Waiting For Maps

From the point of view of the strategic policy and fundamental aspirations of both warring sidesthe Republic of BosniaHerzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republicthe entire territory of BosniaHerzegovina, that is 100 per cent, will continue to be disputable and will remain so regardless of maps, sticks, carrots and other means of selfdelusion. In the foreseeable future the government in Sarajevo will not abandon its goal of unitary BosniaHerzegovina within the internationally recognized borders. The Bosnian Serb Republic has to round off its territory so that it becomes functional and easy to defend. It is clear that the maps of the contact group (no matter what they may be like) stand no chance whatsoever of satisfying the Serb side, not to mention the Bosnian side. Moreover, they are not likely to lead to any rotten yet lasting compromise. If the stick is big enough, the warring sides may calm down for some time. The Americans and NATO have a way to twist the arms of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic so that they feel the pain. That's exactly what Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is doing to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic right now. Speaking long term, the compromise based on the 49:51 partition, even if reached, which is highly unlikely, will turn out to be a mockery. But, even if there is a compromise things will not go smoothly: there will be stalling with the application of maps and demarcation. The Bosnians will complain about injustice, ``rewarding of aggression,'' ``legalization of ethnic cleansing,'' etc. The Serbs will complain about the loss of ``centuries old hearths,'' ``the quality of the territories,'' the corridor that is too narrow, and perhaps about ``rewarding of aggression,'' etc. A temporary success, in other words a short term compromise over the maps of the contact groupwill satisfy all sides in the conflict except for Karadzic. The Bosnians can hope to have a rest and arm themselves better (last week General Rasim Delic, the Commander of the Bosnian Army, has announced the beginning of ``the liberation war,'' since ``the defensive phase'' was over). Milosevic hopes that he will be able to arrange quick lifting of sanctions or at least that they are eased up. Karadzic hopes to survive the loss of some areas he now controls, which would strengthen his currently unstable position; the international community (great powers) hope to finally get rid of that boring Balkan crisis, that has been going on for four years now without anyone having an idea what to do.

It is still unknown how the maps really look. Let's assume, for sake of fun, that the maps of the contact group and the 49:51 partition are accepted. What happens after the speeches are made, the papers signed, the champagne drunk and the chips in Geneva's casinos exchanged?

Milosevic launches a grand operation under the title, ``We are European SocialDemocrats and the Left, we forced Karadzic to sign peace, lift those sanctions, for God's sake, or else...'' (one could add here ``the war in the south,'' or something similar). This time the Bosnians are likely to behave the same way Radovan Karadzic did before: they will make a show of signing whatever is on the table, and then wink at those at home, ``we signed, so what? We can't be expected to honor it when the survival of the state is at stake?'' Radovan Karadzic, however, will not be able to behave like before (in Athens with the VanceOwen plan, for example): this time the signing will really mean giving up territories, which again implies the final ratification of the signature by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in other words, the conflict that Karadzic has managed to avoid so far. Karadzic is in trouble: Milosevic is making it clear to him that he had screwed up and had better sign now, since every new offer will be only worse than the previous one (as it has been up to now). On the other hand, Rasim Delic is attacking him ever more seriously, and the world threatens him with a big stick. The attacks of the BH army may make it easier for Karadzic: they will seize the territories that he would not dare give up... However, this does not significantly change the situation in the long term, since the Bosnians obviously intend to use all Serb weaknesses (a lack of man for defending such a long frontline) and their own advantages (morale, mobility, tactical initiative, and more arms). It follows that Karadzic is in an extremely difficult situation: if he agrees to the 49:51 partition he will give an opportunity to the hard liners in the Bosnian Serb Republic who will accuse him of treason, if he doesn't sign he will expose himself to the danger coming from across the Drina River; Milosevic will have to produce some kind of peace in Bosnia, and if Karadzic represents an obstacle, then the situation's even worse... The political structures in the Bosnian Serb Republic have already been infiltrated and shaken up; the politicians there shiver at the thought of differentiation on the principle, ``Are you for Sloba or Radovan?''.

If the maps of the contact group and the 49:51 division are not accepted, then everything continues in the old way without any new developments. The Bosnian side is now bargaining hard: Ejup Ganic said on Thursday that the partition was unacceptable, while Kresimir Zubak described it as ``unjust,'' but they will nevertheless accept it, since peace is better than war. All things considered, both sides will be very cautious regarding the fine nuances of timing and will try to figure out the other side's moves and thoughts until the last moment in order to score a political point. This applies to the final signing or denying their signature on the proposal of the contact group.