Three Sets of Threats

The historic ``no'' was said. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic figures that it is easier to deal with Skyla, the monster that lives in the cold Geneva lake, than with Charybdis, the dangerous whirlpool in the River Vrbas that runs through Banja Luka.

Some Bosnian Serb army officers insisted even before the Pale session that their leadership must decide once and for all, what territories it intends to cede, so that ``people don't have to die for nothing.'' This, along with protests of political circles in Banja Luka, is a sign that patience is running out. ``Don't the people, in whose name and for whose benefit this war has been fought for three years, deserve to be the first to be told the verdict of the Assembly?'' Such objections indicate the lack of trust in Karadzic's policy and are based on the assumption that combined pressure coming from Belgrade and Geneva proved effective. Dragutin Ilic, the leader of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian Serb Republic, refused to coment on the fact that the verdict was put in an envelope, by saying that his party did not take part in fuelling the war. That explanation is the political platform of Karadzic's new opposition. The enveloped verdict also met with serious reservations in Prijedor, the critical and throughly cleansed area that should belong to the BosnianCroat confederation.

It follows that Karadzic has decided to face the opponent he has already gotten used to rather than to expose himself to attacks of the new enemy that his acceptance would create at home, which would be suicidal. From his point of view the decision was reasonable and predictable. He wants further negotiations which is the most he can do to create the impression of being cooperative and peaceloving. He has learned over these past two years that the talks in Geneva have become an industry for its own sake and beneficial to all participants because the alternatives are much too costly. In that sense, clerks of the great powers have most reasons to be worried now when they hoped to go on vacation. Karadzic thinks that he will be able to cope with Milosevic in some wayassuming that the latter wants to install some order into the allSerb chaos (but the assumption seems to be shaky since no one knows what Milosevic wants at all).

Since the answer of the Bosnian Serb response is negative let's remind ourselves about the threats that were made in the meantime. They roughly fall into three groups: tightening of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, greater military engagement of NATO and UN in Bosnia, expansion of safe areas in BH and their protection from the air and with ground troops, and the worst threatlifting of the arms embargo for BH. Everybody is in agreement concerning the threats. However, there are problems in their implementation and Russia's acceptance of the measures. The Russians have not stipulated many conditions so far, except for the suggestions that the Serbs in Bosnia could be given a possibility of some future confederation with Serbia. U.S. Defense Secretary Willian Perry, currently on an unprecedented tour of Eastern Europe, was the main and most competent source of much speculation over Karadzic's rejection. He repeated one interesting thing several times: whatever the Serbs did, the American side cannot avoid getting militarily involved on the ground in Bosnia. He explained that the acceptance of the plan would mean that the U.N. should deploy some 5060,000 soldiers throughout BosniaHerzegovina (a half of them Americans); the rejection of the plan would open two possibilitiesactive protection of safe areas with ground troops or securing the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops with close air support. In any case, the Americans seem no longer to have the intention to pull out of the Bosnian cauldron. General Sir Michael Rose said something along the lines that he could hardly wait to go home with his men and leave NATO troops to implement the plans of the Contact Group. Ministers Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe reiterated their general threats and that was it.

We shall see what all this will come to when the great powers that are now surprised get the hang of the situation, which won't take long.