Heat On The Southern Border

``It's not aggression, but it is a violation of territory,'' said Macedonian Defence Minister Branko Popovski last week, irritated more by the outcries of Macedonian nationalists rallied around the VMRODPMNE than by incidents on Macedonia's Northern border.

The incidents were nothing special, or new: Yugoslav soldiers had entered Macedonian territory for the umpteenth time. Such incursions had occurred before; Popovski believes that there have more than twenty since the beginning of the year, while in the last threefour months Yugoslav Army soldiers have entered several hundred meters deep in nine places (once even four kilometers) in controversial zones.

The problem lies in the fact that the SerbianMacedonian border has never been measured geodetically, it is not marked nor is it in any kind of order; there are no stones, lines, or a noman'sland. The Serbian side describes the border as an ``administrative'' one, which doesn't bode well; such words have been used before a forceful change of the border was carried out.

Macedonia accuses Yugoslavia of avoiding, for the past two years, the setting up an international commission which would fix the boundaries properly. The consequences of this situation are that the issue is politically manipulated by both sides whenever the need arises. This is happening right now: the Macedonian side claims that the matter concerns pressure because of the census; the Serbian side points to US infiltration, the encircling of Serbs by the ``new world order'' whose troops are in Macedonia under the UN flag, thus threatening the Serbs in Macedonia, etc. Two sisterly Orthodox churches, on bad terms, but both politically obedient are being sucked into the game, as are ethnic minorities, propaganda, nationalist ambitions and the greater part of that familiar arsenal when it comes to crises in the Balkans.

The deeper reasons for the crisis lie in the disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia and the need for a new balance of forces in the Balkans. This new balance is being thwarted by expansionist nationalism in Serbia, Greece and Albania. Serb and Greek nationalists (alarmingly similar) agree that there is no Macedonia and that it shouldn't exist; the Bulgarians are wisely keeping quiet and waiting for the outcome, which doesn't mean that they are not licking their chops at the thought of Macedonia (in accordance with Greater Bulgarian nationalist tradition); Albania believes that sooner or lateronce the inevitable unification of all Albanians comes about, a predominantly ethnic Albanian Western Macedonia will naturally come to be Albanian; only the Macedonians (except for the nationalists around the VMRO) believe that the Republic of Macedonia should exist as a single, multiethnic state within internationally recognized borders... But, that's what the Bosnians thought too.

Belgrade has always given a lot of publicity to Greek stands on Macedonia and it's ``expansionism.'' Jorgos Harvaljas, a Greek journalist (writes for ``Eleftherotypos'') made a typical statement two months ago in a lengthy interview: ``I believe that it would be best for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to go back to the Yugoslav Federation with Serbia and Montenegrothe sooner the better. I can't envisage the future of this small state otherwise, and I don't see it retaining the status quo much longer.'' Harvaljas then accused America of ``finding cheap clients in the Balkans... leaders who were prepared to sell out easily (... like Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in Skopje). America uses these countries and their leaders in a semicolonial manner in order to achieve its military goals.'' He goes on to say that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is important for the US because its troops behave there as they would in a colony.

Serbia's stands are very similar: Colonel (future general) Ljubodrag Stojadinovic (head of the Yugoslav Army Information Service, and its unofficial spokesman) gave an interesting forecast on the position and future of Macedonia in his regular column in the Belgrade daily ``Politika'' (December 1993). Stojadinovic first mentioned Macedonia's proWestern orientation and ``unitarian currying favor with the Vatican'' (Stojadinovic is thinking of the Church, see box); then says that ``there are no indications that a diplomatic solution in Skopje's favor could lead to stability in the South of the Balkans and to peace'' (the only diplomatic conflict which should be resolved at this moment is the Greek refusal to recognize Macedonia). In conclusion Stojadinovic says that ``the Greeks know that the green transversal cuts across Macedonia, Albania and Sandzak, heading towards Bosnia and that a Turkish adventure in the Balkans would start from their territory.'' But somehow, Macedonia does not fit in with this, at least not from the geopolitical point of view: if the Turks wish to overrun Greece, doing so via Macedonia is certainly not the shortest route... Something else is bothering Colonel Stojadinovic: the presence of US troops (which he never mentions as being under UN command) in Macedonia, where they are ``catching smugglers'' and ``organizing successive provocations,'' because ``the presence of US troops has never brought stability''; ``there is no more erroneous belief than that of the British diplomat who thinks that there won't be war in the Southern Balkans just because the Americans are there,'' said Stojadinovic in the end. Why? Because, ``If Macedonia is encircled as a Balkan, Mediterranean and European state, and becomes a `corresponding' member of NATO, then its orientation perhaps won't be to war, but its reliance on powerful allies will be inevitable. Yugoslavia would literally find itself surrounded by the West's military alliance...'' (it turns out that Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are members of the ``Western military alliance,'' while Greece isn't, but Turkey, Macedonia and Albania are). ``The state of Macedonia is an ideal solution for exerting controlled pressure against Serbia with regard to Kosovo and Metohija,'' cautioned Colonel Stojadinovic, ``because of the critical Shqiptar (derogative term for ethnic Albanians) mass in Macedonia''... ``a danger which cannot be seen'' by those who are turning the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into ``a discreditable military fortress in the middle of a dangerous crossroad.''

These thoughts are a logical follow up of some earlier statements by Serb politicians with regard to Macedonia. Several attempts at bringing up the issue of demarcation with Macedonia were made in the Serbian Assembly, but the Government avoided them through skillful maneuvers. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic referred to Macedonia's fate in his famous warning to the Greeks to recognize this state as soon as possible, ``while there was still something to be recognized.'' During his visit to Athens on March 4 this year, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic called on Macedonia once again to join Serbia and Montenegro, and so save itself from Albanian nationalism. ``The current situation in Macedonia is a real threat to Greece and Serbia. If Macedonia were to come under the Yugoslav umbrella, we would have a joint border with Greece, our friend,'' said Karadzic. A very transparent strategy lies in the background of all this brouhaha.

The census which has started, ``is an expensive entertainment which we don't need, but the European community does,'' said Macedonian Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski. All sides are afraid of the results, because they have all manipulated the number of various nationalities. The census is sponsored and monitored by the European Union. Considering that the ethnic angle has already been enforced, accepted and proclaimed the most important political argument in the Balkans, the results of the census in Macedonia are viewed as a crucial element of the crisis. The ethnic Albanian and Serbian minorities have threatened to boycott the census, because they don't trust the authorities (or the results...), this sounds familiar.

According to 1992 estimates there were just over two million inhabitants in Macedonia. Macedonians accounted for 64%, ethnic Albanians for 21%. According to the 1991 census, there were 44,000 Serbs. Albanian sources in Macedonia are now mentioning 800,000one million ethnic Albanians (instead of 427,000 as claimed by Macedonians); Greece claims there are 250,000 Greeks; Serb estimates range between 180,000400,000 Serbs (according to Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj), even though a consensus is slowly being reached on the assumed (or wished) figure of 250,000. From the nationalist point of view numbers are of not of great importance: Macedonian nationalists consider them all to be Macedonians, including ethnic Albanians who are ``Macedonians of nonSlav origin.'' Serb nationalists consider Macedonians ``Southern Serbs'' who have strayed away from the Church and the Nation, and the Greeks agree with this. The Albanians have it easythey are different without a doubt and they have other ambitions, while the Bulgarians are just sitting tight and waiting: from their point of view Macedonians are Bulgarians and the Albanians will be dealt with easilywhen the time comes.

Macedonia has two acute problems along the ethnic line: ethnic Albanians and Serbs. This situation has given birth to two schools of paranoiaone which believes that the young state is threatened by Albanians and the other which holds that the Serbs are the source of danger (Greece and Bulgaria are taken for granted as threats). Ethnic Albanians in Macedoniacompared to those in Kosovostick to the rules of political play: they participate in elections, parliament and government, even though they do rock the boat on questions concerning national equality, education, the filling of forms, citizenship papers, etc. Those Serbs who rely on promises, winks and encouragement from Serbia are playing a different game in Macedonia; one reminiscent of that played in Krajina and Bosnia.

Serbian nationalist appetites with regard to Macedonia have always existed. From 1900 to the present day, people like Seselj would start by citing the number of Serbs in the republic (400,000 according to Seselj; from the point of view of the program, the final figure is not important). Greater Serbian propaganda combines two approaches: scaring Macedonians and ethnic Albanians while discreetly and informally inviting neighboring states (Albania too) to participate in the division of Macedonia.

In the field in Macedonia, the Serbian minority has been chosen to play a role analogous to the one Serbs have played in Croatia and Bosnia: the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (DPSM) has been founded and fights for equality mainly along lines which are not controversial. Incidents have taken place which throw a different political light on the whole thing. In early 1993 the Macedonian police intervened in the village of Kuceviste (Skopska Crna Gora) and took pictures of Milosevic, Seselj, and paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan off the village carousel. DPSM President Borivoje Ristic protested loudly (mentioning 25,000 Serbs who live there); the Serbian press described ``savagery'' and ``genocide,'' but the whole incident ended with three youths being locked up, and that was all.

The DPSM then demanded of the Macedonian authorities measures for the promotion of the Serbs' position. In a memorandum sent to the government and international bodies in 1993, the following were demanded: Constitutional changes which would ensure that the Serbs entered the Constitution and Parliament (regardless of election results); the setting up of seven Serb Orthodox Church parishes in Macedonia; that Serbian priests conduct the service in the SerboCroatian language in over one hundred churches and monasteries; a special eparchy with a metropolitan and seat in Skopje; a Serbian theater in Skopje; two secondary schools in the SerboCroatian language (Skopje and Kumanovo); six primary schools in the SerboCroatian language; one weekly newspaper; the same time on state and local radio as have ethnic Albanians and Turks; a library and the protection of Serb historical and cultural monuments in Macedonia. In August 1993 Borivoje Ristic and Macedonian Minister of the Interior Ljubomir Frckovski signed a document on the treatment of Serbs in Macedonia. The government agreed to treat Serbs on an equal footing with other national communities and enter them into the Constitution (in principle, without a deadline being set), while any problems which might arise would have to be resolved within Macedonian institutions.

From someone's point of view, this agreement was a sign that things weren't developing quite according to plan. The Association of Serbs and Montenegrins in Macedonia immediately distanced themselves from the agreement. Ristic was dismissed and his place was taken by hard liner Dragisa Miletic. As soon the problems over the census started, Miletic cautioned Belgrade that tricks were possible: he claimed that ``80% Serbs in Macedonia (180,000 according to him)'' had not received citizenship (proof of a 15yearlong domicile in the republic is required); he accused the Macedonian authorities of reducing the number of Serbs from 15,000117,000 while there are 250,000; he accused the European control commission of accepting ``only Serbs from the higher classes, loyal to the authorities''; he claims that many people with Macedonian surnames speak SerboCroatian and that Serbs are a ``factor of stability'' in Macedonia. Miletic believes that there are more nonMacedonians in the republic than there are Macedonians.

Serbian Minister of Religion Dragan Dragojlovic claims that ``the right of Serbs in Macedonia to their own church has been denied,'' and that this is an ``elementary human right''; ``that attempts are being made at decreasing the number of Serbs in Macedonia'' and he threatens with the ``fostering of antiMacedonian feelings in Serbia'' because of the situation. The Belgrade daily ``Vecernje Novosti'' in a regular column written by Bora Komad, claims that 350,000 of ``our citizens'' live in Macedonia (probably Serbs unless he is thinking of something else) and claims that ``Serbs in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will not recognize the results of the special census.'' Serb politicians are also spreading stories about the arrival of Turkish troops in Macedonia.

The matrix is glaringly similar to the one in Krajina: Serbs in Macedonia had their Jovan Raskovic (Ristic), then they got their Milan Babic (Dragisa Miletic); if the DPSM does reach some kind of a compromise, there are still the Association of Serbs and Montenegrins and the Association of SerbMacedonian Friendship which will discredit all compromises in defending the ``community of Orthodox countries''; Serbs in Macedonia are divided into ``loyal'' and ``quality'' Serbs. ``We have the support of the Macedonian people,'' said Miletic last week, in a statement reminiscent of those made by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic more than those made by Babic, ``and the authorities must realize that the Serbs are a factor of stability in the Balkans.''

The Macedonian authorities will have to step warily if they do not wish to find themselves facing a Balkantype revolution. Relying too much on the Western alliance and the 600strong US contingent within UNPROFOR are not recommended; the Americans have pulled out of more important places when things got hot. The only reasonable hope is that Milosevic won't dare open a third front, because there isn't much of a chance that he would get the support of Greece and Bulgaria, and certainly not Albania. This blownup drama over border incidents is more the result of mediagenerated panic because of the newsempty summer weeks, than of the real situation in the field. And the Serbian side welcomes all distractions away from the delicate and slippery Bosnian war. A bit of ``homogenization'' is never amiss.

Centurieslong Conflicts

by Svetlana Djuric

At its regular session, the Holy Synod of Serbian Orthodox Church devoted great attention to eparchies in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Serbian Orthodox Church considers them as its eparchies, which, ``because of the arbitrary proclamation of an autocephalous church, have become estranged from the Mother Church and the Orthodox world too.'' An official statement says that the Synod has ``made a final appeal to local episcopes, before undertaking canonical measures, to return to the canonical order of the Church within three months.'' If the Macedonian episcopes ignore this brotherly ultimatum, the Mother Church will have to act according to canonical law and put the matter before the courts, in this case the Church courts. The Serbian Orthodox Church court can decide to defrock all the priests in Macedonia. Such a decision would have very serious consequencesbut only if the Macedonian Orthodox Church decides to return under the wing of the Mother Church one day.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church, with its Archbishopric in Ohrid is much older than many Orthodox churches, and was established at the time of Samuil's state, at the start of the 11th. century. What St. Sava is to the Serbian Orthodox Church, St. Kliment of Ohrid is for the Macedonian Church. St. Kliment comes two centuries before Rastko Nemanjic (St. Sava). He was the first Slav among Byzantine episcopes, an important religious and cultural figure, and the founder of the first school, i.e., university in the Balkans. St. Kliment did not live to see an autocephalous Macedonian Church, but he laid its foundations with the use of the Macedonian language in religious rites, by translating ecclesiastical books and educating priests.

In 1945, taking advantage of a favorable political situation, the Macedonian Church addressed the Serbian Orthodox Church with a plea to give it canonical freedom. After a lot of stalling by Belgrade, an ecclesiastical people's rally was held in Ohrid in early October 1958. A decision was adopted on the renewal of the Ohrid Archbishopric and the establishing of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. In explaining its decision, the Synod called on the wish of the people and the priesthood, canonical and historical laws, the Constitution and the state's positive laws in effect at the time.

Since then, the Serbian Orthodox Church has regularly and persistently challenged an autocephalous Macedonian Church, insisting that it could never approve such a move, since decisions of such importance come within the competency of the Synod of the Universe. The last Synod of the Universe recognized by the Orthodox world was held in Nicaea in 787 A.D.

The majority of today's Orthodox churches, including these two Balkan ones have been at odds since the Synod at Nicaea, often at politically complicated times and with the blessings of their national states.