Squeezing The Third One Out

The new round of the Geneva talks began with a renewed bombardment of Olovo: the Bosnian Serb Army fired 800 shells on the town last week as a part of preparations for a big offensive aimed at surrounding Tuzla. There have been reports on the movement of troops under command of Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic, but also on growing presence of Yugoslav Army (VJ) units, vehicles and artillery on the territory of BosniaHerzegovina. According to some sources, elite troops of the Yugoslav Army have suffered losses on these fronts in the recent weeks. The Serb side will have to pay a high price for the presence of the Yugoslav Army on the territory of BosniaHerzegovinaif indisputable evidence is presented, such as captured officers for example. The sheer fact that the risk was taken at all goes to prove that Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, and Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, consider the situation in the field to be more important that the talks in Geneva or the lifting of sanctions. Although reluctant and unnerved, military sources say that they are not satisfied with the Bosnian Serb Army since it is they who now have to ``sort things out for them.'' It will soon be seem what is meant by ``things.''

While the circumstances in the field are being adapted for another round of bargaining everybody is running out of time. The result of a policy of the thirdrate solutions to the firstrate crisis is now crystal clear: a day after the NATO summit in Brussels the English have explained that the story about threats with airstrikes does not actually mean anything and that British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd is to visit Bosnia soon to see how British troops will be pulled out in ``late spring.''

These hopes have neither frightened nor given hope to anybody: Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian Prime Minister, advised the Army of BH to rely on itself and forget international military intervention, the Serb side did not even flinch this time, if one disregards the prophesies that ``U.S. President Bill Clinton will fall when the first plane is shot down over Bosnia.''

Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, General Jean Cote, was replace after several claims that he would keep the post until the end of his mandate; this was explained by an alleged ``disagreement'' between General Cote and U.N. Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali over threatened airstrikes: Cote wanted to be in command of airstrikes and BoutrosGhali would not allow it... The threats were eventually interpreted to be empty, as they were from the very beginning, so the warring sides took up business in the field. The Army of BH continued to advance against forces of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV) in Central Bosnia and the Neretva Valley. Contrary to widely accepted views Croats seem to have lost ground. They are increasingly turning to their Serb allies for military help in the field and diplomatic support in Geneva, meeting with understanding which reminds of ``yugonostalgia''a mortal sin for both nationalchauvinist churches. They even agreed with the Serbs to exchange bureaus, open the motorway and establish telephone lines, whatever the cost may be, but the question of Krajina remains open. The regime of Slobodan Milosevic is in a much more delicate position: on one hand, Milosevic and Karadzic must find a way to force the Bosnian side to sign something in Geneva,or rather, anything, as they are aware that the whole business in Geneva boils down to producing pieces of paper which noone in the field considers to be binding. The Geneva negotiations on former Yugoslavia are reduced to a bureaucratic procedure which in itself bears utmost importance only for those who live on it and pretend to believe in it (Owen, Stoltenberg and the company) and this is clear to the Balkan players. Milosevic knows that if the Bosnians sign something, even if it may be anything, chances for the lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will rise. The problem is that Milosevic and Karadzic view force as the only way to make the Bosnians do it. Frankly speaking, there is hardly anything left for them after everything that happened over these two years. Meanwhile, the Bosnians have learned this kind of diplomacy in a very expensive school; Silajdzic coldly refuses to sign anything without concessions in the field and continues to threaten with the breakdown of the negotiations, aware that this drives Owen crazy. Bosnian Prime Minister relies on significant and unexpected military successes against HVO and HV forces, and on the fact that Serb forces have failed to achieve some goals in Bosnia recently. Psychologically speaking, the Bosnians believe they have nothing left to lose in this war and are reduced to chose between two elementary alternativesto fight or to die. Awareness about such a position, as it is well known, can mobilize unsurmised resources of force, courage, inventiveness and tactical skill; the Bosnian side has fully realized its advantage.

For the past two years Bosnia has primarily been an internal political question of all countries involved, both former Yugoslav and foreign. When faced with the question of Bosnia, Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman is taking loudest criticism so far, quite justified as well: he sacrificed 600,000 Croats from the riches regions in Central and Northern Bosnia for the sake of a barren patch in Western Herzegovina, giving in to the mafia which took over the administration in Zagreb in an already tested manner of all newcomers descended from the mountains (army, police and crime, based on patriotism). That is where the roots of the problem of Balkan chauvinisms are to be sought: those finer parts of dominant ethnic groups have in principle proven more successful when they took over political, administrative and criminal positions in the country of residence than when they fought for their home in their original boonies. Serbia has a similar problem. Tackling the issue of Bosnia, the opposition harasses the governments of world powers pretending that the Serb (like in Russia) and Muslim (like in the Islamic world) interests are close to their heart.

The populist regime of Slobodan Milosevic is on the biggest test and rightfully so when it comes to dealing with the Bosnian question. The fact that Radovan Karadzic and his followers are washing their hands by changing the name of Foca and other places is not good enough. Also sad is the fact that the Serbian opposition never distanced itself from the bankrupt ``national program,'' Greater Serbia (for which, judging by the obituary columns, young Yugoslav Army captains are laying their lives) and ethnic purity. Now, one has to get out of the quick sand. The opposition won't do it. The task is reserved for Father of the Nation who got us there in the first place. He is now either to fabricate the mess sufficient to reach a critical mass of the Serb national interest or to get rid of the sanctions any way he can, and than see what is to be done next. Counting on the confusion of great powers and the traditions in Geneva, as the experience showed, Milosevic is now trying with a risky game: on one hand he took a risk by deploying the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia with a plan to force a Bosnian signature on some piece of paper by threatening Tuzla so that he could scream that the sanctions are lifted; at the same time he wants the new Serbian Parliament to come to grips with the war, and, naturally, Serbia was never at war, thus securing a minority government on the basis of the national interest; besides, he must also make an impression of a peaceful partner so he signs agreements with Croatia while Milan Babic is breathing down his neck. In addition to all this, a promise about the unification of Serbian lands must be kept alive and avoided at the same time.

Things have thus come full circle. It started with the war and taking territories by force and ends with the war which was not won, because it could not be won, as it is founded on an ethnic and not on a political principle. In addition, we did not manage to kill or convert all Muslims despite brotherly help from the Croats. UNPROFOR from Bosnia (and they are the biggest threat to U.N.) does not help: it is too late and the Bosnians are not gullible. They now want everything back and who can stop them? There is no end to the Bosnian war in sight, since all chances for peace have meanwhile been squandered by making greedy requests in Geneva and relying on the force of Serb and Croat arms. The arms betrayed and that is the fact of life. The Bosnians still exist. Not only that, but they have also found ways to obtain arms and ammunition (e.g., Serbs from Eastern Herzegovina have been supplying them regularly waiting for the result of the ``playoff'' in the Neretva Valley) and the chances are that things will look up for them especially if UNPROFOR pulls out of Bosnia. It no longer makes sense to waste time in Geneva: that story is doomed to end ingloriously.