Teasing The Bear

It was clear on Sunday evening that something had gone wrong: Vitaly Churkin, the special envoy of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the deputy of Russian Information Minister Andrei Kozyirev, appeared on television depressed and downcast. ``These five hours have been the most difficult time in my life. Some big mistakes have been made. This meeting should have been more productive. I'm very disappointed,'' said Churkin before leaving Pale for Moscow. His depression turned into anger of biblical proportions en route. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Churkin called a press conference at the airport and said acidly (according to the ``Interfax'' agency), ``Russia must end all talks with the Bosnian Serbs. The time of talking is over. The Bosnian Serbs must realise that Russia is a great power, not a banana republic. The Russian policy in former Yugoslavia was the policy of a great power. Our relations with the Serbs can be expressed in a simple way: when the Serbs claimed that the whole world was against them we agreed to help on condition they followed our instructions. Instead, the Bosnian Serbs used the Russian policy as a shield. During the crisis in Gorazde the Serbs were supposed to stop their offensive on the town. While the Russian side mediated when the Serbs agreed to U.N. deployment around the town, the Serbs withdrew the offer. They failed to demonstrate either readiness or will to agree to our mediating efforts. They only wasted our time... A small group of the Bosnian Serbs succumbed to war madness. Russia should decide whether it will allow a group of extremists to abuse the Russian policy for the purpose of achieving their goals and drag other Serbs into this madness. Our answer is clearnever. If someone plays with the Russian policy, Russia will reply as a great power.''

At the second press conference held the same day, Minister Andrei Kozyrev was diplomatic and tactical as usual, ``We cannot go from one crisis to another. We are aware from before that words and acts don't mean the same when the Serbs are concerned. In the context of this situation it is necessary that this difference is reduced and not enhanced.'' Kozyrev reminded that the Muslims use NATO air strikes. ``They continue to provoke the Serbs without showing any interest in an agreement on the resolution of the conflict.''

Over the next few days, until Thursday, it turned out that Vitaly Churkin was neither drunk nor ``tired'' (as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic commented Churkin's statement), he neither spoke ``on impulse'' (as Speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament Momcilo Krajisnik said) nor ``in his own name'' (according to ``an unnamed Russian source'' quoted by the Belgrade daily ``Vecernje novosti''). Russian President Boris Yeltsin was furious. Genady Shikin, the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, was summoned to Moscow ``for consultations.'' Sergei Demurin, the Spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, was asked why he refers to ``the Serbs as a whole, and not to the Bosnian Serbs.'' His reply was, ``Our Minister Kozyrev went to see President Milosevic and the latter promised that Gorazde will be deblocked. One must then assume that the President of Serbia knew why he made a promise, and we think that one cannot promise something to one big country and then break the promise.''

It is clear what is implied here: the tactics that goes, ``Who? Me?!,'' i.e. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic passing the hot potato around in order to cover up what's been done and keep what's been takenno longer works. This is the season when the bears wake up and it isn't advisable to tease them while they are still sleepy.

The Russian bear is not the only one. Some angered diplomats from member countries of NATO made the following message clear after the Russian outrage hit Belgrade: firstly, it is very difficult to upset open and democratic societies and make them resort to arms; but, once one does, such societies are relentless; secondly, the telephone lines between Washington, Moscow, London, Paris and Brussels have been very busy since Monday, including other activities, and the Russians are angry... U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on Tuesday that ``the Serbs got tied up in lies and delays without a precedent.'' Yasushi Akashi, the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary General, was quietly desperate and even hinted at a withdrawal of U.N. from Bosnia (hoping that this might frighten Karadzic and Mladic) since, as he said, ``Karadzic had promised a truce and a withdrawal of heavy weaponry, but this did not produce any tangible results in the field.'' Newspaper commentators in U.S. and other Christian countries spitefully plunged into maltreating and badmouthing the policy of U.N., Europe, and U.S., reminding that ``Russia's possibilities are limited.'' The tone is best reflected in ``The Washington Post,'' ``The latest policy of the month in Bosnia boils down to airforce and prayers... It is conceivable that planes and prayers may suffice.'' Several commentators evoked the spirit of Vietnam, with good reason this time: the adventure on April 10 and 11 somewhat resembles the first ``symbolic and warning'' bombardment of North Vietnam in 1965. The Americans want to force the Serbs back to the negotiating table with bombs, yet they forget that the Serbs have a different tactic.

Gorazde is an academic example of that tactic, familiar from the last three years of the Balkan wars. It is based on a ``hot and cold'' principle: we attack and seize ground, and immediately head for Geneva to negotiate, there we bargain to exhaustion with the people who lack an experience of marathon-like real socialist sessions. That's what happened with the Vance plan, with Bosnia in the summer of 1992, with Srebrenica, Sarajevo, etc. The agenda of the next round of talks on the cold Geneva lake can already be made out: Radovan Karadzic said on Wednesday that ``the whole town is not the goal of our counter offensive, but only the right bank of the Drina River which belongs to the Serbs'' (only he didn't say that the right bank of the Drina River has belonged to the Serbs for entire three days); on Thursday, Momcilo Krajisnik described ``the real circumstances in the field, that the Drina is the border which divides Gorazde into a Serb and a Muslim part: the right part of the town is Serb and the one on the left bank is Muslim.'' On Wednesday, Kozyrev was ``received assurances from the Bosnian Serbs that they would cease fire and that they agreed to safe havens under U.N. control.'' However, having learnt the lesson, Kozyrev warned the Bosnian Serbs ``not to test the world's patience.'' In an official announcement issued on Monday Karadzic promised that his forces ``would stay 3 km outside the town,'' and Boris Yeltsin replied that ``the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs should cease attacks on Gorazde and leave the town.'' Meanwhile, Milosevic was making promised that ``he would influence Karadzic.'' While they went on promising and warning each other, Mladic's army pounded Gorazde practically without stopping. On Monday, a team of U.N. military observers (members of the elite British regiment SAS), that had been sent by General Sir Michael Rose, was evacuated by helicopter under the cover of darkness, so that there was no one left to navigate the NATO planes in case of new air strikes, unless the task was to be undertaken by two doctors of the organisation ``Medecines Sans Frontiers,'' whom the Belgrade daily ``Vecernje novosti'' have been mercilessly badmouthing for weeks. But, they would have no time anyway: the hospital in Gorazde, where they work, has taken several direct hits that killed dozens of patients and refugees. On Thursday, over 20 people were killed by one shell, the number of killed civilians rose to over 400, and the number of wounded to over 1,200, this according to the reports of humanitarian organisations. General Milan Gvero said on Monday that ``the units of the Bosnian Serb Republic did not open fire in the area of Gorazde in a 3 km radius from the town center which is situated on the left bank of the Drina River.'' On Wednesday, Karadzic announced that the Serbian side declared a unilateral ceasefire in Gorazde and that the crisis was over as far as they were concerned. Besides, Karadzic said that the Muslims in Gorazde ``activated mines by remote control'' killing each other in order to provoke an intervention by NATO. This was the situation early in the evening on Thursday: shells rained on Gorazde, and Karadzic spoke about peace, the obligatory lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a condition for the overall cessation of hostilities, that he would not take Gorazde, that he wanted to ``turn Gorazde into a safe haven,'' that he was ready to make concessions.

Events in the skies over Gorazde were numerous last week. Firstly, General Mladic said on April 13 that he would shoot at anything that flies over the Bosnian Serb Republic, only to later specify that they ``would shoot at anything that flies and opens fire on them.'' Then, the antiaircraft artillery of the Bosnian Serb Army damaged the French plane ``Super Etandard,'' and the Bosnian Serb Army warned that anything flying below the altitude of 3,000 m would be shot at. On Sunday, April 17, the British ``Sea Harrier'' was shot down (the pilot ejected and was picked up by helicopter). Bosnian Serb military sources responded immediately by saying that the Muslims had downed the British plane and added that ``they had the recording of the radio traffic'' to confirm this. However, there was a mistake in coordination. On Monday, April 18, Lieutenant Colonel Risto Aleksic, the head of the antiaircraft defense of the Herzegovina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army, told the Podgorica daily ``Pobjeda'' that ``his fighters had shot down at least one plane with a missile `strela'.'' ``It is a myth that NATO planes are untouchable and that they can be effective from a distance of 10 km. They are not as horrible as we've made ourselves think they are,'' Lieutenant Colonel Aleksic concluded.

The message of the Bosnian Serbs was clear: if this is what the famed air strikes are all aboutgreat, carry on. The price of all the fun around Gorazde was small (one tent, few vehicles and several fatalities); the bluff was disguised. While U.N., U.S., and Russia writhed in humiliation, Karadzic, aware that one strikes the iron while it's hot, never stopped for a moment. General Gvero reminded NATO that ``they had not used their missiles yet, and possess a large arsenal of those missiles that can shoot down every flying monster!''

On Wednesday, after a twohourlong delay, U.S. President Bill Clinton went public with his plan on the future policy in Bosnia. The plan has three points and relies on the previously adopted conclusions by the NATO Council, that meet the request of the U.N. Secretary General for a wider military support to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. The fist point envisions wider usage of NATO airforce in protection of save havens, but also attacks on the targets from where these havens are endangered; the second point refers to the tightening of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the third to ``the support'' to enforcing UNPROFOR units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clinton thus bought several days to think about the Balkan conundrum. Insulted Boris Yeltsin is buying his time by proposing an already triedout recipe of ``a summit on BH,'' everything is returning, at least temporarily, to old, trodden diplomatic tracks, where everybody feels comfortable, and Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic most of all.

On Thursday evening an UNPROFOR convoy heading for Gorazde according to an agreement ground to a halt in Rogatica. Threats were heard that the town would be shelled unless the population withdrew to the left bank of the Drina River within a 3 km radius. Jovan Zametica, the spokesman of Radovan Karadzic, quoted ``women's concern about their husbands, brothers, and relatives, detained in Gorazde,'' as an excuse for the incident in Rogatica. But, the sources in the field reported that there is a significant percentage of Serbs among the defenders of Gorazde.

The story slowly repeats itself. Someone may soon be skating on thin ice because of being much too sure. The patience is dangerously running out. The game of driving a wedge between Russia and American is becoming risky: it takes time to upset these bears, but when one does, there's trouble. The problem is that the Americans and the Russians are more important to each other than Milosevic and Karadzic are even in normal circumstances, and let alone when two Balkan crooks lie to them, wasting their time. Lies and empty promises in diplomacy occasionally represent necessary means, but sensible people try to stay away from them as much as possible. Reputation and credibility of a great power-Russia, U.S., Europeweighs more on a political scale than matters whose seriousness surpasses that of underhand diplomacy of petty Balkan war lords. The Russian message was quite clear: it does not make any difference to us who controls whom, whether Milosevic controls Karadzic or vice versa. All Serbs are the same as far as the Russians are concerned (as the Serbs have claimed for years now). The story that ``the Serbs are not at war'' no longer works. Gentlemen, be kind and organise yourselves somehow.

It will eventually turn out that Ratko Mladic is responsible for everything, and he was only carrying out the ruling ideology of ethnic exclusiveness and the tradition of dying JNA (the Yugoslav People's Army)first raze to the ground and then seize, it's only ``Turks'' and bad Serbs living there anyway. Gorazde had its diplomatic purpose: it was a message to the Bosnians to agree to a general ceasefire or else... The American policy is similar, but they conduct it unwillingly and clumsily. Given the situation, whoever is more patient and persistent has the advantage until the other side becomes spiteful. Thus the victories such as the one won around Gorazde may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.