Total Recall

On Thursday, August 4, 1994 the authorities in Belgrade announced that they were breaking off all economic and political relations with the leadership in Pale and banning all transport to the Bosnian Serb Republic except food, clothes and medicine. In his statement Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic accused the leadership in Pale of wishing to achieve its brutal political ambitions with the lives of other people's sons, and that it had shown a ruthless cruelty with regard to the interests of the Bosnian Serb Republic and Yugoslavia, that it had endangered the security of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and violated Yugoslavia's laws and vital interests, and had usurped the right to make decisions in the name of ten million Serbs; that they hadn't kept their word on matters starting with Sarajevo, via Athens, via Gorazde, and up until the latest referendum had deceived Belgrade.

Fourteen hours before the statement had been broadcast, Belgrade Television carried a very short item saying that the 55 deputies of the Pale Assembly had rejected the international community's proposal and the advice of the Serbian leadership in Belgrade. The news ended with a quote from a letter sent by Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic to Pale a day earlier. ``Don't stall with a referendum. Practically half your population is here, abroad or in territory controlled by the Muslim-Croat federation... If at this moment, when you have been offered peace, you take upon yourselves the right to decide on the fate of Yugoslavia, you, as the leadership are thus breaking off all possibilities for further relations between us.''

After a four-hour debate the deputies in Pale decided to schedule a referendum for August 27 and 28 which would decide on the maps and the peace plan. The US immediately proclaimed such a solution as stalling and the diluting of the peace initiative. The Russians gave the Bosnian Serbs a few days grace, even weeks, to say ``Yes''; the Russian Foreign Ministry concluded coldly that a period of uncertainty lay ahead. There was no need to wait for a sign indicating that all the members of the Contact Group were serious. Just as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's call for new deals resulted in an immediate ``Nyet,'' ``No'' and ``Non'' from Moscow, London and Paris two weeks ago, he was now made aware that previously drawn up punitive measures were to be implemented. The US administration gave the Bosnian Serbs a 45-day deadline to reach a decision, after which the embargo on arms deliveries to the Muslims would be lifted. The UN Security Council started the procedure for the adoption of a resolution on tightening sanctions against Yugoslavia and the Serbs in Bosnia. After the latest decision on a referendum, Karadzic boasted to ``Reuters'' that he had kicked the ball into the international community's yard, and that it was supposed to give its views concerning his minimal conditions (the maps and sovereignty). Before the Assembly session Karadzic threatened to break off negotiations with the Contact Group. He then invited Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to resolve controversial issues through direct personal negotiations. This proposal was turned down before it even reached Izetbegovic. All in all, Karadzic thought that he had kicked the ball into Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's yard, believing him incapable of isolating his proteges. Initial reports from Pale following the break claim that Karadzic and his associates were shocked. Ilija Guzina (Bosnian Serb Television) said that on entering the building of the Serbian Radio in Pale, he came across a colleague who was paralyzed with shock. The private radio station ``BiG'' from Banja Luka was the only one to broadcast Milosevic's statement at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday. Just before that, VREME's journalist passed through the market and came across confused and dismayed people who kept repeating that Banja Luka wanted a referendum and unification with Serbia. Nobody was commenting the situation, it all boiled down to the fact that everything had been done with Belgrade's knowledge, and it turned out now that the people of Krajina were to blame, and had to suffer because of Belgrade. When he heard the Yugoslav government's decision, a smuggler said: ``Fuck it all, when there's no smuggling with Serbia!''

Bosnian Serb Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik said that the decision was a ``disastrous mistake'' and that strong forces ``of our enemies (NATO primarily) will disarm and disband our army,'' that the JNA had been no guarantee in Krajina, and that by agreeing to the plan, they would ``lose all the results of their struggle,'' that these measures would be disastrous for the Republic of Serb Krajina too, and that ``if Serbia is rejecting us, we are not rejecting Serbia and Montenegro.'' Sympathy for Milosevic remains unchanged, and he, Krajisnik, can understand the President's decision if it was made in anger... Krajisnik foresaw that the Serbs in Bosnia would suffer catastrophic military losses. He rhetorically offered his resignation as long as the plan was not accepted. It seems that the politicians in Pale did not take the signs, indicating a change of course by Belgrade, seriously. Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic recalled, in a statement supporting Milosevic, that he had said earlier that the Serbian people could not be the hostages of any single leader. At the time, Karadzic pretended that this referred to ``some extremists.''

In the final act, Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin was the first to say that it could turn out that new sanctions might be introduced against Serbia at a time when it agrees to the peace plan. He also made a statement which made Milosevic place international observers on the Drina River in order to prove that he was stopping all logistics support of Karadzic's regime.

It was soon made clear what the message ``We won't let you decide on our fate'' in the Serbian Government's letter, meant. There are some signs which show that many state institutions, at the time when the clash escalated, began preparations for changing to the system of ``service after an advance payment'' in their business transactions with the Bosnian Serb Republic. In some institutions it was announced that they would soon receive instructions on how to do business with the Bosnians Serb Republic. The Montenegrin Customs received a telefax on Thursday banning the further issuing of Montenegrin customs declarations for the Bosnian Serb Republic. Bosnian Serb Vice-President Biljana Plavsic was prevented from entering Yugoslavia at the Karakaj crossing. A similar thing happend to her when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan.

Belgrade could have been induced to close the border on the Drina River with interesting offers, and because a total blockade would break Yugoslavia economically and exhaust its neighbors. The ``Guardian'' writes that Macedonia has remained alive thanks to violations of the sanctions and that the sealing off of the Serbian border would throw it down on its knees and destabilize it, which would be an added risk to the war spreading throughout the Balkans. This is why Pale rhetoric that sanctions against Serbia would not be lifted even if they agreed to the peace plan, did not sound convincing to the regime in Belgrade.

Karadzic said on Thursday in Pale rather decisively that Yugoslavia would close the border on the Drina River. He said twice that a state of war would be proclaimed in the Bosnian Serb Republic, in the full sense of the word, with mobilization, work duties, rations. It is a mystery, however, what impression this left on his listeners. Karadzic tried to show ``Christian understanding'' for such a move, but also indicated vaguely that Bosnian Serbs should ``not bow down,'' which Milosevic could have understood as a threat.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic did not manage to persuade the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the peace plan, because the radical element prevailed in the Pale Assembly on August 3, just as they expected. Bosnian Serb Assembly Vice---Speaker Radoslav Brdjanin took the floor and said that it would be as well if they, from Pale, were to visit Belgrade and imbue it with Serb characteristics a bit, while deputy Nedic said that the ``letter from Belgrade should be analyzed by President Karadzic from the medical aspect'' (Karadzic is a qualified psychiatrist---ed. note). Karadzic told the deputies that the Bosnian Serb Republic would be isolated and that Yugoslavia would probably allow international community troops to be deployed along the Drina River. His statement that Yugoslavia must be absolved of all responsibility, was a lot of rhetorical mud in the eye after the Assembly in Pale decided to send letters to the Serbian and Montenegrin Assemblies, urging them to jointly proclaim the unification of all the Serb lands. This, in fact was a declaration of war to Milosevic, who, under the circumstances could have taken seriously ``the intentions of an army to cross the Drina River.''

The pro-Karadzic opposition in Belgrade (Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj, Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica and to some extent, Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic) do not have much of a chance in upsetting Milosevic. A day after the session in Pale, Momcilo Krajisnik said that he counted on the unification of the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina, which would serve to undermine negotiations between Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Karadzic counted on Milosevic not being able to make a radical move because of opposition from the Bosnian lobby in Belgrade, whose strength he overestimated. When the Milosevic-Krajisnik clash escalated, DS leader Zoran Djindjic said the Americans were making a mistake by pressuring Milosevic, because if he closed the border on the Drina, the pressure on him from inside would be greater than from outside.

Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj claimed that this was ``definite proof that Milosevic had betrayed the interests of the Serbian people,'' adding that Milosevic had ``started the war, and that many Serb fighters had died with his name on their lips.'' After the break with the Serb Republic in Krajina, Seselj kept repeating that Milosevic's position had finally become shaky.

Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica stood firmly with the Serbs in Pale, varying the thesis that they were Russia's guarantee (a Serb state in Bosnia) and threats that US Secretary of State Christopher Warren would persevere in his endeavors for a single B-H, and that America was far stronger than Russia, and that he believed that the US option would be the winning one.

Democratic Party (DS) Zoran Djindjic wavered and flirted more with Krajisnik and Karadzic than with Milosevic---explaining from afar that the problem lay in whether the guarantees given the Serbian side were firm; that Milosevic claimed that they were sufficiently reliable, but he didn't give any proof of his claim; and why wasn't this concept (on a confederation of sovereign states) immediately put down in writing.

Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) Vuk Draskovic said on several occasions that the war lobby was still strong in Serbia and included in it the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) warmongers (naming Mihailo Markovic SPS ideologue, top party official Borisav Jovic and TV Serbia director Milorad Vucelic.)

Bosnian Serb Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik was greatly responsible for the Assembly's rejection of the peace plan. He underscored that all the objections of the Bosnian Serbs had been ignored and that they had been allotted the ``left overs of the former B-H'' and that ``from the territorial point of view, there was no state in it all.'' His statement to Serbian TV in Pale, made it clear that his goal was a compact state. Bosnian Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic was one of the first Bosnian Serb politicians to oppose Milosevic. She held a speech in Sanski Most, territory which is supposed to be returned to the Muslim-Croat federation, in which she said that people must say if they are giving up their state, their territories, their graves, and broke off in tears, thus rasing the tension.

TV Serbia found several collocutors in Banja Luka who said in front of the cameras that peace must be signed. This survey was immediately taken off the air in Banja Luka and viewers continued watching the Assembly in Pale. VREME journalists tested public opinion in Prijedor and most of the answers were: ``We will not yield a foot of Serb land! Who cares about Milosevic!'' and ``We won our state in blood, and we'll not leave without great losses, we have no place to go. This is

ours.'' A large part of Krupa on the Una (formerly Bosanska Krupa), Sanski Most and Prijedor, should, under the Contact Group's plan be returned to the Muslims. The people talking of a referendum do not mention the fact that the 1991 census showed that the population in the area of Bosanska Krupa consisted of 74.5% Muslims, and 23.6% Serbs; that the municipality of Sanski Most had 47% Muslims and 42% Serbs. The ethnic make up of this area has been changed thanks to ethnic cleansing. It is a historical paradox that the ethnic cleansing of Muslims has been carried out in the same territory in which the ethnic cleansing of Serbs took place in 1941.

From the psychological point of view, the people living there never saw a way out of the vicious circle of violence.

Sociologist Slobodan Inic noticed that the Serbs first supported Milosevic's war policy in the hope of great gains, but were now supporting his turnabout to peace in fear of great losses. Contrary to widespread belief, they weren't greatly enthusiastic about the war even at the time when Milosevic claimed that it would be a short one. Only the ignorance of the media have concealed the fact that at least 40,000 men took part in the military rebellions in Serbia in 1991 or fled from mobilization, and that there hadn't been such a flight since the time when King Milan led his army into an unfortunate war against Bulgaria at the begining of the century.

Whatever one may think of him, President Milosevic last week lifted all official condemnation to resistance of the war, which certainly served to encourage all those who had spoken out against the war, when this was not the thing to do.

Of course, Milosevic knew that the nationalist opposition was waiting for the end of the war in order to blame him for the failure of the national policy. He took the advantage of applying a solution recommended by an American general at the time when America got bogged down in the Vietnam War: ``Proclaim a victory and run!'' In a statement to the Belgrade daily ``Politika'' on July 31, Milosevic urged the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan, insisting that the war goals had been achieved; that the Bosnian Serb Republic had been set up; that it would be recognized at the recommendation of the international community; and that it now covered half the territory of the former B-H. Milosevic underscored that Yugoslav citizens had showed great solidarity with the Serbs across the Drina River and that without this solidarity the Serb Republic in Bosnia would never have been possible, and that demands for even greater sacrifices from Yugoslav citizens could not be justified with a single moral reason. He concluded that the plan contained many solutions with which the people of the Bosnian Serb Republic might be dissatisfied, but that a proposal which gave half the territory to the Bosnian Serb Republic and the other half to the Muslim-Croat federation could not be described as anti-Serb. Even the most difficult solutions of the peace plan, did not endanger life, freedom and the equality of the people, while an escalation of the war and sanctions did.

A day after this statement, on August 1, Milosevic met with the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who said in an unusually long statement that Milosevic had ``understood the plan put forward by the Contact Group, correctly.''

It is believed that the Russians acted in Serbia's interests within the Contact Group and did their best to tone down the punitive measures against the Serbs, and managed to gain some time in which to persuade Karadzic to sign the plan. This time was not indefinite, probably no longer than Vorontsov's term as Chairman of the Security Council. Milosevic seems to have become closer to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and has tried to hop onto the Russian train. The problem lies in the fact that Karadzic's Serbs don't have any faith in a Russian state headed by Boris Yeltsin, but in one which would be led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and for some reason cling to the illusion that they can break up the international community.

Judging by a statement given to the paper ``Bela Ruza'' (White Rose), Karadzic doesn't want the war to stop, because he doesn't believe that the West will send soldiers to Bosnia for the duration of the war, but will take part through the Croats and the Muslims. Whereas, if the war stops, then NATO will send 50,000 troops.

However, it is hard to believe that the five big powers will clash because of the shape of Karadzic's borders. Milosevic realized that the game had become serious and worked hard last week on getting the peace plan accepted. He started the mechanism of exerting political pressure on Pale, primarily via television. He has allowed many warmongers to don peace mantles. Last week's match against Karadzic was played according to the rules of fair play. The subject of war crimes was not mentioned.

It is hard to believe that latest situation will have a sobering effect on the Serbian people and distancing from crimes, because in these matters, ideology is not the decisive factor, but a balance of forces. Milosevic has received the support of the whole state and economic nomenclature, from top to bottom. It was a means of pressure on Karadzic and a loyalty check.

Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff General Momcilo Perisic put an end to speculations that he allegedly backed Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic when he said on August 1 that the army backed the state policy. Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic concluded that the plan was an honorable compromise. On the same day the Yugoslav Government urged the Bosnian Serb leadership to ``show its commitment to peace and the continuation of the peace process through a more positive attitude towards the current proposal of the Contact Group.'' On the same day Serbian Assembly Speaker Dragan Tomic gave a statement which would have been appropriate had it been made three years ago: ``The most ridiculous statement made by those opposing the plan is that the Serbs are losing Ozren, Kupres and other parts in which they have lived for centuries? On the contrary, I think that only in war can more be lost, and that is human lives.'' The whole state, party and managerial elite gave positive views on Milosevic's decision. (They probably thought so all the time, only didn't dare say so.)

It could be of importance for Milosevic that a significant part of the Serbian opposition greeted his attempt at stopping the war. SPO leader Vuk Draskovic said that with the statement that peace was the first and greatest national interest of the Serbs, Milosevic had confirmed what the SPO had claimed from the start of the war. The Civic Alliance called those who were rejecting the peace plan traitors, having finally managed to outgrow the stigma of traitors which the regime's propaganda had pinned on them.

Other Serbs have finally entered the scene. The Sarajevo-based Serbian Civic Council which challenges Karadzic's right to represent the interests of all the Serbs in Bosnia, opposes the partitioning of Sarajevo, and, as part of the ``Living In Sarajevo'' project, established the first contacts with Serb political groups.

The all-out attack on the war lobby in Pale has resulted in an interesting outcome in Belgrade, where Milosevic's regime succeeded in dumping numerous saloon bar politicians, ``neutral'' journalists, politicians and intellectuals in the war lobby. In short, all those who ``in the name of nationalist interests'' did not stand up against a populism run amok in the late eighties and early nineties, who never condemned the war, never saw the crimes being committed, and declared all anti war activities as ``supranationalist'' and ``treachery.'' They waited for Milosevic to get over with the dirty work and then discard him. It seems however that Milosevic has pulled a fast one on them. He grabbed the opportunity of saying: ``It's over with the war, gentlemen!'' Now they will probably slander him claiming that their phones are tapped and cannot say everything out loud. With ``opponents'' such as these, Milosevic didn't have a hard time.

The situation could become further complicated, even though apart from Seselj no single political group is showing any interest in trying to destabilize Milosevic, who as he has done so far, is protecting the national interests at a very dramatic time. Milosevic is protected by Reasons of State. A suicidal action by the Bosnian Serbs or a surprise large-scale offensive by the Croatian-Muslim side could aggravate Milosevic's position, but it can be assumed that such an offensive would not get the international community's support at this particular moment. If the international community were to ignore Milosevic's gesture, and prolong sanctions or leave him without a visible sign of appreciation, the entire operation could meet with disaster. Initial reactions in America hold that Milosevic is bluffing again. Be as it may, the course of the war will take another direction and with different energy. The operation is similar to the cutting off of a gangrenous limb, while the patient is still delirious.

The Villa "Bosanka''

An anonymous employee at the Villa ``Bosanka,'' the Bosnian Serb leaderships' official residence in Belgrade, told VREME on Thursday afternoon after news of the break was announced:

``I have no comment on President Milosevic's statement. I can't say anything about the Federal Government's decision that Bosnian Serb Republic representatives must leave Yugoslavia; I am not competent---all those who are competent to give statements are in Pale. If we have to go, we'll go. For the time being we haven't received any concrete order to this effect.''