A Summer Intervention

VREME: Besides working for the Slovenian police you had an opportunity to learn some methods of the Serbian police?

CELIK: At one point I was the commander of the federal police squad in Belgrade. This unit was in charge of providing security of the federal buildings: the parliament, the federal government, the foreign embassies in Belgrade... My service in Belgrade lasted two and a half years and I've got very nice memories of that period. All of us, from the Slovenians to the Albanians, got along very well. But, I must say I don't feel sorry about those years...

VREME: Unlike numerous Slovenian officials, you are not ashamed of those years that you spent in Belgrade.

CELIK: God forbid! I am proud of them. I was 33 when I went to Belgrade to take up an important post. In a very short time our unit was so well trained that it could be compared with similar police units worldwide. The Belgrade police, with whom we cooperated a great deal, was at a very high level and its leaders had good international contacts, they were good in curbing crime...

VREME: But the events showed how quickly corruption can affect the police. The Slovenian police did not manage to resist desperadoes' methods the members of the special police force committed a robbery in Klagenfurtwhich proves that crime can be found even in a very good police force. How can these phenomena be preventedby bigger salaries or by an inside control?

CELIK: It is not accidental that the robbery was committed by the special unit that is directly responsible to the Interior Minister. These men had become a sort of a `guard' of the Minister, and Minister Bizjak, just as his predecessor, is a man of politics who hasn't got a clue about the police. And that is how one gets in the situation that the members of the special police unit start doing dirty things for the lack of a real job. For example, before Slovenia's independence on January 25, 1991, former Interior Minister Igor Bavcar introduced a counterintelligence service in the police, and accordingly the criteria similar to those that were in effect in Yugoslavia after the revolution in 1945, which wasn't good. Deputy Domadenik and I warned about the danger that this brings on the basis of what happened in 1949 when the counterintelligence service was introduced in the police, i.e. the police within the police. Bavcar ignored this as Police Ministers who succeeded him did, because loyalty and political devotion of their subordinates was more important to them than their competence.

VREME: It sounds as if you are disappointed with the developments in the Slovenian police.

CELIK: When I took up the post of the commander of the Slovenian police on July 1, 1990, I was convinced that it would be a professional service. I believed that the Minister would give us political guidelines that we would turn into practice and continue to work. Unfortunately, it wasn't so. Both former Slovenian Police Ministers (Igor Bavcar and Ivo Bizjak), just like current Minister Ster, made the same mistake. They appointed the people from their ranks to the key positions, if not their party comrades, then at least the likeminded people from the party. They do the things that they think are politically necessary which go beyond permissible limits.

VREME: Serbia is often described as the ``police state,'' since, according to some data, it employs about 70,000 policemen. How many policemen are needed to enforce order in a democratic state?

CELIK: About 40,000 policemen would be enough for Serbia, Montenegro and Krajinas, if we take that are about 10 million people there. I looked into the data of 16 countries in Western Europe and how many people are covered by one policemen: in Austria one policeman ``covers'' 300 citizens, in Belgium 267, in Denmark 364, in Finland 427, in France 284, in the Irish Republic 290, on Island 444, in Italy 208, in Luxembourg 467, in Holland 332, in Norway 491, in Portugal 258, in Spain 308, in Sweden 340, in Switzerland 455, in Great Britain 417, in Germany 308. As far as Serbia is concerned, if 70,000 policemen cover 9.5 million people, it means that there is one truncheon to every 135 people. That's most in Europe. In Slovenia, the ratio is 280 people to one policeman.

The number of policemen is not a reliable or the only criterion for the police state. Other criteria for the police state are whether police respects the constitution and human rights, what its competencies are and whether it is in the service or the people and the protection of property, or it only serves the regime.

VREME: As a policeman you had an obligation to defend the constitutional order of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) but in June 1991 you faced the dilemma whether to be for Yugoslavia or Slovenia. You opted for Slovenia. Was it easy to make the decision?

CELIK: No, it wasn't. I was in the service in Belgrade, and I had a good relationship with many colleagues from the Federal Secretariat and I am certain that it was not easy either to them or to other members of my federal unit when they were being sent to the Slovenian borders. With some of them I had contacts even during the conflict. They were O.K. guys, and many retired after the war. The majority of them arrived unprepared. I don't think it was the conflict between SFRJ and Slovenia, or the conflict between the Serbian and the Slovenian people, but the conflict between the highest Serbian political leadership and JNA on one hand and Slovenia on the other. Had the talks between Slovenia and Serbia been held in good faith, then Yugoslavia, that beautiful country that stretched from Mount Triglav to River Vardar, would survive as a confederation, the passage of goods and people would be free and we'd have a common market. As far as the Slovenian police is concerned it is only natural that we had to defend our Slovenian state, as that was our duty towards the citizens of that country and towards the decision taken in the referendum, although the conflict itself marked the destruction of the Slovenian and the Yugoslav policy. The police was not ready for the fighting on the front, but we undertook that task, since the Slovenian territorial defense was not ready for such an undertaking. The merits of the police are now consciously being forgotten, while the merits of the territorial defense are being overstated, but I have always stressed that it is not necessary to boast with what we had done in that tragic conflict in 1991. I think we should move on without celebrating and glorifying false heroism. I would personally like that we arrange a meeting with the Serbian officers and all those at whom we had aimed our guns as they did theirs at us so that we can publicly say what had actually happened. Just like the English, French, American, and German generals met and analyzed their battles after World War II. This way, both sides continue to push their own story.

VREME: Do you agree with the thesis that Marija Vogric, the writer, according to which a large part of responsibility for the conflict between JNA and the Slovenian Territorial Defense lies with Slovenia?

CELIK: I admire her courage to utter such a thesis at this moment in Slovenia. It is clear that all sides share responsibility. I am happy that Slovenia is nowadays an independent state although I have always preferred a confederation. I am disappointed with the violent outcome of Yugoslavia's disintegration and the realization that many are now playing with that state by giving priority to their interests.

VREME: How do you see the JNA intervention in Slovenia nowadays from a distance of three years and do you think that JNA wanted to occupy Slovenia by war, as it can be heard here?

CELIK: It certainly wasn't a war. I describe those events in June 1991 as ``a summer intervention of the army in Slovenia.'' JNA's goal was, as it is well known, to occupy the borders. The JNA action was, therefore, aimed at the borders, and not the occupation of the whole of Slovenia, although one should not forget that a successful action by JNA would have caused a change of power in Slovenia. But, regardless of that, if this conflict is compared with what's happening in Bosnia nowadays it is clear that it was conducted on a much higher military and cultural level. Primarily because of the fact that the policemen and the soldiers knew each other. Those personal friendships mitigated many conflicts and saved many lives. But this is not sufficiently stressed in our celebrations because of the needs of the current ideology. But that will change one day, since the friendship and the historical ties between the peoples in general, and therefore between the Slovenian and the Serbian people, cannot be destroyed by anyone.