My Role In Bosnia

Warren Zimmerman, the last prewar U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, has remained in the spotlight even after his departure from Belgrade. The resignation of this respectable professional diplomat to the position at the State Department and his criticism of the U.S. administration and its policy in Bosnia have sparked outrage in Washington. Controversy was also stirred up by the article published in ``The New York Times'' last year, which said the former ambassador had encouraged Alija Izetbegovic to abandon the Lisbon agreement on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992. Warren Zimmerman is now an esteemed associate of the RAND Corporation in Washington.

VREME: The House of Representatives has ordered President Clinton to end arms embargo of Bosnia. Do you agree with that?

ZIMMERMAN: In principle I am not against the lifting of embargo at the right moment, but I do not think that this is the right moment. If it is possible to reach an agreement on the 51:49 basis, I believe it would be wrong to lift it now. I opposed this in the Congress. But, even before I had my doubts concerning the lifting of embargo, not only because of the peace talks, but also because it is not such a simple solution as many Americans tend to think it is. The first problem being how to ship the arms to the Bosnians. We could transport them by air, over the Serb SAM batteries, or by land over the territories where we could come under a Serb attack. Secondly, we would have to train the Bosnians or create the time for them to train themselves. The Serbs would have a motive to attack strongly while the Moslems are trained. We would perhaps need air strikes to do that. That's the meaning of the word ``strike'' in the phrase ``lift (embargo) and strike.'' Many members of the Congress are convinced that the lifting of embargo does not imply a military obligation, but they are wrong.

VREME: You advocate the use of force by U.N. in Bosnia. You have recently lobbied for ``a considerable expansion of air strikes'' against the Serbs. How would you use force in Bosnia?

ZIMMERMAN: I have always been for the limited use of force, sufficient to stop the Serb aggression and encourage a decent agreement at the negotiating table that would be acceptable to all sides. When there were no threats that force would be used, there was a lack of progress on the Serb side which could lead to an agreement and ensure the exchange of the territories for the Bosnians. Therefore, the readiness of U.S. to launch air strikes against Serb military targets in Bosnia would help Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic realize that U.S. and NATO will be persistent all until a negotiated settlement is reached.

VREME: Do you support the 51:49 partition as a solution?

ZIMMERMAN: I don't think that support is the right word. I see it as the only solution at this moment. I think that it is highly unjust towards the Bosnian side, but the best they can get. I think that they would not get more in case they continued to fight, not even if the arms embargo was lifted. I believe that this solution is in their interest and in the Serb interest as well. The Serbs will have to return 20 per cent of the territory they currently hold and I think that they'll be really forced to do it. I believe that the agreement will be implemented.

VREME: President Clinton has recently suggested for the first time that the sanctions against Serbia be gradually lifted as a punitive measure against the Muslims, if the Serbs accept the 51:49 partition and the Muslims refuse it. All previous ultimatums and proposals envisaged punitive measures exclusively against the Serbs. What's your opinion about these latest developments?

ZIMMERMAN: I am against any punitive measures against the Muslims. The sanctions should not be lifted until the implementation of the peace agreement begins. I certainly hope that, in case the Serbs accept the proposed plan and the Muslims refuse it, President Clinton will make the Muslims accept it. If they refuse and continue to fight, I think that the war will have to continue and the sanctions will have to stay in place. That is not the kind of solution that I wish to see, but the fact is that the Muslims have suffered most and if they now feel strong enough to continue to fight, I don't believe that we are able to stop them or that we will stop them.

VREME: You don't believe that you should stop them?

ZIMMERMAN: That's right. They have the right to defend themselves. I don't believe that we can stop them in that.

VREME: You are one of those who believe that Bosnia is an American problem and say it openly that you will never claim that you are neutral in this conflict. At which point did you choose the side and when did it become clear to you whose side America should take?

ZIMMERMAN: I have felt all the time, even before the war in Slovenia and Croatia, that the Serbian leadership, especially Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, put forth unreasonable demands before the rest of Yugoslavia. The thesis that all Serbs should live in the same state is highly provocative, it has no historical grounds or a moral basisthis thesis was destined to destablize other parts of the country. I have been convinced for a long time that the Serb claims, as Milosevic defined them, represent the crux of the problem.

As far as the war is concerned I did not propose any kind of military intervention during the war in Croatia. I wish I had done it in the case of Dubrovnik, because the shelling of Dubrovnik, like the shelling of Vukovar, was a war crime. Now I think that the intervention with which NATO would have stopped the shelling of Dubrovnik would be a very useful messageuseful for Bosnia.

As far as Bosnia is concerned I can say that when a man supports the victim of an aggression, it doesn't mean taking sides in the usual sense of the word. That is not a neutral fight: I believe that there is an aggressor, and the Bosnian Serbs supported by Belgrade are an aggressor and I believe that there is a victim.

This does not mean that the Muslims have not committed any war crimes and that the Croats haven't either. But, the majority of war crimes in the Bosnian war were committed by the Serb side, according to relevant foreign observers.

There is a difference between ``being neutral'' and ``being fair.'' I think that the only fair approach is to do everything possible in order to help the Muslims preserve not what they would like to preserve, which is Bosnia as a multiethnic state, but at least some viable territory. It would be desirable to go back to the situation when Bosnia had an integral multinational framework, but I know that that is now impossible.

VREME: What do you think about the arguments according to which the two sides in this conflict used their respective advantages: the Serbs had the arms, and the Muslims had the support of the West?

ZIMMERMAN: That is a ridiculous argument. It would be the same if we said that Hitler, who did not have the international support, had to resort to arms in order to achieve a balance.

I am willing to admit that there were reasons for the Serbs to be unhappy because of Bosnia's independence. But this cannot justify the use of force to which Karadzic and Milosevic resorted.

VREME: Does this mean that negotiations should have been used instead of force? But, the negotiations had been held even before the war broke out, and the Bosnian Serb leaders warned during those negotiations that they would rather go to war than allow the Muslims and the Croats to ``take them out of Yugoslavia.''

ZIMMERMAN: I think that political methods should have been exploited in a independent Bosnian state where the rights of Serbs would be protected. To go to war over than meant starting an aggression. Even before Bosnia gained independence there have been incidents that pointed to the wish of the Serbs to secede, even by using force if necessary (what I have in mind is their crossing over the Drina River, the Serb declaration of independence from Bosnia). Provocations were numerous and all of them pointed at one thing: whether Bosnia was independent or not, the Serbs who were under Karadzic's control would have seceded from the rest of Bosnia.

VREME: A contrary thesis is possible as well: that it was not the question of the Serb secession from Bosnia, but of the secession of other republics from Yugoslavia. When exactly did you tell the State Department that it was not the secession from Yugoslavia but the separation within Yugoslavia?

ZIMMERMAN: My position, and I believe that of the State Department, was that what Slovenia and Croatia had done in June 1991 was illegal. Those were unilateral, illegal acts and we did not recognize them for a long while. The situation in Bosnia was somewhat different since only one side resorted to force. I can understand that the Serbs may have had objections to the political course that Bosnia had taken, but no one in the world can understand why Serbia thought that because of that it had to not only resort to the use of force but also to seize the territories whose size surpasses any reasonable division of the population in Bosnia.

VREME: Slovenia and Croatia were eventually awarded with recognition for those illegal acts. May the Serbs in Bosnia have interpreted this as an encouragement to choose the similar path?

ZIMMERMAN: The Serb use of force can be justified in this way. That could even be a reason. But no civilized society would accept it as an excuse.

VREME: What did your analysis show in the months that preceded the war?

ZIMMERMAN: I personally opposed the decision taken by the European Community in December 1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, and offer the recognition to Bosnia. The U.S. government opposed it as well. There is evidence to prove it. I'd also like to say that I think that Alija Izetbegovic has made a big mistake by rushing towards independence. But, to us at the American Embassy in Belgrade, it was clear at the beginning of 1992 that Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs were preparing for aggressive acts. The transfers of troops of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to Bosnia, the unrest in Sarajevo on March 1, 1992all these indicated that Milosevic and Karadzic had a plan to take over a large part of the Bosnian territory and that this would happen regardless of Bosnia's recognition.

VREME: A month before the war began a provisional plan for a political agreement of the three peoples of BosniaHerzegovina was agreed in Lisbon. The Muslim side later abandoned this agreement. Is it true that you encouraged Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his acceptance of the plan?

ZIMMERMAN: No. On the contrary. I discouraged him. I saw him when he returned to Sarajevo from Lisbon. He told me that he had accepted the agreement but that he did not like it. I asked him, ``So, why did you sign it if you don't like it?,'' I tried to persuade him not to withdraw his acceptance, since the position of my government was to support everything that the three sides agreed with the European Community. ``The New York Times'' misinterpreted this fact to the readers, and the Serbian press repeated it many times afterwards.

VREME: If I got it right, it is true that you asked him, ``Why did you sign the agreement if you don't like it?'' but not with an intention to talk him out of the Lisbon agreement?

ZIMMERMAN: That's correct. I actually thought that he should stick to the agreement if he had signed it.

VREME: At the time your critical attitude towards Milosevic's leadership was well known. Did Alija Izetbegovic had a reason to think he would have American military support in case of a possible armed conflict?

ZIMMERMAN: I don't think so. He did not have a reason to expect our military support. It was clear during the Bush administration that there will be no intervention. It even turned out to be very difficult to send a handful of observers to Bosnia before the beggining of the war. Izetbegovic was always nervous concerning a degree of the American support he enjoyed. The leader who believed he enjoyed more support than he eventually got was Tudjman. He counted on American military support and I had to warn him that there would not have it. By the way, if we were critical towards Milosevic, then we were very critical towards Tudjman. As far as Izetbegovic is concerned, he probably hoped for the American help, but did't get it: he didn't even get the lifting of embargo. Milosevic and Tudjman often told me that Alija Izetbegovic was an Islamic fundamentalist. I have to say, and I think I am a careful observer, that I never noticed any elements that would support such a claim. I think the man really believed in the multinational community.

VREME: But, you must have been aware then of ``The Islamic Declaration'' (the book by Alija Izetbegovic because of which he went to prison in 1983)?

ZIMMERMAN: I was, but his book was not the plan for the creation of an Islamic state. He never even mentioned an Islamic state in it.

VREME: He did mention it. Moreover, he said it was the highest and most desirable form of a society's organization.

ZIMMERMAN: He did. But that is not his formula for Yugoslavia. That is a very general and abstract stand. But even if that's what he thought thenthat Bosnia should be an Islamic stateI don't believe that that's what he had in mind when he was the President of Bosnia. The greatest irony is that it was Milosevic and Tudjman who actually advocated an Islamic state by wanting the Serb and the Croat state which would actually leave the Muslims with a Muslim state. Izetbegovic didn't want that, but the governments of Serbia and Croatia did.

VREME: He said that should Croatia leave the Muslims will refuse to stay in Yugoslavia.

ZIMMERMAN: Maybe. He told me that there would be no chance for Bosnia to remain unitary in that case. He expected violence. I have already told you that I understood Serbia's objections to the independence of Bosnia, but I also think that one should also understand that Izetbegovic had reasons to object to the staying in Yugoslavia where there would be no Slovenia and Croatia to keep some kind of a balance. Milosevic was not a politician who would inspire confidence of other republics when it comes to justice and equal treatment.

VREME: Do you think that Izetbegovic could win confidence of the Serbs in Bosnia?

ZIMMERMAN: He obviously did not win their confidence, but his program obviously wasn't so radical as Milosevic and Karadzic were. So, I think it was possible to create independent Bosnia that would have close ties with Serbia and do it without violence. It would not been an ideal solution but hundreds of thousands people would now be alive.

VREME: Were you surprised by the way things developed in Croatia after it was recognized and after you left Belgrade?

ZIMMERMAN: No, because everything was obvious in the first year when Tudjman came to power: a lack of sensitivity towards the Serbs, a lack of resolve towards those people who were ready to deny the rights to the Serbs, manipulating with the press, creating a planned economy, a militant stand of the Croatian government... All that is not typical of a democratic government.

But Tudjman differs from Milosevic because he really wants to be a Western type statesman, and when he is told that he can join the community of Western governments only through certain actions and an orientation, he will undertake those actions and adopt that orientation. It was not easy for him to support the MuslimCroat, i.e. BosnianCroat federation, but he did it because he realized that that is what his friends from the West expect of him. Therefore, he deserves some recognition for such flexibility.

VREME: How would you appraise Milosevic's opponent on the domestic scene Vuk Draskovic (the leader of the Serbian Renewal MovementSPO)?

ZIMMERMAN: I think that he is a very complex person. My opinion about him is that he has learned a great deal since he got involved in politics. I think that he demonstrated some very positive traits like courage.

I have talked a lot with him about nationalism. I think that he sees himself as a Serbian nationalist, but not in the sense as Milosevic and Karadzic are nationalist. He is a Serb nationalist who truly cares about his people, and is ready to adjust to the interests of other people. Therefore, I consider him to be a politician who does not share the ruthlessness or Serbocentrism, if that's the right word, of the Serbian and the Bosnian Serb leadership.

VREME: Are you surprised by the fact how strong Milosevic's grip on power remains even two years after the sanctions were imposed?

ZIMMERMAN: Actually, I am not surprised. In war people gather together around a leader, who, in this case, with the strong control of the media, has access to most of the people. If there was more access to the publications such as VREME the people would have a better opportunity to judge him properly. I am not sure how popular he'll be when the peace comes. Some claim that he needs the war to stay in power, others think that he needs the war to end because the sanctions are hurting. I think that the Serbian people will, sooner or later, reject a lack of democracy and economic traumas for which he is responsible.

VREME: What was the key moment of your mandate as the ambassador to Yugoslavia?

ZIMMERMAN: When it became clear that Yugoslavia will break up, my embassy predicted that there would be violence in case of the breakup, probably war, which is the main reason why the American government tried to keep the country together. But we always made it clear that we will not support unity that would keep Yugoslavia together by the means of arms. We made that clear to Milosevic and General Kadijevic.

I believe today that Markovic's government was a true chance for Yugoslavia to be transformed into a modern, democratic country. That chance was thrown away. I blame Milosevic for this more than anyone else, but I also think that Slovenia and Croatia should assume a part of responsibility.