Words And Deeds

A genuine revolt broke out in Herzegovina after the Washington agreement, and especially after the drafting of the maps in Vienna, that envision two joint, CroatMoslem, i.e. MoslemCroat cantons. The rallies staged in Vitez lasted for days since according to the maps the whole of the Lasva Valley, along with Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Fojnica are to be a part of a mixed, predominantly Moslem canton. The people gathered there shouted that the Croat population in this area had been betrayed and wondered why the local population had not been asked for its opinion before the signing of the Vienna agreement. The women in mourning spoke and said they refused to be governed by the Moslems.

Although HerzegBosnia had terrorized its own population such stubborn refusals of cohabitation that was agreed in Vienna should come as no surprise. For two years the local population had been constanty persuaded that they cannot live together with anyone, that the boundaries must be established, and that their happiness lies only in their own state. Now Zagreb is offering them to live together in mixed cantons with the same people whom the Croatian media vilified until recently. They have now received the same guarantees that they had before and therefore rightfully askis this what we fought for? The question of why the war had been waged at all can hardly be avoided. Thousands of people have been killed, Central Bosnia has been burnt, the ancient city of Mostar has been ruined and now the local population is being urged to accept everything which they were told earlier was unacceptable. To agree to this would be the same as to admit that the sacrifice was futile. To accept a deception. This turn in the official policy has confused the people whose frustrations are now being deliberately exacerbated and abused. The rallies have not been spontanous, but organized or Kresimir Zubak, the first president of the MoslemCroat federation, put it the people are now being pressed by those whose interests had been threatened by the Washington and the Vienna agreement. Mainly for very prosaic reasonsthey will thus lose their ministate in Herzegovina which implies a possibility of uncontrolled power along with that of impudent war profiteering. Their interests indicate that a defeat may be at hand, i.e. that the Croats are in for the new Bleiburg.

&127; The same view was presented in the recent commentary of the Croatian daily ``Slobodna Dalmacija,'' where the Vienna agreements were described as the capitulation of the Croat side, since they are, allegedly, ``below everything proposed to the Croats so far.'' The commentator says that the Herzegovinians are dismayed by the agreement that envisions the creation of joint cantons because Western Herzegovina, as a Croat canton, thus remains without Mostar, Capljina, Neum, Prozor, Citluk, and even without the Virgin Mary's sanctuary of Medjugorje, while the fight for the canton in Posavina is still ahead. Since such an ``agreement which is beyond comprehension'' was signed, the paper concluded that it is doubtful whether the Croat delegation may have been held at gunpoint when it accepted it. The author of this commentary was recently appointed editorinchief of this paper. Jadranko Prlic, the prime minister of the selfproclaimed HerzegBosnia, said recently that between 10 and 15 per cent of the people of his state are against Washington. This was enough to provoke a serious revolt and it seems that the message was primarily intended for Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Frequent explosions in Vitez, on the premises of the HerzegBosnian government or in some mosques, may be indicative of the prevailing mood in Herzegovina, which the local media reported reflects dissatisfaction with the cantonal solutions. The situation in Herzegovina was on the brink of an armed resistance. Just as it was on one occasion earlier when the Croatian President said it was in the interest of Croatia that the Croats in BosniaHerzegovina create, as he said, their territorial compactness that would require the socalled human relocations. There was a danger then that the Croats from Posavina and from other parts of Bosnia oppose such a policy with arms. In a similar way, the Croat hardliners called on the emigration to protest after the signing of the Washington agreement. Because of a possible outbreak of discontent, Zubak decided not to return to HerzegBosnia from Vienna. It was assessed in Zagreb that it was much better to summon the HerzegBosnian leaders to the President's court.

Tudjman thus lined up 140 Croat representatives from BosniaHerzegovina, MP's in the assembly of the selfproclaimed HerzegBosnia, their civilian and military leadership, the members of the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in Bosnia, and tried to convince them behind the closed doors that the Viennese map must be signed, since it is ``the most that could have been achieved in the given historical circumstance.'' Tudjman again received the Herzegovinian leadership while the Constitutional Assembly in Sarajevo in session. He promised them again that he will not abandon them, that Croatia will help in the reconstruction of the ruined areas in Herzegovina, and suggested that they be linked with the Croatian towns. Since a direct annexation is not possible, it is obvious that another roundabout way is being sought so that Herzegovina is connected with Croatia as tightly as possible. This was announced, but the talks, nevertheless, took place behind the closed doors. Some other promises may have been made as well. The fact that the Croatian currency `Croatian dinar' was in use in Herzegovina, and that it is now being replaced by `kuna' may point to such a conclusion. Herzegovina is thus being included in Croatia's monetary system. Taking this into consideration, it is hypocritical when Croatia objects that Serbia is incorporating Krajina into its system through money.

Gojko Susak, the Croatian Defense Minister, said without hesitation on Croatian Television that he federation represents merely an interim solution, that the Vienna agreement must now be signed, but that it will be decided later what will actually come of it and when. In an attempt to persuade the Herzegovinians to agree to it, Susak said that the Bosnian Croats will not represent a minority, but a majority population in the confederation with Croatia.

It is obvious that the people who execute Tudjman's policy in Bosnia Herzegovina, as the Croatian President admitted, have not abandoned their goals, but are only trying to achieve them by other means. Instead of dividing BH between the Serbs and the Croats, the whole CroatMoslem federation will be added to Croatia. Thus the goal, of which Tudjman spoke upon his return from Karadjordjevo (where Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to divide BH) would be achieved. In the interviews he gave on Statehood Day, Tudjman assured the Herzegovinian Croats that the Vienna agreements are much more favorable than the adding of only Western Herzegovina and brought up the assessment by an U.S. advisor to the Bosnian Government, who came to the conclusion after analyzing the Washington agreement that Bosnia would be presented to Croatia as a gift according to this agreement. Tudjman also said that according to him the federation of BosniaHerzegovina represents an agreement, i.e. a decision by U.S., Europe, and Russia, which would place the federation under the protectorate of Croatia, and he obviously likes the idea.

The fact that about the same time, around Statehood Day, President Tudjman promoted and awarded Slobodan Praljak who is believed to be responsible for the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, could be indicative that there is a system in all this madness. Honors to the destroyer of the Bridge, not to mention anything else, are meaningful enough.