called Defense Minister's Collegiate Body comprising four generals (Milorad Dragovjevic, Radovan Radinovic, Dobrasin Prascevic, Dusan Zunic) and Admiral Milosav Simic.

New forms of the Army's political engagement have been invented this year. On November 22 Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic, had a panel discussion in Belgrade's Congressional Center ``Sava.'' Majority of his guests were army pensioners. On the same Monday, November 22, the army introduced four bus lines, most probably only election lines, into chaotic public transportation in Belgrade.

``Fuck the pension, when it's not enough for one kilo of meat,'' is how a resigned pensioner in the waiting room of the Military Academy Hospital responded to the news, which would have certainly rejoiced him several years ago, that his pension was raised by 100 per cent. ``Don't be crazy and don't blaspheme God!,'' the man next to him snapped and added, ``If Vuk comes to power, you won't have even this little.''

This line, ``If Vuk...'' seems to have become a commonplace and a sort of a slogan used by active officers and pensioners including their families to a certain extent in the prelude to all elections Milosevic has orchestrated so far. Last December a colonel's wife was heard frantically screaming that ``Vuk will take away her flat if the comes to power in Serbia.'' This might answer the question why military pensioners voted for Slobodan Milosevic and his party in all elections so far.

Soldiers doing their military service and cadets of military schools represent a subgroup of voters because they will mail their ballots to their hometowns. A technical part of the job will no doubt be performed professionally as it was before. One should also keep in mind that one can influence the way they'll vote as much as he likes while they're in barracks and schools, although ``those in charge'' keep repeating that ideology has been banned from classrooms and cabinets.

According to rough assessments, military voters would ``cover'' between 1/13 and 1/10 of the electorate in Serbia, which is a value in itself. It is therefore easy to understand why all big parties in Serbia are fighting to win as many voters in uniforms as possible. The following unofficial assessments as regards the popularity of political parties among the army are in circulation: the Communists are written off for a long term period, the Democrats are circling the army in a wide arc, the Radicals could have penetrated the military tissue but things changed after Seselj fell out of a swing occupied by Milosevic's favorite opposition politician, and the Socialists consider the military to be their realm.

If our observations and conclusions are correct, Vuk Draskovic seems to have been the only one who received almost no votes from the army. It seems that few of them will vote for him this December.

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