What Will the Next Elections Look Like

Regardless of whether it's a matter of "inside information" on how all this will end with some kind of early election, or whether it's a matter of "putting the cart before the horse," one of the stories concerning political life after the war tells of an early election.

In general this issue mostly cropped up in statements issued by political parties and local political figures which were given to press agencies as early as the first air strike alerts.  This story took on very specific form in the interview the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic gave to the French Le Parisienne.  According to our daily press (not all of it, of course), the former Federal Vice-Premier stated that "after the air strikes stop, time will come for organising an early election, stating that he will submit his candidacy for president of the FRY."

Even if Vuk Draskovic were in possession of "accurate information", even if his party were to back such an initiative in Parliament following the signing of a peace agreement, even if something of the sort were to be initiated by ruling coalition or the President of the Republic himself, it is worth considering several issues which such a development of events will make relevant, particularly the issue whether an election should be rushed into, and who would benefit most from this?

The bombing which has been going on for two months already has changed the political scene here in many respects.  The one constant is that prominent representatives of the ruling coalition in Serbia are dominating the political scene, whether because of the nature of their positions or because of the manner in which the media are behaving during the state of war, and the way they behaved before the war also.  Of course, the Radical Party element in the coalition cannot boast equal coverage in the media, while their relatively infrequent "live" appearances could be the result of their intention(?) to keep a low profile in these difficult times.  With the exception of SPO, the mention of activities of other parties which appeared relatively frequently in political announcements before the war can now only be divined through carefully chosen quotes from their press releases.

Will it happen once again, as in each previous case, that if an election is called the ruling coalition will enjoy the strongest position with respect to its opponents.  This, of course, will depend on the resolution of the position the country finds itself in at the present.  If we assume that "face to face combat" with NATO troupes in a ground assault on our territory is mere fiction, for under such circumstances no one alive can predict fully what exactly will happen, the traditional political position of the regime heading into an election will be most affected by what they do in the interim, by the speed with which an agreement is reached, by the character and the extent of the compromise made by Belgrade based on what is offered.  At this moment this is the biggest unknown, and without this information all predictions fall under the heading of speculation.

There is no doubt that once this junction is reached, the nature of the peace agreement which is signed will be the starting point for all those who are putting together a strategy for an upcoming election.  It is realistic to expect that, for instance, the Serbian Radical Party will either sharpen its differences with its present coalition partners, or will work on furthering co-operation.  On the other hand, in the event that the signing of an agreement results in a benefit for the regime, a benefit mentioned by the UN representative for the FRY, Carl Build, above all ready cash and credits for rebuilding what has been destroyed and for establishing a more or less normal standard of life, perhaps the SPS/JUL coalition might end up generously thanking Seselj for services rendered, with everything that goes along with this.  It should not be forgotten that every discussion of post-war conditions in the FRY, not including the daily pragmatic ones, persistently includes the old demand relating to the process of democratisation of he society, which could influence to an additional degree on the eventual change not only of the present balance of power of those who are presently part of the government, but also on the election strategy of all relevant political parties.

However, it is precisely this issue which could have enormous influence on the electorate.

Every mention of "The West" never brought a smile to the face of the majority of Yugoslav voters, and it is beyond doubt that the bombing merely increased the number of voters to whom it is best not to mention "Western Democracy."  There is not doubt that civil oriented parties will have their hands full in convincing their potential voters that it is necessary to differentiate between political principles, the functions of institutions and the general lasting values of a "legal system", and daily political activities or the long-term interests of those states which are participating in the bombing of the FRY.  This is a unique challenge for such parties, as well as their Achilles' Heel in pre-election campaigning which was not characterised by fine argumentation and civilised debates concerning basic principles.  In other words, it is not too hard to imagine that the specific kind of party "propaganda" which is being directed at discrediting the opponent, and not at affirming a party's policies and programs, will merely become that much sharper.
One of the issues which certainly warrants mention here is pre-election promises.  At a time when tensions run high because of the present situation - from patriotism and sense of injustice, up to the fear for the future - this will be certainly the most fertile ground for pre-election activity.  Taking into account all the heated emotions which fall under this broad heading, it can be supposed that the ears of those who have been left without a means of making a living, or who are on the verge of losing all sources of income - that the ears of such voters will be most willing to listen to the promises of someone who has a full wallet (small or large, regardless), or at the very least has some perspectives of getting foreign financial aid, for the simple reason that the predictions that "we will eat anything we get our hands on" are becoming very real, forcing parties into a real test of the times.  By contrast with the former assumption about the possible influence of the idea of "the western world" on voter behaviour, it is precisely the western world which can be very important here but in a completely different sense.  But it is worth waiting for the conclusion of the diplomatic process in Kosovo in order to get a more realistic picture of the extent of this influence on the electorate.

How the pre-election campaign will look is a question unto itself.  After everything that happened is it at all possible to establish any type of fair conditions for political competition?  Do we have any cause for optimism from previous experiences of pre-election manoeuvres?

Are there at all technical possibilities for a pre-election campaign on RTS until television transmitters  get repaired and until conditions for broadcasting all those programs which have been stopped since the beginning of the bombing?  From a technical point of view, it will be very difficult to monitor electoral units in post-war conditions, especially because of destroyed communications (it seems that there will be enough fuel because free import has been allowed).  Skipping over an entire host of questions which need to be answered, let us pose the crucial one: where will all the money come for this?

But let us say that this gets solved in one way or another...

The question remains which has been left last, but not because it is least important.  The reason why all this which is happening now - the status of Albanians in Kosovo.  The extent to which the signing of a peace agreement will be the first step toward their inclusion in the political life of Serbia and the FRY will determine, quite certainly, not only the pre-election strategy of important parties on the political scene here, but also the attitude toward this changed situation will serve as a test of their democratic orientation and the political awareness of their voters, to the same extent that this will also as a test of the political leaders (both old and new) of the Albanians in Kosovo and their voters.

Dusan Radulovic