The Minimum Consensus

Zvonimir Markovic, the Head of the Bureau of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade, waited for the whole month to be received by the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic. It paid off. A twohourlong meeting, also attended by Zeljko Simic, the Vicepresident of the Yugoslav Government, instead of a fifteen minute protocol, ended with Markovic's announcement of Milosevic's ``willingness'' to meet President Tudjman (according to the Croatian daily ``Slobodna Dalmacija,'' July 2). Croatia's representative in Belgrade also said that the ``victims of this war'' on both sides are pressing for a solution to their position, adding that heightened international activities force the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia to cooperate.

Diplomatic sources claim that some concrete issues have been discussed as well. Allegedly, after Croatia insisted that no progress in the peace process has been made, specifically that the present situation concerning UNPA's in Croatia is unbearable, the Serbian side offered the meeting at the highest level. Three groups of questions would be discussed: mutual recognition, exchange of embassies and the like, problems concerning the economic cooperation, and humanitarian questions, like the exchange of remaining prisoners, enabling refugees to return to their homes... Diplomats said Zagreb offered the list with possible issues for discussion but it is up to Milosevic to decide what group of questions will be tackled first. Quick and concrete results are the only condition. Belgrade is reportedly not ready yet for the talks concerning the recognition. Meanwhile, Simic and Markovic are coordinating the list of proposed topics for a possible meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman. Geneva, Budapest, even Montenegro have been cited as the meeting place.

Zeljko Simic was the first to send signals that something is cooking in Belgrade. On June 26, he told Radio Kragujevac, that relations must be normalized, that the present situation is only ``a rest in the course of reaching the agreement that will have positive effects not only on solving of the problem in Krajina but also in Bosnia.'' Ivo Sanader, Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister, confirmed (Voice of America, July 10) that these signals were received, i.e. that there are signs that ``the leadership in Belgrade is ready to talk about all issues including the question of mutual recognition'' and mentioned the suggestion of the Contact Group in Geneva that ``all states created on the territory of former Yugoslavia should recognize each other in the borders such as they were in former Yugoslavia.'' Both sides agree that ``the SerbCroat relations are of utter importance, affecting the political and overall situation both on the Balkan Peninsula and in the region'' (Simic), i.e. ``that the solving of the CroatSerb relations is the foundation for solving the crisis in former Yugoslavia'' (Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic).

So, what's the point of all this? Analysts say that Milosevic is caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand is the pressure of the seemingly compact international community to put an end to the war in BosniaHerzegovina (and indirectly in Croatia). On the other is Bosnian Serb unwillingness to give in under the pressure to the extent Belgrade would like them to. Given the situation, the compromise is sought through an agreement with the second ``strongest'' politician in former YugoslaviaFranjo Tudjman. The President of Croatia wants to solve everything that can be solved on the ``domestic'' terrain; the parliamentary crisis seriously undermines his position, while influential radical members of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) threaten with an armed adventure in Krajina whose outcome is not certain and the ``Herzegovinian lobby'' (extreme Croat radicals from Herzegovina), who are dissatisfied with the CroatMuslim federation, could renew the fighting with the Army of BosniaHerzegovina... It is unlikely that Tudjman alone can stand up to those pressures, especially when the West, particularly US, wants him to ``obey the rules.''

Aware that a possible summit could be interpreted as helping out Milosevic (the same way the meeting in Karadjordjevo, after the demonstrations in Belgrade on March 9, 1991, was interpreted), Tudjman told the news conference that his going to Belgrade before the mutual recognition of the two republics is out of question. However, it is believed that this statement does not imply his refusal to meet Milosevic. The statement is described as a form of ``diplomatic pressure'' at the moment when Milosevic, under pressure of the international community, is doing everything to make Bosnian Serbs accept the peace plan. Everything, including the blockade of UNPROFOR in Croatia, ``bellicose'' statements of politicians and soldiers, such as one by Croatian Army Chiefofstaff, General Janko Bobetko, who warned that his troops are ready ``to fulfill their task'' and ``refuse to be humiliated,'' is aimed at creating the impression that the Croatian negotiator has no intention to bargain, but to use his ``peaceful policy'' as much as possible.

Krajina represents the crux of the problem. Many observers tend to think that the search for ``interim solutions'' acceptable to both sides is the main purpose of the announced meeting. The minimum consensus in this sense would imply Zagreb giving up the ``military option of integration'' and Belgrade approving the change of the mandate of UNPROFOR, that would have to acknowledge some requests of Croatia, like return of refugees, control of infrastructures, opening of some roads, etc. As it is unlikely that the Serbs from Krajina would accept all this that easily, regardless of the fact that Krajina President Milan Martic owes his position to Milosevic, it is believed that the Serbian President is ready to ``use'' the ``urban'' Serbs, who live and work on the territory of the Republic of Croatia and who have been given a marginal treatment until now. Quoting well informed sources, ``Slobodna Dalmacija'' wrote that Milosevic offered Markovic holding of the referendum on the political future of Krajina with all Serbs in Croatia taking part and added that there is no reason for Zagreb not to be satisfied with that proposal.

Such prospects couldn't but concern the leaders from Knin. Krajina President and Prime Minister, Milan Martic and Borislav Mikelic, went to see Milosevic right after the latter's meeting with Markovic and were allegedly told that all important statements in the future have to be in accordance with the official policy of Belgrade. The latest invitation Martic sent to Croatia proposing that the talks about the economic cooperation be renewed is interpreted as Knin's attempt to stay in the game. Krajina is allegedly ready to allow controlled opening of the railroad (two freight trains a week without cargo that can be used for military purposes), opening of the highway (demilitarization of the area it runs through with Croatia financing the maintenance) and supplying the towns in central Dalmatia with water from the Serbcontrolled hinterland.

Reciprocal opening of the road through Slovenia towards Western Europe and using a part of the port of Zadar would be asked in return. It is believed that Zagreb had no objections, but requested explicit guarantees of Belgrade, which were not given, so that the announced round of negotiations between Krajina and Croatia on Plitvice was canceled.

However, it is claimed now that the realization of the above mentioned plan represents one group of topics that could render ``quick and concrete results'' acceptable to both sides at the possible Milosevic Tudjman summit. Serbia would become ``cooperative'' in order to have the sanctions eased and Croatia could say that the process of reintegration has finally begun.

Tudjman and Milosevic in essence remain to be opponents. However, it seems that both are aware that if one of them steps down the other will face his own political death. It is cynical, but realistic to say that precisely such state of affairs gives hope that it is possible to normalize the SerbCroat relations in the foreseeable future and end the war. Krajina, refugees, all those killed and afflicted are irrelevant since the grip on power is the only thing that matters.