Kosovo Si Not Serbia

`Hogg reviewed the possibility of broad autonomy in Kosovo, along the lines of the 1974 Constitution. We however, made it clear that it was impossible to return to the autonomy of that period, for the simple reason that Socialist Yugoslavia no longer existed, nor that type of a federation. We said that we believed that that would be the framework for the return of old, and the birth of new conflicts. Hogg is aware that the solution is not around the corner, and suggested that a start should be made by resolving individual problems, for example, the problem of education, which we accepted.''

VREME: Douglas Hogg said that Kosovo was part of Serbia...

AGANI: A number of European countries have this stand, but it is my impression that, after being faced with our point of view, Hogg corrected his stand and only insisted on the fact that a speedy solution was not possible.

VREME: DSK president Ibrahim Rugova has linked the problem of Kosovo with other territorial and political problems in the former Yugoslavia, and mentioned ethnic borders and a confederation...

AGANI: Those are, however, just marginal statements.

VREME: The 2K formula, whereby the same status is urged for Serbs in Krajina and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, is seen as one of the solutions.

AGANI: The formula of equating Krajina and Kosovo is untenable. Kosovo had its political identity and subjectivity. Kosovo was de facto a federal unit, and that is why its independence is the logical outcome of Yugoslavia's disintegration. If Kosovo had a constituent assembly, a government which was not subordinate to that of Serbia, a presidency as the embodiment of sovereignty, all levels of the judiciary, then these are the characteristics of a federal state and not autonomy.

VREME: Is the DSK considering correcting the political and nationally constructive goals with which it will enter negotiations with Serbia?

AGANI: The stand of the DSK and all ethnic Albanian political subjects in Kosovo is the result of the 1991 referendum, which voted for an independent and sovereign Kosovo, and no corrections are possible here. We are aware of the fact that negotiations entail concessions. We, however, believe that we have made a great concession by not insisting on unification with Albania, and have made a show of goodwill by urging for a Kosovo in which no single national group will be treated as a minority, and that this will be guaranteed by international bodies. Therefore, a concession lies in the fact that we were as open towards Serbia as to other neighbors.

VREME: A completely open Kosovo means that Serbia would be able to satisfy its cultural-historical needs, including its current and economic ones.

AGANI: I underscore that the Serbs would not be a minority. I stress this because Federal Human Rights Minister Margit Savovic is always telling us what we can do, and what we cannot, because we are a national minority, which just means that the status of a national minority is a very limiting one.

That is why I believe that we have already made significant concessions and that any corrections, if they are extracted, must be verified by a referendum.

VREME: Does this mean that in achieving the ethnic Albanians' national goal in Kosovo, ``lesser'' demands are being made than those formulated at the referendum?

AGANI: No, but if we are faced with certain models which do not satisfy our demands, then we will have to consult the people again.

VREME: What influence does Albania have in resolving the problem of Kosovo?

AGANI: Albania's influence is very positive, even though there are attempts at denying this in official interpretations. Albania's stand is that the problem must be resolved through dialogue. This has greatly influenced Kosovo Albanians to opt for a peaceful solution of the problem. Albania has said that it does not uphold a change of borders, but of course, it cannot withhold its support from ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

VREME: Could Albania appear as a direct negotiator with Serbia?

AGANI: If it is understood that it represents Kosovo, then it certainly couldn't, nor, do I think would it agree to. It must not be forgotten that Kosovo is politically and institutionally formed to such an extent that it has its own legitimate political representatives. But, Albania would certainly contribute in negotiations on Kosovo.

VREME: Political maps suggesting the division of Kosovo often appear in public.

AGANI: The socialdemographic reality of Kosovo does not allow such divisions. The division would be along ethnic criteria, which would inevitably lead to the forceful resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people. I think that ethnic Albanians and their political movement are capable of urging the peaceful option for a long while still. However, if a division is insisted on, it won't be feasible.

VREME: Information on Serbian-ethnic Albanian contacts has increased lately, the names of the heads of contact groups are being mentioned. What is the truth?

AGANI: There have been no contacts. I mean, there could not have been any. All that lacks in seriousness. The situation is not such that groups would be formed at all, because there have been no preliminary contacts, and I don't think that Serbia is ready or willing to start talks. If it says that it is willing, that means that they know our principles and limits, and wish to create the impression that ethnic Albanians are refusing to talk. Negotiations with Serbia, if nothing else, would show the untenableness of Serbia's position in Kosovo. Serbia does not wish to make any significant changes, nor is it ready to admit that its stand with regard to Kosovo is untenable.

VREME: However, ethnic Albanians are starting the battle for the realization of their political goals in Serbia?

AGANI: Not within the framework of Serbia, but in certain contacts with it and this has resulted in a lack of understanding for our stand. Kosovo is not Serbia either in the national makeup, or in the will expressed by the population, or the constitutional legal position which was legal until the 1990 Constitution was enforced. If a state enforces a system of special and forceful measures for 13 years, it loses all pretensions at legitimately installing its instruments of power in Kosovo.

VREME: Do you agree with the view that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia started in Kosovo, and that this is where it will end?

AGANI: I don't believe in such fatalistic statements. The crisis in Socialist Yugoslavia did start in Kosovo; but processes have their course and development which cannot be anticipated. I would never dare forecast the time it will take for the Kosovo Gordian knot to unravel.

VREME: In the meantime, the average Serb and ethnic Albanian is interested if there is danger of war in Kosovo or not.

AGANI: If Serbia is faced with the danger of wider conflicts at home, then it will transfer them to Kosovo. However, the outbreak of conflicts is made difficult because of several reasons: Serbia is tired of war ambitions, it is under the surveillance of the international community, our option for a peaceful solution makes the instigating of a war more difficult, and finally, there is a great risk that war could engulf all the regions inhabited by ethnic Albanians from Albania via Macedonia...