Nato Strikes

On Sunday, April 10 at 16:32 local time, the radar crew of a large radar network which monitors the whole of the Balkans and the Adriatic, noticed during routine observation, an eightplane formation in the zone of 25 nautical miles from the town of Gorazde. At 17:15 they lost one plane because it was flying low, and between 17:20 and 17:25 two planes were no longer on the screen, while at 17:52 all eight planes left the area. What happened on earth? At 17:22 two US F16C planes belonging to NATO forces dropped three MK82 bombs (mass: 227 kilos) on a target described as the ``command position: a tent and several military vehicles''; ``target destroyed,'' was announced later.

What military analysts had feared most, had happened. The first UN shots from the air had been fired against Serb positions on land. There had been various incidents between UN and Serb forces before; guns and artillery had been employed, but things were different now. Politically and psychologically air strike threats are something else; this had been underscored several times: both sidesthe Serbs and the UN, had in the meantime, started attaching great importance to air strikes. The international community had threatened to use planes for a long time; Serb Republic in BosniaHerzegovina officials had made it clear to the UN that in such an event, they would consider UN staff ``members of aggressor troops in Serb Republic in BH territory.'' An exchange of direct threats started during the Srebrenica offensive (JanuaryFebruary 1993), and escalated during the crisis over the Sarajevo ultimatum in mid February this year. Bosnian Serb Army Generals Manojlo Milovanovic and Milan Gvero were very clear, they even included foreign journalists and staff working for humanitarian organizations among potential ``enemies.'' Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic denied the statements later, but added that in the event of air strikes against Serb positions, it would not be possible to ``control the anger of the people,'' which boils down to the same thing.

The situation in Gorazde in 1994 is different from that in Srebrenica in 1993. The number of UN troops has increased significantly; the number of available NATO planes (with regard to the enforcement of the nofly zone, and as support to UNPROFOR on the ground) now stands at 180 planes. The psychological atmosphere surrounding the Bosnian crisis has also changed after the Sarajevo ultimatum and the downing of four ``anonymous'' planes. The Srebrenica crisis was neutralized thanks to the skill of both sides: Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic and General Milanovic were more flexible, while UN Force Commander General Philippe Morillon was very energetic. In the case of Gorazde, it is interesting to follow the behavior of both sidesthe Serbs and the international community. How did the issue get out of hand? Who did what? How did the air strikes come about?

It was clear for weeks ahead that the BH Army would launch a spring offensive. The new alliance with Croatia (such as it is) had increased the BH army's military potential somewhat, but not everywhere, since the level of cooperation and trust differs from place to place. The success of the Sarajevo ultimatum and the downing of those planes were just additional encouragement. Even without them there would have been a renewal of fighting because the Bosnian side knows that it must maintain the dynamics of warthey have no other option.

The Serb Republic in BH and its Belgrade war lobby announced through their propaganda machines that Eastern Bosnia would be the scene of combat once more. Operations around Gorazde started in late March after smaller incidents instigated, it seems, by the Bosnian Muslim side. BH Army attempts at breaking through to Gorazde were to be expected: this enclave is barely able to contain 65,000 inhabitants, mostly refugees from other parts of Eastern Bosnia (before the war the Gorazde community had 37,505 inhabitants70% Muslims and 26% Serbs). The logical direction of attack from Gorazde and towards the city were to the West, towards Trnovo and Sarajevoif this were possible, but it wasn't because it was too far, there was too much resistance and few men. Viewed realistically, and considering the balance of forces, all that could have been expected was an attempt at extending the enclave. Gorazde's only military facility is the factory ``Pobjeda,'' the only factory in Yugoslavia which produced ammunition caps. This is what makes Gorazde so attractive to the Serbs.

Official propaganda explanations on the operation against Gorazde, are, however, somewhat unusual: ``The teeth of the Islamic dragon have been broken and Alija Izetbegovic's last hope is to link up from Sarajevo via GorazdeCajnicaFoca with Raska and Kosovo and further on with Albania, the biggest hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe'' (``Javnost,'' Bosnian Serb semiofficial weekly, April 9, 1994, page 7). This thesis has been repeated on several occasions; the ``green transversal'' to Sandzak is mentioned, along with systematic accusations against the UN that they have armed Muslims via UNPROFOR and operation ``Provide Promise.'' ``But, they won't manage to cross the Drina River with those arms and enter Yugoslavia,'' said Bosnian Serb Army Colonel Jezdimir Lakicevic on March 30. General Radovan Grubac, Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army Herzegovina Corps, said on April 3: ``The Muslims have launched this offensive with the blessing of the UN forces... We no longer recognize this organization.'' Serb military sources accused the UN of air dropping substances to the Muslims ``for the production of war gas in Vitkovici,'' a village in the vicinity of Gorazde which has a fertilizer factory. Ambitions of capturing Gorazde were not denied: ``We are starting a counter attack with the idea of recapturing Serb land in the region of Gorazde which has been under Muslim occupation for the past two years,'' said Colonel Novica Gusic in early April. ``We will soon capture the whole area around Gorazde and so set up control on both sides of the Drina River,'' said General Vlado Spremo in a statement to Radio Montenegro on April 8.

Attacks in the area of Gorazde started on March 29 and lasted until April 11. Bosnian Serb forces came to one kilometer from the city center and practically took over the right bank of the Drina River, including part of the city zone of Gorazde. According to UNHCR data there were 156 dead among the refugees and over 600 wounded (the number of dead and injured has grown in the meantime). The reasons for the attack on Gorazde are not absolutely clear; the population and the army were not given a chance of withdrawing (and where would they go?). It is hard to believe that the Bosnian Serb Army would take on the responsibility for 65,000 hungry civilians in Gorazde (what for?). It is more likely that the matter concerns the compressing of the enclave to a size which would not be a threat to the Zvornik Foca line of communication, and the instigating of a crisis which would later be resolved along the lines of the Srebrenica crisis: with the UN crew in Gorazde and UNPROFOR taking over responsibility for BH army troops. It seems that Bosnian Serbs are intent on securing traffic between Eastern Bosnia and Eastern Herzegovina on territory they hold, and not through Serbia and Montenegro. It was expected that this episode of the Bosnian war would end along these lines, but something went wrong somewhere...

Something happened along the line of relations between UNPROFOR in Bosniathe United Nations in New YorkUS President Bill Clinton's administration. UNPROFOR Commander General Michael Rose and his associates systematically reduced the importance of the Bosnian Serb Army's operation in Gorazde from the very beginning. General Rose repeated for days that the Serbian offensive in Gorazde was an isolated tactical military maneuver with no greater strategic goal. This would have been understandable had the UNHCR not started cautioning of great civilian losses. While General Rose tried to reach an agreement with General Mladic, his spokesman Major Aninck did his best to soothe public opinion. During this time UN representatives warned that Serbian forces were holding the southern and southeastern parts of the enclave. US Defence Secretary William Perry and Chief of Joint Staffs General John Shalikashvili said publicly that the US would not undertake any military operations over Gorazde. Omer (John, Jovan) Zametica, Karadzic's spokesman told a foreign journalist that these statements had been regarded as a ``green light'' for the Serbs to take Gorazde. On April 8, Karadzic told UN special envoy for the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi that ``the city was not endangered and that the battles were being conducted outside the city, and that they were the result of the Muslim offensive.'' Karadzic's real message, however, read differently: no partial ceasefire; peace in the whole of BH; the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia. The links between diplomacy and war are clearly visible here: Karadzic said he ``wanted negotiations''; Alija Izetbegovic replied: Only after you stop pounding Gorazde; the Serbs claimed that they had not touched Gorazde, but that the matter concerned the Muslim's spring offensive; General Rose tried to go to Gorazde, but Karadzic and General Mladic dissuaded him (according to some sources ``prevented'' him); Rose did however, send a team of his SAS special units to Gorazde. It turned out later that Karadzic had kept the Russian side in the dark over the true nature of events in Gorazde, so that Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin criticized him sharply.

Things speeded up: the US side tried to remedy the impression created by Perry's and Shalikashvili's statements; UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros BoutrosGhali expressed a growing concern; the UNHCR sent alarming warnings of civilian victims in Gorazde; the Serbs continued to claim that the matter concerned a ``counteroffensive.'' On April 9 Belgrade daily Politika military commentator Miroslav Lazanjski said the following: ``From the military point of view, it was irrational and unreasonable to open artillery fire on the Gorazde city center, because this resulted in world public wrath over the civilian victims, while the military results of such fire are questionable.'' On the same day, Boutros BoutrosGhali demanded of the Serbian side that it withdraw its troops from the UN protected area of Gorazde, and ordered UN troops to use all available means. On this last day before the attack, UNPROFOR staff were still trying to convince the public that the intensity of the fighting had dropped.

The first bombs hit Serb positions around Gorazde on Sunday afternoon. The surprise was total. The first reaction from the Bosnian Serb side came from General Mladic's deputy, General Milan Gvero. ``The Bosnian Serb Army did not fire on the town of Gorazde,'' said General Gvero in a statement to Tanjug news agency, in his best Dubrovnik style (``Not a speck of dust has fallen on Dubrovnik,'' in autumn 1991). The bombs destroyed the artillery command position and two tanks and killed some fifteen people. The operation lasted about half an hour, and even though it wasn't necessary from the technical point of view, included the UN SecretaryGeneral. General Rose first cautioned General Mladic on Sunday at two o'clock in the afternoon (local time) by telephone that General Mladic's artillery was endangering UN staff in Gorazde and asked him to stop. An hour later the warning was repeated by telefax. At half past six, after the NATO air strike, General Rose's headquarters received a telefax message from General Manojlo Milovanovic which said that ``shells were not falling on Gorazde.'' It was too late.

The bombing of Gorazde stopped 18 minutes after the air strike. Omer Zametica told the BBC the following morning (Monday), after the second attack: ``If the UN endanger Serb lives with air strikes, then we will no longer be able to guarantee the behavior of our soldiers towards UNPROFOR troops in the field. If the air strikes continue then we will find ourselves at war with the United Nations...'' Asked by a journalist to comment statements made by onthespot witnesses on the shelling of Gorazde, Zametica said: ``We did not shell Gorazde at the time. That is not true.'' On Monday, April 11 in the morning, Serb artillery continued to shell Gorazde. UN military observers reported precise and concentrated artillery shelling (8 shells 50 meters from their building); UNHCR staff reported that shells were falling 200 meters from their building.

On Monday morning at around 11:45, two F/A18 fighter bombers flew low over Serb positions several times as a warning to Serb forces to stop firing. At 12:25 the UN command center in Sarajevo telephoned General Mladic to stop firing or new air strikes would follow. NATO planes flew over Gorazde again between 12:36 and 13:00 and dropped magnesium signals as a warning (or possible countermeasure to anti aircraft fire from the ground). However, the artillery shelling of Gorazde continued.

At 13:15 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic telephoned Karadzic in the presence of Vitaly Churkin, and Karadzic promised that the firing would stop. General Rose asked that new air strikes be put off for half an hour. At 14:03 a fighter plane broke the sound barrier over Gorazde and the firing stopped, but started again after a few minutes. General Rose ordered a new air strike against tanks firing on the city. At 14:19 a F/A18 plane dropped three bombs destroying one tank and two armored transporters. It turned out later that one of the bombs had not unhinged from the plane and that two did not explode. At 14:33 an interesting telephone conversation followed between Generals Rose and Mladic: Rose tells Mladic: If you stop firing on Gorazde we will not send any more planes. Mladic: One more attack and I will shoot the planes down. I can't guarantee UNPROFOR's security and I will attack UNPROFOR and your headquarters. This is followed by a quiet period which lasts until 15:45 when Rose calls Mladic again because of sporadic tank fire and threatens to order new air strikes. Mladic says that his side is not firing and by 16:00 the deadline set by Rose, the fighting has stopped.

What happenedhappened. Later propaganda exploitation of the event was interesting. Karadzic told Vitaly Churkin on April 12 that bombs had fallen on the city center of Gorazde: ``Lets go to Gorazde and see how we can help Muslim civilians. NATO has bombed the city center,'' said Karadzic, adding ``the Muslims are getting peace in the hope that the zone of Gorazde will be extended to the border with Serbia, even Sandzak.'' On the same day the Bosnian Serb army artillery said that it was not shelling Gorazde. A Bosnian Serb Army commander in the field said on April 12: ``In the past 15 days, the Serbs never shelled Gorazde.'' The Bosnian Serb Army Herzegovina corps command said on the same day: ``Serb artillery is not shelling the city,'' while Karadzic and Mladic issued orders that any plane firing on Serb positions should be shot down. Papers supporting the war lobby in Belgrade hinted that UN military observers were forced at gunpoint to ask for air strikes, and that British soldiers in the UN force ``since Michael Rose's arrival had exchanged their blue helmets for turbans'' (but forgot to add if they had been circumcised). Sixty odd UNPROFOR members and UN observers in BH are under ``house arrest,'' but there are no complaints as to their treatment. UNPROFOR troops in Sarajevo are withdrawing from the demarcation line, troops everywhere are in a state of full battle alert.

Churkin, Akashi, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg are flying around trying to patch things up, while Karadzic and Milosevic are doing their best to make the most out of the political side of the issue. The game is familiar: they know that negotiations as such are the best thing for professional negotiators and the UN bureaucracy. Karadzic has already started blackmailing: remove those responsible for the air strikesRose to start withand then we'll talk. Clinton and BoutrosGhali are still talking of new air strikes, but it is too late for them now. It is clear to all that the air strikes would not have happened if the US administration had been less confused and General Rose had not relied so much on his underground diplomacy. The air strikes against Gorazde stand a chance of remaining an isolated incident. Otherwise Katz's Law holds true: ``Men and nations see reason only when all other possibilities have been exhausted.''