The Election Stalemate

Dreams about a stable government or a big rally to celebrate the opposition victory did not come true. With 123 seats gone to the Socialists, 120 to the opposition and 7 to ethnic parties (5 to the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DZVM) and 2 to the coalition between the Party for Democratic Activities and the Democratic Party of Albanians), what is left is, according to Vojislav Kostunica, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), "a complicated situation with a large number of possibilities."

Addressing the press Ivica Dacic, the Spokesman of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), gave priority to a Socialist minority government. In order to form such government, the Socialists would need tacit support from some parliamentary party and that's where new combinations come into play. "They'll eventually find the means to form their own cabinet," Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), said and emphasized that "Hungarians, Albanians or Djindjic (Zoran, the leader of the Democratic Party)" might help the ruling party. Goran Vesic of the Democratic Party (DS) doubts that Hungarians would go along with the Socialists and Ivan Kovacevic of the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS) shares his opinion. The biggest problem for SPS in potential cooperation with DZVM would be the price which would have to be paid for certain favors. What's even worse, the people form the ruling party could never be sure that support for forming of the government would be long-lasting. DZVM could turn its back on the Socialists on the first occasion, e.g. when it comes to the vote on various electoral laws, the budget or the law on Radio and Television...

Milosevic cannot expect anything better from the relationship with Djindjic, should he turn to him who is the next candidate on Seselj's list of "the accused." "Support to the Socialist government is out of the question", the leader of the Democrats told VREME and added that he had not changed his proposal regarding a concentration government with him at the head and him to choose all the members. The Socialists would have to know in advance that the government may be left without any of their representatives. The only concession Djindjic is ready to make is to leave foreign affairs (all kinds of Geneva, Brussels and other talks) over to Milosevic. The Democrats' leader would run internal affairs - hyperinflation, poverty and providing for the naked and bare-footed people.

Djindjic will have to wait for Milosevic to return from abroad in order to discover whether his offer is acceptable. That is the reason why he disregarded Dacic's statement according to which the Democrats must obey the rules of procedure and ask the Socialists for cooperation. "He is very much like a band which entertains the crown before Mick Jagger appears on the stage," is how Djindjic commented the stands of the young Socialist spokesman and went on doing business. He scheduled a meeting with Seselj, met with Kostunica and Draskovic, and is expecting to meet Milosevic.

What could be learned about the meetings which have already taken place is that Kostunica would be willing to support some coalition opposition government, that he would abstain from voting for Djindjic's concentration government ("I would not vote against it in any case," Kostunica said.), but that he himself would not be a member of either an opposition or a concentration government.

Explaining his last stand, Kostunica said he believed that the opposition government must be formed by the three strongest parties in the parliament. He would give them support with his votes. Although this may change, his decision on refusing to be a member of the government together with the Socialists, according to Kostunica, remains final.

"The Government is not a problem", Vuk Draskovic told Djindjic, asking him to support his request that the elections in the electoral units Pristina and Leskovac are declared invalid. Draskovic immediately received support for Pristina, but Djindjic is still contemplating whether the elections in Leskovac should be annulled. He explained that the opposition might be worse off after the elections are repeated in this electoral unit. Djindjic needs the opposition support for a concentration government more because of maintaining good relations and future cooperation than because of the actual balance of power. If the Socialists accepted this offer, Djindjic would have secured sufficient number of the votes in the parliament and would not have to bother whether Draskovic, Kostunica and Seselj like his idea. The Socialists represent an obstacle to realization of his plan and the problem is to what conclusion would his idea drive them.

If he did business with Djindjic, Milosevic would have to agree in advance to the gradual transfer of power. One should not have any doubts that any proposal by Djindjic that would harm the Socialists would be approved in the parliament; thanks to this SPS would be left without television, and without the "independent legislature", and without the national mint, and even without the police. Djindjic would eventually become so strong that he could openly take on the father of the nation himself. Whoever knows the President of Serbia would be naive to believe that the latter could swallow it just like that.

Although the opposition, which got reconciled overnight, refuses to publicly tackle the issue, many believe that Milosevic could once again turn to Seselj for help. The main argument to support this thesis is a certain break which the Socialists had made in their campaign against the Radicals just before the elections were to take place. Seselj's reply to this was, "They may approach me as much as they like," but the reasons to discard this thesis lie elsewhere that in his words. What the leader of the Radicals finds unacceptable is the price he would have to pay in case his cooperation with the Socialists is renewed. He would have to abandon the post reserved for the first among "defenders of the Serbian cause" and accept the territorial deals Slobodan Milosevic has made recently. The entire policy of the Serbian Radical Party would also have to be changed and it is well known from before that Seselj never supported sharp turns. "If you make a sharp turn your supporters will continue to go straight through inertia and join some other party", that is how Seselj explained his stand.

Regardless of the fact that there are only few who would consider a "fair" cooperation with his party, it should not be ruled out that Milosevic might offer some kind of a compromise to the opposition. It would be to his advantage because of the tasks he currently has on the side, he could say that the whole of Serbia is backing him, and because of the fact that in the time to come it will be necessary for him to get rid of the blame for the situation in the country. Some expert, coalition and concentration government would be the best possible solution to meet these needs.

Milosevic has already tried with Milan Panic, and a man who has recently been mentioned as a "Serbian version of Milan Panic" is Boris Vukobrat, the Yugoslav businessman from Paris. Vukobrat has had good relations with a part of the Serbian opposition, especially with the people from today's DEPOS. According to some reports his name has already been brought up to Milosevic. The first time, about a month ago at one of the "coordinating sessions" in the Cabinet of the Serbian President. The second time, about ten days ago before the President's trip to Geneva. People around Vukobrat say that they've had similar signals, which could ultimately lead to an offer of the Prime Minister's post.

Vukobrat is a convenient solution for Milosevic, because through him he could secure support of the second strongest parliamentary party, but there are two problems in this combination. The first being that all reports on signals, talks and offers have come from the people around Vukobrat and not around Milosevic. The second being that there is no mention whatsoever in his publicly presented program about the unification of Serb lands or anything similar. On the contrary, Vukobrat recognized the "old" borders and has no intention to change them. It's out of the question for Milosevic to accept that after all the effort his has put forth. Vukobrat may change his program, but then the President of Serbia would face the same danger as in the case with Djindjic: the transfer of power would thus begin.

"Everything will end with some trick," Kostunica thinks. According to him, Milosevic will try to prolong all decisions, to stall with the election of the government members and continue to refuse to cooperate with the opposition.

Ivan Kovacevic had something similar to say, "He'll first try to wear us out, then he'll try to find a coalition partner and eventually offer some minority "expert" mandator. In the end, we shall have another dissolution of the parliament and new elections."

New elections represent the last of all possible combinations. Besides Kovacevic, a number of opposition leaders are expecting them to take place as well. Some believe that this would not be so bad for the opposition after all. For the first time the elections would be held in spring, but the only warning came from Djindjic. "That's no good. The people would be fed up with everything and think that both we and they are crazy."

With his statement Djindjic has touched on the most serious problem the Serbian opposition is faced with at the moment. The opposition is in a much worse position simply because the last card is in the hands of Slobodan Milosevic. And also because they have not won a sufficient number of votes in order to be able to contemplate some agreement or their own coalition government. Everything depends on the next move Milosevic will make. Whoever is not ready for the worst possible option in such a situation will have made a serious mistake. And, he should not be sorry afterwards.