How to Survive the Peace

The answer should not be sought from Cyrus Vance, although it is now quite clear that he is an American extended arm, which is now taking the "Yugoslav case" in its own hands. According to all that has been known so far, Vance did not bring anything new or different from what Lord Carrington was offering as well as to what he himself was offering. The only thing he could have done was to express with added force the American interest in putting an end to this war and to clearly convey what it could mean to disappoint America. He could also have dazzled Milosevic with some geopolitical construction concerning the America-Europe-Germany triangle and offer an acceptable excuse for him to step down from power.

They should all have by now realized that geopolitics has become so popular in Serbia that nothing can be solved until the view of the world prevalent in these parts is accepted and until it is promised that, in the view of global strategy, the forces of good will defeat the forces of evil. That means that Milosevic should be given a firm guarantee that the European fascism will not go through, owing to the fierce resistance of Serbia.

But, not even this trick would be enough to stop the war (under a suspicious assumption that it is really over), if it had not begun slowing down of its own accord and turning into brutal violence for want of a sense of purpose. For Milosevic it was a war aimed at defending the endangered Serbs whose gratitude is obvious. It was also a war for saving Yugoslavia, or rather, the Great Serbia which is now out of the question if he was sincere about accepting Vance's plan concerning the demilitarization of all the war torn regions. Finally, with regards to Serbia, the war was being waged for internal reasons which were kept quiet about.

After March 9, Milosevic became aware of the force and the danger of the internal division in Serbia, which were aggravated by the unrealistic election results, for which the regime is held responsible. The incidents concerning the liberation of Plitvice, Pakrac, Borovo Selo etc. ensued. The Serbian opposition was left stranded when the loyalty to the national interest was put on trial of such magnitude. But peace in the house can not be preserved by entering a war with others. The opposition is temporarily disoriented but it would be nothing short of a miracle if Serbia saw the end of this war without even fiercer blows and a dictatorship.

Milosevic certainly did not invent the Serbian divisions which date back from the time of the revolution, but his attempt at national reconciliation, with the widespread support of the part of the national elite was reduced to the maintenance of his regime with such force that he had to start a war, while that same elite is now turning its back on him. His policy is becoming too heavy a burden for the common sense to bear.

He was enthusiastically greeted as a fighter for united Serbia. Hardly anyone paid attention to his aggressive methods, the terror in Kosovo which produced international isolation. An attempt at salvaging the Communist Party of Yugoslavia aroused initial doubts, but he was forgiven because he had already opened international fronts. Many stood by him even when it turned out that he was enacting his own regime and that he can not tolerate opposition. Siding with the ideologically coloured Army was justified with war aims and hardly anyone would have expressed any moral indignation had the vastly superior Army had a quick winning stab at Croatia. But after the desperate defence of Vukovar the obviously cynical explanation concerning the liberation of the war consumed territories became meaningless, as well as the ones referring to the salvaging of Serbs which fled in terror. Tudjman consented to an unequal war, rightfully expecting international sympathy, although the world realized that he wants a national state with as few Serbs as possible. In simple terms, foreigners can not be expected to show a profound understanding of all our idiosyncracies, so Serbia and the Army had to be seen as aggressors.

The official Serbian war version can not be explained even to the Serbs. They were called to defend their brothers in Croatia with firm guarantees that Serbia is not in war although its president is signing the cease-fire, that the Army is of its own free will stifling the rebellion and that it is in war against the paramilitary formations, that is, against fascism, or for some new borders within Yugoslavia, or Serbia, and that Army should be understood as being Serbian but it, however, can not be publicly admitted since it would then make it an act of aggression, which in this case it is not.

What could the Serbian reservists do but flee from this inferno? Who could have so grossly despised and underrated the common sense of the people? It would be such a pathetic act of naivete if the Serbs and the entire world had been called upon to pretend that they do not see what they see and that they do not know what they actually do know, and to, instead patiently follow the official version, had the consequences not been so tragic and had not that naivete be a clear sign that the Serbian leadership is completely at odds with reality.

Milosevic's latest peacemaking stand tops it all. He is announcing that the "blue helmets" are bringing peace, that he was totally in agreement with Vance, he who has never been in war. He is satisfied and is behaving like a victor, since the Serbs in Croatia will be placed under an international protectorate, now that they had been killed, had immigrated, and their houses had been ransacked. The borders have stayed the same and his "common state" will be much smaller than anyone before the war would have offered him. The only obvious result is the desolate and shrunken Croatia. But Tudjman himself has reason to be proud because of this. He congratulated himself on the occasion of the New Year, emphasizing that the previous one will be engraved in gold in the history of Croatia. The great achievements are yet to be made by the Croatian press and television. Defeats should be turned into victories, the embittered and miserable people should be worked up into a state of ecstasy. If the war indeed ends, this Orwellian operation should not succeed. If it does succeed, these two states would be depraved of the basic democratic traditions meaning the non-existence of political responsibility and a power changing mechanism. Regardless of whether the emergency elections will be held or not, neither Tudjman nor Milosevic should be in power when this agreement is implemented. Not because of the agreement, but because of all that they had done before.

At this moment the end of war looks more like wishful thinking than a realistic forecast. As for Slobodan Milosevic, he has irrefutable proof that Serbia is staunchly against his war. His politics in the last few years, his rhetoric, syntax, gesticulation, posture, the modulation of his voice were aimed at producing the conflict which has finally materialized. But he must have been aware that a strong Serbian feeling which he only partially controlled was pushing him towards it. He must be feeling now that the tide is shifting. It could be that he is detecting fear rather than faith in the eyes of an ever decreasing number of those around him. He is trying to muster a peace-loving and naive smile since he has always, as we know, been against the war and has merely been talking about justice, truth and dignity.

Since he has once before managed to switch from communism to socialism, Slobodan Milosevic probably believes that, with a little help from the media, he could turn into Mother Theresa. We should not be surprised if he were to suddenly realize that there are a lot of military extremists in Serbia who should be crushed. And they would want to use this moment of his weakness, during his second metamorphosis, to continue along the path which he wishes to abandon. But it would be difficult to believe that both in Serbia and Croatia, after the demise of Milosevic and Tudjman there will be anyone who could top them.