Trade

The romantic interpretation underscores "historical rights", "lebensraum", "national dignity", and "the state before all." The realists discard all this, but have nothing against it nevertheless: they wait for the war to begin, sometimes giving it a helping hand (which depends on how much they've invested and how quickly they can make a profit). The wars can turn into business with an astonishing speed, while the romantics tend not to be skilled in these sort of things. They are here to die heroically or to wonder later on as cripples how come they have nothing and the realists got rich.

In order for the war to become a profitable deal it requires the authority which would by its own nature impose duties and limitations which by rule does not suit the subjects. The authority is founded on romantic ideological assumptions but, surprisingly enough, it is the realists who are at the head. For example, the authority would introduce a range of measures for patriotic reasons: a comprehensive military duty, a ban on abstraction of weapons and other military equipment, limiting the movement and activities of the citizens of other nationality, a ban on cooperation with the enemy and other expected other things which appear normal. Patriotism, however, can not be eaten or turned into a profit (except in some cases that will be mentioned later). All above listed bans and orders will turn out to be convertible into a certain amount of German Marks, that is mainly determined by the laws of the market. In a nutshell: he who pays is exempt. It did not take too long for the conditions for such a transformation to be created in the Balkan wars of 1990. The Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb Republic in Bosnia, the Serb lands at war, are actually very poor. They managed to survive in normal circumstances only as a part of a larger economic and market whole and with help of the state aid for underdeveloped areas (with the exception of two or three regions). Both states made it through the first phase of the war with help of mother Serbia and looting. The economy of looting, as the Viking learnt, has one serious shortcoming - something can be looted only once. That phase is now finished, the proof of which is a deteriorating public security situation in these lands: looting became a way of life and some people have to be re-educated since they developed a habit. They used up others and turned to their own people. That is a critical point in history: some more organised and institutionalised form of business is needed now.

The population and its basic needs for survival, such as food, clothing, alcohol and cigarettes, represent the primary and traditional economic resource. Whoever succeeds in gaining a monopoly on fulfilling of these vital needs - wins. Thus, a certain Zeljko Holman from Zenica became a main food supplier for this big town: a half of all food supplies for the town passed through his hands when the war began. He founded HOS (Croatian Armed Forces), gathered a group of about thirty people who never came even close to the front, declared himself general (although he dropped out of the sixth grade of the secondary school) and engaged in trade between Zagreb and Zenica, which lasted until Easter 1993. The Croat-Bosnian cooperation went phut, some one else wanted to have control over food, Holman was arrested and is allegedly still taking a beating in the penitentiary in Zenica to reveal where the money is. Brothers Serbs also made a handsome profit in Zenica: two brothers held a monopoly on cigarettes and dispatched trailer trucks for months. A retail price for a pack of cigarettes went up to as much as 10 DM. By the way, a record of these wars was set in central Bosnia where a man paid 500 DM for a carton of Marlboro's in 1993.

An iron law of supply and demand is at issue. In January, the prices at the spot market in Zenica near Gluva Bukovica at the foot of Mount Vlasic, where the Serbs and the Muslims conducted trade were as follows: flour - 20DM; a liter of cooking oil - 20DM; a kilo of meat - 15DM; a liter of brandy -10DM, etc. More luxurious items can be found in other places (mostly in central Bosnia): a gram of cocaine costs 300DM (or 150DM in Belgrade), a gram of marijuana 10-12DM (or 3-5 in Belgrade). All these deals fall under a private initiative of individuals and a free black market where there is competition. Returns are high, but pale before those realized at a state level. Since the free trade can be easily obstructed by means of administrative measures, the state has begun to charge for the freedom of trade. The state remains financially stable as long as a final buyer pays a state racket and a dealer tolerates a reduced profit.

The state revenue collected through taxes, rackets, state-sponsored smuggling and abuse of natural resources (which is suicidal, like "Hadzic's logs") can hardly cover the expenses of the prolonged warfare. The war is expensive fun and the state finds itself in trouble if the war does not yield some benefit or stable peace quickly. The soldiers of the Serb Republic in Bosnia have already publicly complained that "Serbia charges them dearly for every bullet and shell." The Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina has for moths been receiving food and basic supplies in kind instead of salaries. The events which took place in Banja Luka in September 1993 represent the best illustration of the crisis in the Serb Republic in Bosnia: the reservists rebelled since their families were starving (while they were in trenches) and salesmen and dealers accumulated wealth. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic crushed the rebellion, and promised protection to "business people" who will be crucial in "the future". Patriotism is patriotism, but money is money...

Primarily because all warring states in the Balkans are forced to engage in certain transactions, which the realists find understandable, but confuse the romantics forcing them to the verge of desperation.

The transactions between the states also depend on demand and supply: who has what and who needs what. Therefore, the Bosnians have people but do not have weapons. The Serbs have weapons but need people. The Croat have both people and arms in moderation, but they are in tactical and strategic trouble. All these things differ from one region to the next just like tactical interests. This is why we have witnessed all possible temporary alliances between two sides against the third. It began during the war in Croatia when the Bosnian police of Alija Delimustafic cooperated with the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA); then JNA armed recently founded Croatian Defense Council (HVO) in Kiseljak; then the Bosnians and the Croats joined fire against the Serbs, the Serbs and the Muslims against the Croats (Herzegovina, Kupres), only to later have the Serbs and the Croats in a serious alliance against the Bosnians (although they supplied them with ammunition in Herzegovina), all until a few days ago when the Croats and the Bosnians signed yet another pact.

Central Bosnia, i.e. the front around Kiseljak and Kresevo, shows best how it all looked in practice. It began in the summer of 1992 with renting of artillery weapons (with or without crews and ammunition) to HVO; It continued with renting of tactical services (artillery support) and ended with selling of big weapons systems and ammunition. At one point in 1993 the Serbs sold HVO two T-55 tanks, one double 30mm anti-aircraft cannon on a chassis of a tank and 2.5 million bullets for the price which later became disputable. HVO claimed they had paid 4.5 million DM and the Serbs said they had received 4 million DM. One Serb source has said he believes the Croats and wondered where a half a million DM are.

The Serbs and the Croats are not the only ones trading. The example of Cazin Krajina and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, run by Fikret Abdic, shows how local tactical circumstances can lead to realistic alliances. According to Miroslav Lazanski and his article in the new by-weekly "Argument", the most severe fighting around Bihac is taking place between the units of 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina under command of Atif Dudakovic and the forces of Fikret Abdic who are joined by the Serbs. "The most likely goal of operations of the Serb Army and the forces of Fikret Abdic in this region...is to reach the bank of the Una River, so that this area could be territorially divided between the Serb Republic in Bosnia and the Autonomous Region Western Bosnia." VREME has learned from independent sources in the field around Bihac and from VREME's special correspondent who spent some time in Bihac, that entire military units of the Serb Krajina Army and the Interior Ministry of Krajina have been fighting for Fikret Abdic at least since the end of 1993. There is a legend that Abdic asked his friend from Bijeljina Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan whether he would take Bihac for him; upon hearing that Arkan asked 8 million DM for the favour, Abdic concluded that he could do it on his own for so much of money and turned to Captain Dragan. Majority of the military aid from the Republic of Serb Krajina are the people of Captain Vasiljkovic for his training center "Alfa", while soldiers of the Serb Krajina army and the special units of the Krajina Interior Ministry account for the rest. It seems that the authorities in Serbia are aware of the operation, since they allegedly supply weapons and equipment. The files of the people fighting in the Autonomous Region Western Bosnia say that they are on leave in Serbia. The operation is organised on the spot in Velika Kladusa by certain Serb Krajina Army Major. The tariffs for this warfare are as follows: 2,000DM for an action which takes 5-7 days; 1,000DM for a one-day-long reconnaissance within the enemy territory; 200 DM for a prisoner; special rewards for every position taken (1,000-2,000DM per person). There is also a price for renting armed support and other services: a day in a military hospital of the Republic of Serb Krajina in Vojnic costs 50DM; 50,000DM a day for three T-55 tanks with crews; 50,000DM a day for a battery of 122mm howitzers (6 pieces) plus 1,000DM per each fired shell if artillery is located on the territory of the Autonomous Region Western Bosnia, and if its on the Serb territory then only ammunition ( between 1,000 and 3,000DM, depending on the type of ammunition); a one-day support by helicopter "Gazela Gama" costs 100,000DM.

A correspondent of VREME from Bihac reported "Gazela" helicopters pounding the villages of Srbinje and Sokolac during her stay (the beginning of March) and a constant artillery fire on Bihac from the plateau of Grabez and Golubic, which was confirmed by Colonel Legrie of UNPROFOR. 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued an ultimatum to Fikret Abdic and surrender by February 10 or else they would attack Kladusa. Four days before the deadline, 5th Corps units and Bihac came under a Serb offensive and Abdic was relieved. At the same time, which is interesting, the headquarters of UNPROFOR in Zagreb systematically ignored and minimized the developments on the front in Bihac (the situation ordinary, one shell here and there...).

Where did Fikret Abdic get the money to pay for all these goods and services? It's been known for a while that Abdic imports from Croatia to the Autonomous Region Western Bosnia much more food, fuel and other goods that the local population needs. A significant portion of the capital of "Agrocomerc" was successfully turned over abroad (the arms purchases for Croatia), and it is believed in Zagreb that much of the capital of the powerful war-mafia lobby from Herzegovina is being turned over via Abdic and his comrade in arms Alija Delimustafic. It follows that Abdic supplies the Serbs with whatever they need and charges them either in cash (trade) or in services (fighting). At the moment this suits the Croats in tactical terms; UNPROFOR has turned a blind eye (which also has the price), and Serbia is using Fikret Abdic prove a political point: he provides a model for "co-habitation" and ethnic tolerance...

However, everything is bound to change if the Bosnian-Croat agreement from Washington happens to actually work. In that case two important players in the Balkans will become obsolete, even detrimental: Fikret Abdic is one, and Gojko Susak is another. If the Bosnians and the Croats enter into a genuine alliance, without the usual stabbing in the back (as was the case many times before), Abdic will be left all alone: the Croats won't need him and he would be eventually left both without oil and food and 5th Corps will rapidly gain in strength; the Serbs won't need him either, since he will have neither food nor goods. If the Croats had really decided to form an alliance with the Bosnians, this won't be feasible nor will anyone believe them all until several heads of politicians from Herzegovina roll over the main square in Zagreb. Gojko Susak realised this immediately and two weeks ago he already started grumbling about it. Tudjman's mistake was to begin the war in Bosnia under the pressure from the Herzegovinians and the entire adventure went awry. He has to admit his mistake now; someone has to answer for it and Tudjman would rather he is not the one. A selection of other candidates is modest...An interesting political speculation which is hypothetical could be postulated at this point. In case the Bosnian-Croat alliance proves to be successful, Abdic and Susak will not be the only obsolete and detrimental players: the logic of realpolitik tells us that Mile Martic, the President of the Republic of Serb Krajina, is not so indispensable as he was so far. He is the poorest and his state will in that case be in greatest danger. Martic becomes obsolete should Krajina be left within Croatia (defending the sovereignty would cost too much in that case). The situation is similar as far as Croat Herzeg-Bosnia is concerned. Mate Boban is already 'on ice', although the real power is still in his hands.

When everything is taken into consideration there is a natural joining of interests: who cares most to see the Washington agreement undermined? Susak, Boban, Martic, Pale and Abdic; in this order, just about. If this should be so, and it seems it is, then nothing is impossible, especially since all kinds of things did take place in the past. It is known that the Air Force of the Republic of Serb Krajina carried out combat missions in Bosnia (bombing and helicopter support) for the needs of the Bosnian Serb Army, but also for those of HVO and the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia, for a fee. The relations between the Republic of Serb Krajina and UNPROFOR are so bad that neither side cares to insist on this: UNPROFOR does not know what to say (and is muddled anyway), and the Republic of Serb Krajina would have to explain why planes fly over Bosnia and were not used in the offensive against the Croats in the area of Medaci (Medak pocket). The fact that all sides relentlessly refuse to claim responsibility for the bombing of Novi Travnik and Bugojno and for those four unfortunate planes seems to be stirring up hard feelings: the romantics were killed and the realists are not crazy to confess. Whether the Herzegovinians paid and the Serbs from both states flew so that the Bosnian-Croat alliance would be undermined in a joint effort is still uncertain but is bound to come to light sooner or later.

There isn't a war which is clean, on the contrary. These wars, however, have managed to degrade to cynical business and common looting as main motives at a record time. Since the motives and interests of all sides are similar (not to say the same), mutual understanding appears to be inevitable: if the current ally is in trouble we'll sell him a pack of cigarettes for 10DM, a tank, grenades, etc. for a price he can afford. Thus, the action "Granica 94" in the Bosnian Serb Republic revealed that the trade with the enemy reaches large proportions (tanks, ammunition, weapons, vital strategic material). Everybody shells transformer stations in unison (which are repaired by UNPROFOR), since loads of money can be made on oil for transformers. The wounded Serb fighters who are treated in Serbia are entitled a television set, so that as many as ten TV sets are smuggled in per every wounded soldier and his permission. Strategic army industry facilities, such as "Kosmos-Cajavec" from Banja Luka, produce electronic components for poker machines. This is a serious business which yields serious money (even lives are lost because of these machines). A significant fraction of the Eastern European market is thus being supplied as well.

The hard dinar as masterminded by Dragoslav Avramovic was also introduced in the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina (20 million dinars were issued); if every dinar has a hard currency base, as Martic and Karadzic swear it does, where did the hard currency come from? Definitely not fro the economy and its exports. What's left as a source is renting of people and military equipment, the money from the war lobby in Herzegovina, the left-over cash from plundered mattresses and murky deals with Serbia (the export of food and vital necessities along with the draining of hard currency reserves from the people. Who is the "enemy" here? The answer can be found in a classic study of warfare called "Catch 22" by Joseph Heller. In the book, Milo Mindebinder explains why he had struck the deal with the Americans to bomb an overpass, and then with the Germans to defend it. "And the Germans are not our enemies.Sure, we're at war with them. But the Germans are also members in good standing of the syndicate, and it's my job to protect their rights...". Later on Milo negotiates with the Germans the bombing of his own air force base, since he is short of cash. There is a scandal, the papers are raging, the mothers of conscripts protest, but Milo offers an impeccable logic of a war-time realist, "In a democracy, the government is the people...We're the people, aren't we So we might jest as well keep the money and eliminate the middlemen. Frankly, I'd like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole field to private industry." Supposing that the warfare has remained as the only branch of industry which can yield some profit - then, why not?