The Die Is Cast

Reporters in Pale (Bosnian Serb political center) last Tuesday, argued over whether Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, on arriving to attend the second day of the Bosnian Serb Assembly session, said that the decision would be ``Yes'' or ``No,'' since he muttered something in English like: ``Yes, in some way!'' or ``Yes, one day!''. After listening to the tapes several times, all agreed that Karadzic had said: ``Maybe, yes, in some way!''

Karadzic's Delphian answer was followed by a Delphian silence from the Contact Group which would state its views at the summit of European ministers due to take place in late July. Torn between the statement of Charles Redman, the U.S. envoy to Bosnia, who mentioned ``disappointment'' and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's interpretation (that the Serbian answer is more of a ``Yes'' than a ``No'') journalists are trying to make out what will be decided in late July.

It is said that Napoleon always wished to wage war against coalitions because they are fragile, as a rule. According to one interpretation, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's war fortunes and those of Radovan Karadzic, lie in the fact that the international community, embodied by the fivemember Contact Group, has barely managed to preserve a semblance of unity. The hawks in the United States, according to this version, would like to bomb ``Greater Serbia'' until it was reduced to the size of the Belgrade district, while another version has it that Germany supports the U.S. in this, but can't say so out loud, because of its historical sins in the Balkans. France and Great Britain are frowning because Germany and the U.S. are the real forces in ``their'' European backyard, while all they can do is look on helplessly. On the other hand Russia is thwarting what they see as America's arrogance, and trying to pave its way to becoming a real superpower once again. A tendency towards a global outlook has become epidemic.

However, analyses of this type often disregard the fact that there are at least two points of interest which link the Contact Group. One lies in the fact that all relevant world forces have invested their prestige in stopping this war, using diplomacy, guns, secret services and economy. This is why the foreign ministers of the coalition formed to pacify the Balkans will probably conclude on July 30 when they meet again in Geneva, that the Serbian answer boils down to ``it doesn't matter'' and that they will continue to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs (while tightening the noose around the Serbs from Serbia), aware all the time that any other variant leads to a bottomless chasm. Suspecting something like this, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic (and judging by Agence France Presse reports on Thursday afternoon) tried to pressure the international community by withdrawing his unconditional ``Yes.'' Incidents which broke out on Wednesday and Thursday in Bosnia, spoke of the risk of a new escalation of hostilities.

According to some views, the Karadzic/Milosevic duo has once again correctly assessed the seriousness of foreign threats, so that they answered the ultimatum deadlined for July 20 in kind, with another ``final'' peace plan: an empty envelope, which some analysts who had expected such a move, immediately proclaimed as ``unimaginative.''

It is an open question as to what extent Karadzic and Milosevic are a duo. Serbian President Milosevic left the impression that he was exerting pressure on Radovan Karadzic, who according to some sources among the Serbian opposition, took the hard line initiative during the talks in Dobanovci (near Belgrade, where Karadzic and Milosevic met secretly during the night before the beginning of the Bosnian Serb Assembly session). The session was six hours late in starting, and this was interpreted at first as tactics aimed at waiting to hear the decision of the Muslim Croat parliament in Sarajevo. Later there were reports of red hot telephone lines between Pale, Belgrade and Geneva which is why the session was late and frequently interrupted. Some ``wellinformed circles'' claimed that Karadzic flew to Belgrade for consultations by helicopter several times during the session.

The outcome of the conflict between Karadzic and Milosevic will depend on Karadzic's gambler's instinct. During Kozyrev's visit to Belgrade there was an impression that Milosevic was talking Karadzic into haggling, and into putting forward constructive proposals at the same time.

At the start of the last round, VREME pointed out that the Serbian side could once again overplay its hand in searching for a hidden meaning in clearly phrased demands, something which has happened countless times so far, from The Hague to the present.

Judging by the course of the session in Pale, the ``Serbian drama'' wasn't all that simple. Unlike last summer when the VanceOwen plan was rejected despite efforts to the contrary by then Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic, and Milosevic, the Bosnian Serb Assembly held this assembly session behind closed doors. Karadzic spoke dramatically saying that they ``had to face air strikes and down as many planes as possible.'' His speech sounded very fierce, presenting his deputies with a picture of a hopeless war. This time, according to reporters (big and small TV houses were present, with the exception of Serbian state television) the doors were closed tighter than usual, and none of the deputies were prepared to even hint at the direction the debate was taking.

The most persistent journalists tried but failed to find out something of the decision contained in the pink envelope from Radovan Karadzic. Contrary to custom they were asked by security to stand some 30 meters away from his car. From this distance some journalists noticed that he looked ``tired,'' while others that he was ``in a good mood.''

All this secrecy led to speculation (with the usual citing of ``well informed circles'') about the contents of the envelope, what was happening behind the Assembly's closed doors, and why the session had lasted so long. The first reports from Pale claimed that a conditional ``Yes'' was in the envelope; there were guesses as to the number of conditions. Some claimed that there were six, others that there were three: to ``improve'' the plan and specify the degree of independence of the Bosnian Serb Republic within a Bosnian union; to partially change the maps, but not as much as was demanded at first; that firmer guarantees for the lifting of sanctions should be given. Some thought that the envelope contained instructions giving ``discretionary competencies'' to the Bosnian Serb delegation in Geneva to decide what was to be done about the plan, on the spot in Geneva.

Some ``wellinformed circles'' claimed that Karadzic held two speeches. In the first part of the session open to the public he suggested that the answer to the Contact Group be ``No'' and announced the introduction of a state of war, general mobilization, and the transition to a war economy. In this speech (later interpreted by some reporters as a manoeuver for domestic consumption), Karadzic quoted Churchill promising the people ``blood, sweat and tears,'' announcing between lines a referendum on a new peace plan, and claiming resignedly that the Serbian people and the Bosnian Serb Republic were alone, without a real friend.

Independent Belgradebased Studio B radio and TV reported that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had sent Karadzic a letter aimed at persuading him to accept the plan and promising Russia's help in further negotiations. The Belgrade media suggested that this promise resulted from a statement made during the week by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. If he did have such a promise in his pocket, why did Karadzic mention God as the Serbs' only ally. Perhaps he was aware that he was gambling with the international community's ultimatum and with his friends' patience.

Some journalists claimed that this speech was followed by another behind closed doors, made in an entirely different tone. In the second speech there could have been mention of the Bosnian Serbs as not being quite as friendless as had been said earlier, and that the whole matter could be resolved with a more flexible answer which might even split the Contact Group. This speech allegedly moved the Assembly to opt for a ``Yes'' but with several conditions.

Even though no one gives much thought to threats anymore, the current situation may further complicate matters. U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry visited Yugoslavia's Balkan neighbors last week, which must have left a feeling of unease. In the first days of his Balkan tour, he refrained from giving definite statements about America's military involvement, but kept repeating that he hoped a political solution would be reached. On Thursday his statements grew stronger and it was possible to discern earlier U.S. threats on lifting the arms embargo for Muslims and the tightening of sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Threats of extending the ``safe areas'' around larger Muslim enclaves, threats of tightening sanctions against Yugoslavia and on lifting the ban on arms sales to BosniaHerzegovina did not worry the Serbian side much, just as promises that a ``Yes'' would be awarded with the opening of Belgrade Airport to civilian traffic did not impress them in the least. Some kind of a solution can be discerned and it brings the whole horrendous fratricidal war back to its beginnings.

Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic, relying on Kozyrev's statement, insisted at first that both warring sides have the same rights (to a state and a confederation), and this was repeated by the media and officials in Belgrade.

Just ahead of the meeting in Geneva, the ``New York Times'' and other leading U.S. papers suddenly showed a lot of understanding for the possibility that Bosnian Serbs might link up with Serbia in the same way as Herzegovinian Croats did with Croatia. The conservative London ``Times'' even urged such an option. President of the BosniaHerzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak told the Croatian daily ``Slobodna Dalmacija'' at the start of the week that British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd had asked him and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic if their side was opposed to such a confederal solution. Zubak said bitterly that Croatia found something like that inconceivable because it would in fact lead to the restoration of Yugoslavia once again. Silajdzic said that it would be a double award to the ``aggressor,'' not only awarding them for ethnic cleansing and other crimes, but also allowing them to unite with the motherland. On the other hand, he reiterated his call to Serbs to enter the CroatianMuslim federation.

All the actors need is to find a way to reconcile the disintegration of Yugoslavia with the preservation of BosniaHerzegovina. U.S. Presidential Security Advisor Anthony Lake said that the warring sides could improve the demarcation line, but that the preservation of the Bosnian union was a fundamental principle.

The Bosnian Serb's agreement to set up a confederal link with Serbia within the union, could resolve irreconcilable differences, by creating a constitutional precedent. It would be convenient as a short term solution for the Serbian President, against whom the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Radical Party, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia are now flaunting their support of Karadzic. Zagreb's and Sarajevo's ``master and servant'' relationship with Washington and Bonn has progressed, so that some arm twisting would result in their agreement.

A confederal union of BH with two confederal offshoots towards the East and the West, could serve as a model in resolving the wars for Yugoslavia's inheritance, but also become a source of new complications. But tying up the enemies with a loose Bosnian knot could mean something elsethe setting up of a protectorate which would last until an ultimate solution to the Yugoslav crisis is found.

Declaration

Considering the reality that there are two states on the territory of former BosniaHerzegovina, Republic of Srpska and MuslimCroat federation, the Assembly of Republic of Srpska adopted at its 42nd session, held on July 18 and 19, 1994, the following

DECLARATION

which it is necessary to treat in its entirety

1. The Assembly of Republic of Srpska was not in a position to decide about the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group since:

a. all the elements of the peace plan are not known to the Assembly of Republic of Srpska (constitutional arrangements, agreement on cessation of hostilities, the question of access to the sea for Republic of Srpska, agreement on the implementation of peace proposal, agreement on the lifting of the sanctions against the Serb people) and

b. further work is required on the proposed map.

2. The Assembly of Republic of Srpska is committed to a lasting peace and empowers its negotiating delegation to conduct further negotiations.

3. The proposal by the Contact Group about territorial delineation can serve, in considerable measure, as a basis for further negotiations.

4. Following further negotiations the Assembly of Republic of Srpska shall be deciding on the complete peace plan. The Assembly of Republic of Srpska concludes that the implementation of the individual elements of the peace plan can begin only after the adoption of the entire peace plan for former BosniaHerzegovina.

5. The Assembly of Republic of Srpska rejects the possiblity of any presence of foreign armed forces in the region without its prior agreement.