Milan Martic's Flying Circus

Milan Martic, the Interior Minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina, who is also running as a presidential candidate, is at the peak of his career. It is clear to every viewer of Radio Television Serbia and every reader of the Belgrade daily ``Vecernje Novosti'' that he is the man whom the Serbian regime trusts most. He gives interviews to everybody, even to the Zagreb weekly ``Danas,'' he insists on demarkation between Krajina and Croatia and claims that it is way too late for any kind of cohabitation, which is reported as his ultimate patriotism and relentlessness on the Belgrade prime time news. Martic does not lack anything in his election race in Krajina. He arrives by helicopters of the Interior Ministry (the rumor has it that they have a Red Cross sign) to election rallies which are loudly announced by megaphones on cars days ahead although there is an acute shortage of petrol. Goran Percevic, the deputy president of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and his delegation allegedly used the same helicopter while visiting Krajina. Apart from founding the Serbian Party of Socialists (SPS) they also worked on the meetings with independent candidates, most of whom were directors and other prominent figures. The purpose of these talks was to point to the person who must be supported in the presidential election and show that the programs of these candidates are identical with the program of the Krajina's SPS. Finally, Martic chose not to appear on TV Knin. He stressed that his political stands and public work were sufficiently known; the analogy of identification with the President of Serbia, on a much lower lever, is self-evident in this case.

Before becoming known to the public, Mile Martic was a commander of the police station in Knin. He was a professional policeman not a nationalist; he allegedly beat up one Serb for publicly promoting the Serbian cause.

However, in 1989, when the then republic authorities came into conflict because of a strike by Albanian miners in Stari Trg, it became clear that a number of policemen from the areas which are today known as Krajinas do not support their superiors in Zagreb. It is interesting to mention that Martic himself regarded this period of his life as crucial in an interview given to Television Serbia. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was then formed, the multi-party elections were held in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won and Martic appeared in the public in a grand style. At the head of 40 policemen in Knin he wrote a petition on July 3, 1990 to Federal Secretary of Interior Affairs Petar Gracanin, and protested against a red-and-white checkered shield (Croatian symbol) on police uniforms and other changes in the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. Soon afterwards, on August 17, the first barricades were erected as a reaction to Croatia's stand that a referendum on Krajina's autonomy will be opposed with all available means. At the time Martic was distributing arms to police reserves, organizing patrols, introducing sentry duties...

There are contradicting assessments of motives and goals of ``the log revolution.'' In any case Martic was a key man in the connection with the Serbian Ministry of the Interior: he obtained 600 carbines from the ``Crvena zastava'' factory (car and arms manufacturer in Kragujevac, Serbia) and sold them in local stores at a production price, he was active in the Serb municipalities which ``the log revolution'' had not reached, and engaged in solving all current issues concerning arms and man power. He was allegedly directed by operator Frenki, ``known'' in Knin as a journalist; Captain Dragan was also there organizing the training of his policemen, of which the then Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was ignorant. Three years later JNA was assessed by Martic as a confused gang. He did not trust the officers who were not Serbs, and believed that many officers who were Serbs could not live up to the situation. However, he was constructive in the end: when the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) made a decision on disarming paramilitary formations he ordered that JNA in Knin is returned 102 automatic rifles, 3 machine-guns, and 2 rocket-launchers (the Croatian authorities returned 140 rifles on that occasion, but only 11 were ``Kalashnikovs'' and the rest were trophy rifles). He allegedly accepted the explanation on the occasion that the Knin Corps was his strongest barricade, which meant that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic knew quite well what he was doing and thus won the trust of a disciplined executioner of orders. In return, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior always met Martic's requests.

Martic spent the period of neither war nor peace which lasted in Croatia from August 1990 to April 1991 by gaining positions. His policemen, ``Marticevci'' (which is how the Croatian media named them) represented the only law on the territory of Krajina, regardless of the fact that Croatia was still a federal unit of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They used to stop infrequent passengers who had decided to take the shortest route from Zagreb to Split, asking them in a civilized manner to show them a pass which was the picture of Slobodan Milosevic. Since they did not have it, they were forced to buy one at the price which the policemen thought they were able to pay. The next patrol would again ask them to pay the fine, depending whether the picture was in color or black and white.

Martic's policemen were the only ones to take part in fighting when the first clashes took place. They were headed by capable operators of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, whose code names were Crnogorac, Frenki, Badza, Major Fica, Captain Dragan... By entering the war in Croatia, JNA found that his police and military structure was completely formed and never managed to subject them under its control, although it tried. It was believed that Martic and Milan Babic were closely connected, but when the former cold-bloodedly disclaimed his first comrade in arms who questioned the Serbian president's decision it became clear that there are parallel authorities in Krajina---ones are cooperating with Belgrade along political lines and are therefore susceptible to changes and others are police and monolith. Krajina's Interior Minister was never stronger than after Goran Hadzic (he replaced Milan Babic) assumed power; the units under his control grew after JNA's withdrawal and demobilization and appropriated the only armed monopoly to interpret official stands. Therefore, Martic never shunned a conflict: first with Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, then with Hadzic and finally with Vojislav Seselj (the leader of the Serbian Radical Party), regardless of the way they were treated by the state media in Serbia at the time. He never allowed any one of them to intrude into his area which he had tried to secure for himself. It was confirmed several days ago that he was not operating on his own.

If all things are taken into consideration, it seems that Martic was the only of all leaders in Krajina who had clear instructions as to what should be done and when. For example in Glina, when he sent his people through the buffer zones of the then JNA to carry out offensive actions against the Croatian Ministry of the Interior; the same thing happened again when the Knin Corps was to enter the war and when Kijevo was razed to the ground---it is claimed that he was jumping on the sign with the name of this village. The last example is the best illustration of the instructions he was following; that's when the federal commission for control of one of numerous cease-fires was sent to the field, but confusion of its members showed that Martic is one of the untouchables.

Mihajlo Markovic, the ideologist of SPS, has recently stated that SPS has actually never supported Goran Hadzic, but only original aspirations in Krajina. The man who represents them now happens to be Milan Martic. It would be very difficult for anyone to back Hadzic: poverty, anarchy and a lack of prospects spread so that the entire idea of the westernmost Serb state was put into question. After everything has been disclosed, Martic presented himself as the authority fit to implement the last solution. He has access to the sources of information and can control the media in Krajina which are already strictly controlled (during the promotion of the local Radicals on the radio the power went out on the transmitter Pljesevica with no explanation). He can also introduce the state of emergency. His election platform is populist: fight against war profiteers, aid to war invalids and families of killed soldiers, as well as economic revival. If one disregards the way he intends to carry out his program, the whole thing sounds attractive especially if its backed by the Serbian regime. Spots which are broadcast by Television Serbia where the Army of Serb Krajina is shown advancing in 1991 and he standing on the first front-line looks nostalgic especially in comparison with the present state of affairs.

On the other hand, Martic supports professionalization of the Krajina's armed forces. If he wins and carries out his idea, it is realistic to expect that there will be a special military junta which will obey every wink from Belgrade. According to some testimonies he has received about 200,000 DM from the Serbian Socialists for financing his election campaign. Regardless of the outcome of the elections and since a three-year-long lobotomy must have had an effect and all undesirable surprises are still possible like Milan Babic's come-back (the Radicals are allegedly ready to support him in the second round), Martic will remain to be one of most essential factors in Krajina.