Ethnic Albanian Realism

The stand of the great powers with regard to Kosovo is well known since the Washington agreement of the big five in May 1993, in which they say that Kosovo must be given a high degree of autonomy within Serbia. This is what British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hogg reiterated during his recent visit to Kosovo. Hogg's offer of autonomy within the framework of Serbia, left great misgivings in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian politicians are divided on the issue. Differences had existed before, but now they have been exacerbated. Polemics started over the contents and character of all that the world is offering Kosovo.

Several commentaries, especially those brought by the weekly ``Koha'' which is edited by Veton Suroi, including Adem Demaqi's statement, carried ``realistic'' overtones, suggesting that the world factors' judgement on autonomy was being given serious consideration, i.e., that in politics, ethnic Albanians must start thinking of accepting autonomy as a necessary transitional phase for other solutions. Reactions to this were rather sharp. Vicepresident of the leading Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) Fehmi Agani assessed this readiness to accept the judgement of the big powers uncritically, as a ``quasirealistic'' and ``defeatist'' policy. Agani believes that the ethnic Albanian side has no reason to limit its ambitions before negotiations have even started.

However, compared to earlier polemics on a similar subject, the present one is not being terminated with the silencing and excommunication of the ``realists.'' The reason for this does not just lie in the fact that the polemic has been public and included only those who are considered moderate ethnic Albanian politicians (Agani belongs to the moderate, ``realistic'' wing of the DLK), but also because the project of Kosovo's autonomy within the framework of Serbia did come from world power centers. Local politicians only expressed their views on the project and made ``realistic'' and ``unrealistic'' assessments on the ethnic Albanians strength in resisting the world powers' ``judgement.'' All in all, the impression left by the polemic is that the ethnic Albanian political leadership is closer to a realistic point of view. However, ethnic Albanian leaders face the problem of reaching a pragmatic formula under existing circumstances, one which will enable the start of a dialogue with the Serbian side, something that the foreign factors insist on.

When it comes to relations with the world, Serbs have an advantage, inasmuch as they can dictate conditions, get up to various tricks, and make false statements, since they have a military advantage and control the territory. Ethnic Albanians do not have the nonchalant ease of masters of war or peace. All they can do, is rely on the democratic decision of the majority of the population in Kosovo, and other democratic procedures in resolving problems. However, in order to reach a democratic solution of the crisis, it is necessary that the other side abandon military means, which is not the case in Kosovo. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's regime relies on military force in Kosovo. A democratic solution would topple Serbia's military control over Kosovo. Serbia, in fact, has no other way of holding on to Kosovo except by force.

The project of renewing Kosovo's autonomy, which comes from abroad, and which, as Hogg claimed, Milosevic accepted very easily, will in fact, result in much greater problems for the Serbian side. The regime's current policy, as with the greater part of the Serbian opposition, is based on challenging all autonomy for Kosovo. There is no social segment in Serbia which is favorably disposed to the idea of returning elements of statehood to Kosovo, such as it enjoyed under the 1974 Constitution (an assembly, government, police, courts...) with an absolute ethnic Albanian majority (9:1), as this would really mean the loss of Kosovo.

To get back to the ethnic Albanian political scene. Recent events have confirmed that differences in views, when talking of fundamental questions, are very small. For example, when speaking of the ``radicals'' and the ``moderates,'' the ``realists'' and the ``unrealistic'' views among ethnic Albanians, the differences between them are usually much smaller than the terms used to differentiate them usually imply. On the whole, ethnic Albanian policy is nonmilitary and realistic, so that differences should be sought only within such a common orientation. This view was confirmed by the last meeting (in Tirana, May 18) between Albanian President Sali Berisha and DLK leader Ibrahim Rugova. A statement issued after the meeting says that: ``The two presidents believe that the imperative of the moment calls for the setting up of a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, with the presence of a third party, in order that measures for the normalization of life and a political solution for the problem of Kosovo might be found.''

This formulation opens possibilities for unconditional negotiations with Serbia, and is much closer in spirit to the ``realist'' and ``moderate'' outlook. The ``radicals'' among ethnic Albanians, who would be prepared to negotiate only over Kosovo's independence, do not like this formulation, and are grumbling against Rugova and Berisha. But, it is a fact that the negotiating position of the ethnic Albanian side must be as open a possible. Berisha and Rugova follow a concrete policy and know that an offer for negotiating, formulated in this way, has its advantages. After Milosevic's statement that there will be no problem over Kosovo's autonomy, the Serbian side gained the advantage of the side which has agreed to a dialogue based on the solution offered by the big powers. However, this advantage could pass over to the ethnic Albanian side, because the negotiating tactic which was tried in September 1992, is becoming topical again. At the time, the goal was to stop police repression before the question of Kosovo's status even cropped up. This approach might give rise to suspicions that this dialogue, like the earlier one on schools, will not be fruitful. This skepticism, however, must be countered with the answer that the earlier dialogue was only a preliminary step.

What is important, is the fact that ethnic Albanian policy has retained a realistic and moderate line in resolving problems through political means. This can be seen from the stands which Berisha and Rugova have with regard to Macedonia. The two men underscored in Tirana that ``Macedonia's stability and independence were very important for the peace and stability of Albanians and other peoples in the Balkans.'' They encouraged ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to ``cooperate both with regard to the consolidation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and in ensuring the freedoms and human rights of ethnic Albanians, which are prerequisite conditions for Macedonia's stability.'' Does this mean that after the rift with ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, when it seemed that relations between Tirana and Skopje were tottering, that a single, allAlbanian policy is being set up once more, a policy which is based on a realistic and moderate premise, but with a greater chance of achieving long-term goals.