Us And Russians 200 Million Souls

by Milan Milosevic

When those who wish to praise Milosevic's Machiavellian moves, they say that he was the first to realize that Josip Broz Tito was dead. There are many details in Milosevic's policy which point to the fact that we can expect to see many ambitious politicians who, in their fervor to cover up Milosevic's disastrous policy, will claim that Milosevic was probably among the last to understand that the August 19, 1991 putsch in Moscow failed

`In short, Ristic (Serbian PM at the time) believed that it wasn't wise to make deals with Russia, but that it was much better to put Russia before a fait accompli. If we bargain with Russia, then it, as the bigger and stronger of the two, will enforce its will; if we put it before a fait accompli, we may not succeed, but our catastrophe more than our victory, will force Russia to take a stand and get involved. Undoubtedly, all this is very risky, but taking risks is part and parcel of high politics.''

This is what wellknown Serbian historian and intelectual Slobodan Jovanovic wrote when describing SerboRussian relations at the time of the SerboTurkish war, a time when this country was inundated with Russians, Cossacks with their tall bearskin caps, volunteers, idealists who urged the PanSlav idea, desperados wishing to die to a heroic death like Vronsky, retired officers yearning for glory and medals, idlers, bon vivants and other tricksters who wished to have a grand time at the expense of the Slav committees.

The text describes General Chernayev, the Slav committee deputy who had personal interests in seeing that the war went on, because ``if he managed, through his activities to instigate a SerboTurkish war, then all his minor failures on the Serbian battlefield would be forgotten in the face of such a great historical event.'' The Russian Emperor, however, was not in the mood to go to war in order to round off Serbia's borders, and sent diplomats to soothe the Serbs. They poured cold water on the fire while Chernayev added oil. The epilogue: ``The bloody episode which Chernayev, the dreamer and humbug, staged in the Morava valley missed its main purpose.''

According to Slobodan Jovanovic, Chernayev, as our army commander was more at war with Russian diplomats than the Turks.

That is the way things stood in 1876, and that is how they are today. In this new ``war against Russian diplomacy,'' the following have been mobilized: radical elements, adventurers, psychopaths, even soothsayers. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is the main target of these attacks. During the Moscow putsch, Kozyrev had been appointed to visit the West and enlist support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and in the event of Yeltsin's downfall, to set up a government in exile. Kozyrev, therefore was the Russian reformists' ``last reserve.''

There are many details which indicate that the Belgrade regime (and national intelligentsia) supported the putschists, and that they still can't get over the fact that the putsch failed. There were undenied claims that certain retired Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) generals were in contact with some of the putschists in the top Russian leadership (the state committee during the state of emergency ordered 250,000 pairs of handcuffs). A document issued by the JNA political department in early 1991 uses language reminiscent of the ``state of emergency plan'' tried out in the USSR in December 1990 and January 1991, with its (public salvation committees), etc. Finally, the Stalinists were quick to embrace the ``patriotic line'' in our state media. This happened in the same manner in which demoted keepers of the internationalist flame turned into chauvinists in Moscow.

It is unnatural that Serbia, should confront the Western world to the verge of self-destruction, in spite of the fact that 600,0001 million of its citizens live and work there, while Serbia's highly educated youth are fleeing to the West en masse. The latest isolationist wave (persecution of journalists, humanitarian workers, supporters of the European idea, and even ``bad Russians''), is not the product of a nationalist tradition but of Stalinism. Serb nationalists, such as they are, and there have been many variants, were not isolationists, on the contrary, they defined themselves as ``allies,'' or fighters for democracy. Serbia never before had ``an anti-allied phrase'' as is now propagated by official propaganda. This bitter rejection of the ``new world order'' must have arisen from an imperial feeling of affront, greater and more spontaneous than could have been the case with Serbs.

One must pity our evil old men they will die without living to see a third world war. All this is not surprising. At the start of his career, Milosevic held a lecture on Mikhail Gorbachev and the advantages of Socialism. Preparations for Milosevic's rise to power were carried out by so called ``orthodox Marxists'' and the retired officer corps in Serbia, who, it is becoming increasingly clear as time goes by, were linked emotionally to the fate of the old Russian order.

After the failure of the Moscow putsch, many supporters of the military police apparatus and the old nomenclature visited Belgrade. In fact, more of them came, than did White Russians after the October Revolution. Men such as former Soviet government Premier Popov and extremists like Aleksandar Vengerovski and Liberal Democratic Party leader Aleksandar Zhirinovski, who after visiting Belgrade this spring, bragged that he had ``confidential information'' that the Serbs would lease the naval base in Kotor to Russia, and that he intended to send 200,000 Russians, most of them retired officers to Bosnia.

The fact that TV Belgrade journalists have interviewed so many opponents of the current Russian government cannot be explained with ideological sympathies, there must be some more obvious plan and reason.

Officially, everything has been covered with the guise of patriotism and ``economic cooperation.'' On the other hand, the domestic opposition (Serbian Renewal Movement SPO leader Vuk Draskovic) expressed suspicion that the opposition in Russia was being financed by Belgrade via Cyprus. In some of its news items, the Moscow news agency ``Novosti'' hinted at such a possibility. When all those who today come under UNPROFOR's competency, one day come under Interpol's competency, many interesting details will surface.

Because of these and many other psychological and material details it wasn't to be expected that domestic officials and warlords would receive Yeltsin's mediators with sincerity. Practically all domestic participants could have had some personal motive in making sure that the mediation failed and that the Russian envoys were humiliated in some way, or at least lied to. It is interesting that long telephone conversations with Moscow played a large part in this affair. (Grachev disclosed that he had talked with Bosnian Serb Army commander Ratko Mladic on Sunday.)

I do not believe that Vitaly Churkin and Kozyrev did not know who they were talking to, and because of the outcome of their mission, lost all diplomatic tact, as many here underscored from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic. They knew who they were talking to and took the opportunity of slapping the face of ``fools obsessed with war,'' largely with the Russian public in mind. This is the reason for the mentioning of Russian pride and greatness.

Just as BH President Alija Izetbegovic is exacerbating the catastrophe suffered by his people in the hope that he will get the Americans involved, so the warlords on the Serbian side are repeating general Chernayev's game, in which, if they lose, the very catastrophe will get the Russians involved. The slap should have been sufficient warning that no prolongation of the war in the Balkans will be in Russia's interests.

Milan Milosevic

Russians

Us And Russians 200 Million Souls

``In short, Ristic (Serbian PM at the time) believed that it wasn't wise to make deals with Russia, but that it was much better to put Russia before a fait accompli. If we bargain with Russia, then it, as the bigger and stronger of the two, will enforce its will; if we put it before a fait accompli, we may not succeed, but our catastrophe more than our victory, will force Russia to take a stand and get involved. Undoubtedly, all this is very risky, but taking risks is part and parcel of high politics.''

According to Slobodan Jovanovic, Chernayev, as our army commander was more at war with Russian diplomats than the Turks.

It is unnatural that Serbia, should confront the Western world to the verge of selfdestruction, in spite of the fact that 600,0001 million of its citizens live and work there, while Serbia's highly educated youth are fleeing to the West en masse. The latest isolationist wave (persecution of journalists, humanitarian workers, supporters of the European idea, and even ``bad Russians''), is not the product of a nationalist tradition but of Stalinism. Serb nationalists, such as they are, and there have been many variants, were not isolationists, on the contrary, they defined themselves as ``allies,'' or fighters for democracy. Serbia never before had ``an antiallied phrase'' as is now propagated by official propaganda. This bitter rejection of the ``new world order'' must have arisen from an imperial feeling of affront, greater and more spontaneous than could have been the case with Serbs.

One must pity our evil old menthey will die without living to see a third world war. All this is not surprising. At the start of his career, Milosevic held a lecture on Mikhail Gorbachev and the advantages of Socialism. Preparations for Milosevic's rise to power were carried out by so called ``orthodox Marxists'' and the retired officer corps in Serbia, who, it is becoming increasingly clear as time goes by, were linked emotionally to the fate of the old Russian order.

Officially, everything has been covered with the guise of patriotism and ``economic cooperation.'' On the other hand, the domestic opposition (Serbian Renewal MovementSPO leader Vuk Draskovic) expressed suspicion that the opposition in Russia was being financed by Belgrade via Cyprus. In some of its news items, the Moscow news agency ``Novosti'' hinted at such a possibility. When all those who today come under UNPROFOR's competency, one day come under Interpol's competency, many interesting details will surface.

I do not believe that Vitaly Churkin and Kozyrev did not know who they were talking to, and because of the outcome of their mission, lost all diplomatic tact, as many here underscoredfrom Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic. They knew who they were talking to and took the opportunity of slapping the face of ``fools obsessed with war,'' largely with the Russian public in mind. This is the reason for the mentioning of Russian pride and greatness.