And Nowsomething Completely Different: Brcko

A brief look at the map is no longer necessary. The Bosnian war has moved on to its second crucial moment (the first was in the winter of 1992/93, when the crippled Bosnian state managed to survive politically, and, what's more important, militarily as well). The current crucial moment is a result of simultanous ripening of four political processes:

a. the process of consolidation of the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina

b. the process of survival and strengthening of Republic of BosniaHerzegovina

c. the process of changes in Croatia's policy towards BosniaHerzegovina

d. the process of great powers running short of patience regarding the Balkan crisis.

Ill fortune that recently befell Brcko following the first crisis in the area in the summer of 1992 was doomed at the very beginning of the war in Bosnia. The Serb side then failed to take the territory that would be wide enough and stretch from the north to the south on the right bank of River Sava. With such territory the Bosnian Serb Republic would be a compact entity that could be easily defended and on which the Republic of Serb Krajina could rely. This way western Serbs have the Corridor, a narrow strip that connects Serbia and Serbcontrolled Eastern Bosnia with the area of Banjaluka and a greater part of the Republic of Serb Krajina. A decision to start the war in Bosnia brought the Serbs in a paradoxical situation: the war threatened the survival of the selfproclaimed Serb state in Croatia. The opportunity to seize the whole of Northern and Central Bosnia and to round up the territory was missed. Corridors, in general, represent a big problem and are short lived: whether they are passable and safe largely depends on the balance of power. Whoever controls a corridor must deploy a much stronger military force than the party attacking it. The wider the corridor the better. But, it is by far the best if the corridor is unnecessary.

The width of the corridor around Brcko varies: it is only one kilometer in places, and a little more elsewhere. Forces of the BH army in the area have so far been too weak to engage in a serious operation of cutting off the traffic. Each time they tried the Bosnian Serb army responded with a superior military force. This is logical: the Corridor occupies the first place on the Bosnian Serb list of priorities because of the shape of the territory under Bosnian Serb control. This means that they would give up many things only to save it. The Corridor is of vital importance to the Serbs and the Bosnians and the Croats know it. In practise this means that any attempt at cutting the Corridor would prompt a fierce reaction by the Serb side both in this area and in other places as reprisal and deterrent (as Bosnian Serb generals Ratko Mladic and Manojlo Milovanovic keep pointing out). On the other hand, the Serbs face a reduced number of military options in Bosnia: U.N. have proved they are willing to save their reputation by closely watching the safe areas in Bosnia. It is dangerous to touch these areas (both the Nordic battalion and the British are not hesitatant to open fire). This implies that the area around the Corridor remains the only and most desirable stage of future operations conducted by Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic. The area also represents the only major problem of the Bosnian Serb Republic that remains unsolved.

The Bosnians are aware of this, but they also know that the Bosnian Serb army forces are stretched over the territory that is too large for their number and equipment. They also know that the main advantage of the Bosnian Serb Army, i.e. heavy weaponry and military equipment, is inevitably depleting with the passage of time. The sanctions are slowly but surely affecting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its industry and its army, so that the Bosnian Serbs can count only on their stocks (sizable, but limited and already largely spent). The Bosnians know that the time is running out. However, they are unclear as to whether it is already too late or should they succumb to temptation of attacking the Corridor. Given the situation a cautious and responsible commander would weigh pro's and con's before making a decision to attack the Corridor. Both prolonged and strong support of the Croatian Army is necessary to ensure a successful attack. However, it cannot be counted on for the reasons which will be addressed later. If the last week's show of words performed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and BH army commander, General Rasim Delic, in the Bosnian zone south of Brcko when they announced a big offensive on the Corridor is logically analysed it should be understood as a psychological maneuver. On the other hand, also logically speaking, the most practical thing General Mladic could now do is to concentrate his troops in the area and launch a strong attack southward from Brcko, widen the Corridor as much as possible until the U.N. and great powers begin panicking (which will take a week or two) and repeat an ultimatum scenario, such as those around Sarajevo and Gorazde, and then stop on the spot he had reached and see if anyone can make him return... As it's already wellknown, logic may not necessarily work in Bosnia.

Another approach of the Bosnian side would be to pull NATO, if not the Croats, into the showdown around Brcko. Great powers have already sensed the danger and launched a series of warnings against all sides and all participants in the Bosnian war. Significant coverage has been given to reports of Serb and Bosnian troops massing up around Gorazde with Croat troops building up on the left bank of Sava River including pontoon bridges and artillery (all of which seem to be true). U.N. sent military observers into the area and issued a number of serious warnings to the warring factions to refrain from provocations and offensive actions.

Talented for a political faux pas Croatian President Franjo Tudjman got into deep trouble by signing the U.S.sponsored confederation with BosniaHerzegovina. He may have gotten carried away by inertia: Tudjman has so far signed several agreements and pacts with the Bosnians and shortly afterwards breached almost all of them. The Bosnians have not forgotten this so that last week Izetbegovic sent a cold and spiteful letter to Tudjman reminding him that it is high time for the beginning of some form of cooperation between the two states.

Franjo Tudjman played the wrong card this time: in order for the Bosnian Croat alliance (also known as the shotgun wedding) to work, the Croatian leader must first get rid of bitter Herzegovinians who are headed by Gojko Susak, the Defense Minister and the leader of the extremenationalist Herzegovinian mafia, i.e. the same lot who pushed him into the Bosnian war. His hesitation do go ahead with this has already caused a split in the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), and could also lead to a parliamentary crisis with an uncertain outcome. Therefore, considering the political mood and a short time to make a decision it is simply impossible for Croatia to enter the war around Brcko together with the Bosnians. Croatia's participation in cutting the Corridor would almost certainly provoke attacks by the Serb Krajina army on delicate communications lines ZagrebRijeka in the area of Karlovac, RijekaSplit in the area of Zadar and around Okucani that would ultimately result in the break down of the talks on the future of Krajina. It follows that Croatia does not feel like stirring up trouble. Tudjman does not feel like anything. Dobrosav Paraga, the leader of the ultraright Croatian Party of Right (HSP), has already reminded him of his proposal back in 1991 to conduct a consistent strategy in Bosnia and added that Tudjman should not complain now...

``The international community,'' i.e. U.S., Europe, Russia, and U.N., is running out of patience when it comes to not only the Balkan crisis but also relations among themselves. The Bosnian Serbs are systematically aggravating the relationship with U.N. on the propaganda level, accusing the world organisation of serving in the interests of U.S. and NATO, of arming the Bosnians, of waging the war on their side, etc. What this implies in the field is an increase of serious incidents between the Bosnian Serb Army and UNPROFOR. The record of bad relations between the Serbs and the British goes back to January 10, 1993, when the soldiers of the Cheshire Regiment destroyed several Bosnian Serb mortar positions around Kladanj. The most recent clashes took place around Kobilja Glava (Sarajevo), Gorazde, hill Vis around Tuzla, where the tanks ``Leopard 2'' of the Nordic battalion of UNPROFOR responded to the attack by the Bosnian Serb army (as U.N. claim) with 72 shells, killing nine soldiers and destroying an ammunition dump. The Serb side claims that the Nordic battalion ``took the Muslim side'' for a lot of money: a figure of some half a million DM is mentioned, which is way too much even according to the wellknown local tariffs if this were to be true. The thing progressed so far that General Manojlo Milovanovic objects even to the cameras of British soldiers and therefore stops the convoy for Gorazde.

General Sir Michael Rose, the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia, is one of the least popular figures when all sides are concerned. Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. envoy in the former Yugoslavia, shares the same reputation. The BH Presidency demanded his resignation right after he made up with the Americans. This may illustrate U.N. impartiality in the field, but does not make life less difficult. The two main warring parties in Bosnia, the Serbs and the Bosnians, have learnt how to use the U.N. presence in the field: the former use them as a proof of a worldwide conspiracy against the Serbs and the latter are trying to pull them into the war on their side. What can great powers do in Bosnia?

Judging by the ideas currently in circulation ranging from threats to all sides not to start trouble to establishing zones and banning the use of arms everyone is horrified at the prospect of renewed fighting. On the other hand, a possibly successful widening of the Corridor could represent the last big battle of this phase of the Bosnian war (great powers can hardly wait to sit at the same table with satisfied Karadzic). An attempt by the BH Army to cut the corridor could be the first big battle in the new and extremely dangerous sparking off the war not only in Bosnia, but also in Croatia, and perhaps even elsewhere, if all unfavourable circumstances happen to coincide.

The crisis around Brcko can be reduced to a rather simple story: the Corridor's importance for the Serbs is so great that they are prepared for everything. Whoever wants to cut the Corridor must count on an all out desperate war on all demarcation lines of the Serbs with the Bosnians, the Croats, even possibly U.N., judging by the current situation. Even if status quo, i.e. a protected Corridor, is maintained around Brcko this will not mean a step towards peace. Opportunities when final solutions could be reached were missed a long time ago. The Bosnian side gained in strength and came to its senses so that it can no longer be reduced to the measure Karadzic and Mladic would tolerate. Regardless of whether the showdown around Gorazde takes place there will be no peace in Bosnia in a few years to come.

``We took peacekeeping as far as it could go. We took it right to the line.'' `The Guardian', April 30, 1994