The Start of the Trade-Off

The two-day Croatia-Krajina negotiations in Zagreb were interrupted without results, and it was announced that they would continue in seven days' time. Nobody was particularly disappointed. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy Vitaly Churkin assessed the talks as "constructive". The U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Gallbright said that the matter concerned a really complex problem, but that he was an optimist with regard to the part on the cease-fire. The negotiators too, seemed reconciliatory and peace-loving.

Head of the Croatian delegation Hrvoje Sarinic said that his side urged a "simple solution - that all forces in the field be separated, and that matters should be looked at from the point of view of peace, with UNPROFOR in control." Republic of Serb Krajina Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic went a step further. He concluded that both delegations had agreed that the people were tired of bloodshed, and spoke like a real pacifist when he said: "If it had been possible to achieve something by war, Croatia would now be in Knin or Krajina in Split". If we add to this the fact that the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade has started work, as has the Yugoslav Bureau in Zagreb, then it looks as if the battle-axes will be buried soon. The people seem to think that warlords in the former Yugoslavia are the only ones who can put an end to the three years of bloodshed, maiming and general poverty.

Even though economic sanctions and threats of air strikes against Bosnian Serbs helped greatly in securing Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's cooperation, the first move in the latest peace initiative, was made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Intimidated by the possibility that Croatia might suffer the fate of Serbia, all the more so as the Americans made it clear that they were deadly serious this time, Tudjman abandoned his policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and proclaimed the setting up of the Croatian-Muslim federation as one of the facets of the "thousand years' dream" (Croatia's dream of independence, ed. note). The abandoning the Herzeg-Bosnia project was made conditional to Krajina remaining a part of Croatia, and as matters stand, Tudjman seems to have received strong guarantees that it would be so. These developments have brought Milosevic into a situation where he must choose between a sparrow in the hand and a pigeon on the roof. The pigeon in this case would be the unification of all Serb lands, and the sparrow, the preserving of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and all that it means. As something is better than nothing, the great trade-off can begin. Many believe that the first steps in this direction were made in Geneva on January 19, with the signing of a joint statement on the normalization of Croatian-Yugoslav relations. The clause on the resolving of the conflict in Croatia is left to direct negotiations between Zagreb and Knin, and so points to the fact that Milosevic has started regarding Krajina as Croatia's internal affair. Tudjman's statement that "this is a recognition of Croatia's sovereignty", can be interpreted as another one of his proverbial gaffes, when he shoots himself in the foot, and unwittingly embarrasses his partner.

If things at the top are clear, their realization in the field is another matter. Feeling instinctively that Serbia was turning its back on them, Krajina Serbs nearly elected Milan Babic, an authentic and uncompromising warlord, at the presidential elections. Belgrade barely managed to thwart Babic's comeback by pushing former Interior Minister Milan Martic who swears by Milosevic, as the man who will unite all Serbs. But, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Krajina and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) hold the majority in the Krajina parliament, so that a blockade of political life seemed unavoidable. In fact, the SDS-SRS coalition threatened to annul Martic's victory. It started after the majority elected the Speaker and vice Speaker from their ranks. They then began insisting that the PM must be one them. As Belgrade's man, Martic could not agree to that and stalled for as long as he could. SDS Krajina and SRS deputies started vetoing presidential decrees which had been made during a state of war and carried legal clout. Martic had no other choice but to proclaim Borislav Mikelic mandator, and so split the Krajina Serbs, and in the ensuing situation and total lack of agreement, if necessary, dissolve the Assembly, and proclaim a state of emergency. The way things stand now, Babic and his supporters do not seem to be discouraged by such a possibility. After analyzing all election problems, they launched an attack against the current government. The Assembly first passed a vote of no confidence in Information Minister Milena Tanjga (primarily for her aggressive promotion of Martic in the local media). Prime Minister Djordje Bjegovic's resignation, and that of his cabinet, probably saved a lot of ministers from suffering a similar fate. Not many people would be interested in who is in authority in Krajina if the matter did not affect the negotiating process; while Martic guarantees the fulfillment of Belgrade's wishes, the general belief is that Babic would not abandon a bellicose policy, regardless of the cost. That is why his elimination from the scene became a priority with the Serbian leadership. Since things may not be admitted out right, the local state media are doing their best to accuse him of being the main protagonist in all quarrels among Krajina Serbs, something which can only be regarded as being in Croatia's interest. The Belgrade daily "Vecernje Novosti" said in a commentary that if the Krajina Serbs "wish to survive and unify with their brethren," they must first "unite between themselves".

Ahead of the negotiations in Zagreb, Martic did his best to underscore that Krajina's statehood was not being brought into question and that talks about it were out of the question. Tudjman also did his best to make it clear that he wasn't prepared to make any concessions. He underscored that apart from cultural and some territorial autonomy (special status for the districts of Knin and Glina), Krajina Serbs would not be offered anything else. Still, it is believed that neither of the two will manage to persevere in their stands, and that the matter concerns moves aimed at anticipating internal political quakes which could follow a radical departure from a nationalist policy and the making of big concessions.

For as long as Krajina exists, it will be a constant source of instability in Croatia, and Martic, or rather, Milosevic, will try to use this fact to soften up Croatia's policy. A part of the Croatian public fear that such pressure could force too many concessions, thus jeopardizing Croatia's statehood. On the other hand, Tudjman wishes to use the withdrawal in B-H maximally and increase the international community's sanctions against Serbia. His latest appearances all point to this, from his speech in the UN Security Council under US protection, to his statements on returning to Zagreb. Statements such as the one by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that sanctions against Yugoslavia should be linked to Krajina, seem to offer credibility to all those who claim that Tudjman has reached an agreement to abandon Herzeg-Bosnia. Veljko Knezevic who heads the Yugoslav Bureau in Zagreb, said that Croatian representatives were very obliging in bilateral meetings, and the fact that they were doing their best to use the international scene to spite Serbia as much as possible, was not accidental.

Both sides, each in its way, are trying to make the most of the current negotiations. International mediators, after extracting a cease-fire, plan on setting up economic links. Because of the dependence of Krajina and Croatia on each other, they believe that it will be a lot easier to resolve Krajina's status, probably with a federation, after the warlords have cooled off. In that way all would be satisfied: Zagreb with territorial integration and Belgrade with the "protection" of the Serb population.