War Fortunes

It was clear already at the beginning of May that something was wrong. During the first two weeks of May the BH Army launched a series of well planned attacks along all lines of demarcation south of the Corridor: around Zvornik, Teslic, Ozren, Majevica, Doboj, Zepca, Maglaj, Bugojno, Turbe and Vlasic. The Bosnians made good use of highly interesting tactics: fast technical penetrations for the purpose of taking control of important heights. This gives the impression of preparations being made and of taking up of the initial positions for the future attempts at endangering or severing the lines of communications of Karadzic's state and army. The Bosnians didn't rush into adventurous undertakings like trying to seize some big town or to sever some important road. Firstly, they are not strong enough to keep such a gain (they've got the manpower, but are short of arms), secondly, it seems that they are strictly adhering to the already tested guerrilla tactics: simultaneously flanking out Mladic's forces and not exposing themselves to a possibly higher concentration of the Bosnian Serb Army.

Such tactics produced results in the field: according to the Belgrade daily ``Vecernje novosti'' it took them only ``one hour of fighting'' to seize control of Vijenac (615 meters), an important elevation in the area of Mount Ozren, despite the fact that the defense forces had two tanks (one was destroyed, the other captured), several mortar launchers and cannon, some of which were antiaircraft and some 240 well fortified defenders (there were about 110 casualties). ``Novosti'' brought up few relevant questions: Where was the commander of the tactical group ``Ozren'' at the time of the attack? Where was the commander of the battalion that defended Vijenac? Why wasn't Vijenac defended by the local fighters from Ozren but by the men from other regions? Why weren't any special units sent from Doboj as reinforcement? This defeat has raised serious doubts and speculations that the area around Mount Ozren, which belongs to BosniaHerzegovina according to the Geneva maps, was sold. It is difficult to imagine that Karadzic could win over the Bosnian Serb Assembly to give certain territories up voluntarily; it is an altogether different story if they are lost in fighting. But, this is only in the domain of speculations: on the other hand, the fact is that the Bosnians have launched a large combined operation of increasing the pressure on the Corridor. They advanced on Mount Majevica and damaged the telecommunications tower to which the war lobby in Belgrade reacted by accusing the Nordic battalion of UNPROFOR of having destroyed the tower with fire from ``Leopard'' tanks. Doboj, Brcko, Teslic, Tesanj and Donji Vakuf were shelled regularly in the second half of May.

The fortunes of war began to turn thanks to the continuation of two trends present on the Bosnian front over the last year. The first trend is a gradual weakening of the Serb side on the whole; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on which the Bosnian Serb Republic relies for support, is being strangled by the sanctions; the main advantage of the Bosnian Serb Army, i.e. its supremacy in arms, is slowly melting away; the Serbs in Bosnia have seized far more territory than they can efficiently defend; they are not accustomed to fighting away from home and are now being forced to; their morale is being destroyed; the human resources are becoming scarcer (Serbian High Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina, stated two weeks ago that some 300,000 refugees are expected to return to the Bosnian Serb Republic from Serbia). Only two out of 850 Bosnian Serb refugees of military age responded to mobilization in Herzeg Novi, Montenegro. French Major, a U.N. military observer in Tuzla, said at the beginning of May that he was under the impression that the Serb infantry in Bosnia is ``demoralized, disorganized and poorly motivated.'' Despite the Serb supremacy in tanks and artillery, their infantry seems incapable of seizing and keeping the territory, he added. ``If the Serbs had the real infantry, they would have finished with Bosnia a long time ago,'' the French Major concluded.

The second trend is a gradual strengthening of the BH Army in organizational, tactical and technical terms. With the strong support coming from Haris Silajdzic, the new BH Prime Minister, Generals Rasim Delic and Jovo Divjak disciplined the army, reorganized the units in the field, and are now curbing the influence of the local power holders have on the BH Army. This is not an easy task: the Sarajevo daily ``Oslobodjenje'' reported that there are difficulties in carrying out personnel policies at the level of the lowranking officers and noncommissioned officers, since ``every proposal has to pass through a thick sieve in the base.'' In other words, this shows that the positions gained in the first chaotic days of the war cannot be easily abandoned, which is a typical phenomenon when an irregular army is being transformed into a regular and organized force.

As far as the tactics is concerned, one gets the impression that the Bosnians have learned a great deal over these past two years, formulated the doctrine, to which the organization of the army was adapted. And, there is only one doctrine possible: keep whatever you've got, do not rush into decisive battles, flank out the enemy units with your own mobility, wear them out as much as possible.

Simply speaking, the second phase of the guerrilla tactics: forming of bigger units and endangering more important targets while maintaining one's own mobility (which remains imperative). Finally, the Republic of BH perfected the methods of smuggling the weapons and bypassing the embargo to that extend that more room and more ambitions were created. The truce with the Croats, whatever it may be like, has relieved the BH Army of the significant pressure in Central Bosnia, enabled it to move its elite forces to the critical positions and redirect the available weaponry and ammunition.

Generals educated in the West, like Bertrand de Lapresle and Sir Michael Rose, appear as if they hadn't learnt anything at war colleges from numerous lectures they heard on ``the people's (i.e. guerrilla) war'' such as those waged by Mao Tsetung and General Vo Nguyen Diap. While taking Admiral Leighton Smith, the NATO Commander for Southern Europe, on the tour of Bosnia, in Travnik general Rose tried to explain to General Mehmed Aligic, who is one of the more successful Bosnian commanders, that the Bosnian state stands no chance of regaining the territories by force, nor ``achieving the strategic balance'' even if the arms embargo was lifted. For some reason, this conversation resembled a classic debate between Colonel Harry Samers and one Vietnamese colonel during the peace talks in Geneva in 1973, ``You've lost every battle with the American army since 1965,'' Samers said. ``That's correct, but irrelevant,'' the Vietnamese Colonel replied. General Aligic told General Rose that ``the war here is not waged according to the West Point rules'' and that he perceived the BosnianCroat federation not as a step towards peace but as a way to some more successful operations in the future. According to him, the federation means opening of roads (to Bosnia). Open roads mean more arms.

One cannot but agree with General Rose that it will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve the balance; but, the Bosnian side perceives the problem in a different way: it is of utmost importance to them to gain strength and survive over the long term, and Karadzic's state will eventually die of its own, again over the long term. If the federation with the Croats happens to work, so much the better...

What are the chances that the federation will really work?

There is a consensus among the military and political observers that the chances of things changing radically are nil unless the alliance between Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina is genuine. The genuine alliance implies a serious military engagement of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) and the Croatian Army on the Bosnian front. However, neither the Croats nor the Bosnian Croats seem to be ready for such an engagement. On the contrary.

A joint headquarters of the federation (headed by General Ante Roso and General Fikret Muslimovic) comprising 30 members (15:15) was indeed formed; General Roso pointed out that it represents an advisory body without the authority to command. When asked about his opinion on the lifting of the arms embargo against BH, General Roso said, ``I don't know. It's very difficult to answer that question.'' On the other hand, the Bosnian side has been strongly urging for years that the embargo is lifted. In the same interview Ante Roso was asked ``whether Greater Serbia was being strangled on the Corridor.'' His answer was rather vague. ``That thesis was made up. I think that it is much better for us to return (to Posavina) in a peaceful way,'' he said. The differences between the two sides are meaningful.

Herzegovina is a different story. General Milovoj Petkovic, the HVO Commander, said ``it was illusory to expect that the joint army would be formed any time soon.'' He added that the ``HVO principle, which says: a Croat soldier on the Croat soil, in the Croat army barrack, remains unchanged.'' HVO General Ivan Andabak said on May 17 ``he expected that the Serbs would launch a fierce attack on Konjic in ten days' time, and if they took it they would continue to advance in the direction of Mostar, Buna, Klepci, Prebilovci and Stolac.'' The statement does not make any sense but the message is clear: he made up a nonexisting threat in order to justify a complete lack of readiness on the part of the Herzegovinian HVO to take part in the operations in Bosnia. Ante Prkacin, an independent MP in the Croatian Assembly (formerly a member of the Croatian Party of Rights), described the mood of the Herzegovinians. ``In the eyes of a man from Herzegovina, a Moslem is a bigger enemy than a Serb. Two men were killed in the war against the Serbs on Siroki Brijeg. 107 died there in the fighting with the Moslems.'' The war lobby in Belgrade is in agreement with Prkacin: ``Vecernje novosti'' carry the articles about ``the Christian brotherhood'' of the Serbs and the Croats against the Islam and about ``HVO fighters who put Chetnik insignia on their caps as a sign of the protest against the federation with the Bosnians.'' The Croatian community of HerzegBosnia decided on Wednesday to adopt kuna as its currency, regardless of the future currency in BH. The federation cannot be taken seriously, nor can any significant joint military operation be expected all until the situation in Zagreb has been cleared up and until Croatian President Franjo Tudjman remains surrounded by those who started and waged the suicidal Croat war in Bosnia.

According to quiet and unofficial reports from the field, Serb refugees that had settled down in the area of Donji Vakuf, Teslic and Kotor Varos, started to flee the region last week. As if they had been told not remain there... This report coincides with the changes in the diplomatic tactics of the warring sides. The Serb side decided all of a sudden that ``percentages are irrelevant'' and that piece will not be conditioned with the lifting of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Karadzic is increasingly insisting on ``a comprehensive peace'' or at least a four monthlong ceasefire, while the Bosnian side is systematically blocking him with a proposed twomonthlong ceasefire and with conditioning its participation in the negotiations with the withdrawal of the Serb fighters from Gorazde. The situation is clear: the Bosnians fear that the current demarcation lines will be frozen and become the future boundaries (as in Cyprus), they count on the rain and winter, and have also figured out how the international negotiators work: for them the talks, however effective they may be, are sacred. Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, has proposed that ``gray zones'' (similar to ``pink zones'' of the Vance plan) be set up as a temporary solution for ``the territories which are claimed by all three sides.'' Karadzic is obviously in great trouble: how to accept 51:49 division and still survive politically. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is pressing him to accept it and finally have the sanctions lifted; the Bosnians have seen through this game, and therefore pressure him militarily and torture him by diplomatic hesitations and objections. Such a strategy that the Bosnian side adopted cannot last forever: U.N. will not be feeding them endlessly while they continue to fight and the recently announced French withdrawal from UNPROFOR sends out a clear message.

The war in BH stands all chances of turning into a low-intensity conflict which may last for years with the current rules of the game--all until the rules change.