Knin Between Two Kingdoms

However, during recess, Krajina President Milan Martic and Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic remembered to phone Belgrade and ask what stand they were supposed to adopt, or they were called and told that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was really angry with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic this time, and that his statement on breaking-off all relations, made on the same day, was not a bluff.

There was nothing of last year's situation, when it was decided, because of the need to leave the impression of great determination when rejecting the Vance-Owen plan, for the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia to finally unite on the basis of a referendum. This time the men in Krajina were warned to watch what they were doing.

The deputies got together once more, and during the debate on the Republic of Serb Krajina's military position it was decided to annul the decision on a separate unification with the Bosnian Serb Republic, because it constituted part of the decision on the unification of all the Serb lands. RSK Interior Minister Ilija Prijic said: ``After having been informed of the new facts, and bearing in mind the good of the whole nation, it has been decided that the earlier decision be annulled.'' Krajina parliamentarians have clearly demonstrated that they are perfectly aware that ``there is no alternative to peace.'' The Belgrade daily ``Politika'' (on August 11) claimed that all payments transactions with the RS had been stopped on August 5 at the Federal Government's order. On August 7, Mikelic and Krajina Foreign Minister Milan Babic met with the Croatian negotiating team headed by Hrvoje Sarinic, without prior announcement. Talks included negotiations on questions of economic links, but produced no results. In the end, Sarinic expressed a wish to stroll through Knin, but was told ``that he could do so only if he promised that Croatia would not launch any military actions against Krajina.'' As Sarinic could not make such a promise, Babic presented him with a copy of the RSK Constitution as consolation.

During the election campaign Martic had on several occasions publicly denied claims that ``Milosevic had sold out on Krajina.'' He said that when such speculations reached him, he had asked Milosevic openly if they were true, and the latter's answer that they were not, had the importance of a revelation for Martic. It seems that the problem lies in the fact that Karadzic would have agreed with the same claim only a few days ago, with regard to the RS.

The break between Belgrade and Pale has really left Krajina's leaders in quandary. Namely, to back Milosevic absolutely, and accept the Contact Group's peace plan, means, in the long run, the start of a reintegration with Croatia, while backing Karadzic, means losing Belgrade's support, which boils down to the same thing. A Solomon type solution has been found in the half-hearted agreement with the decisions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and in proclaiming neutrality in the clash, in order to appease Belgrade. But time is running short, and the Serbs in Krajina will have to opt for one of the two kingdoms. There is an impression that the Krajina leaders, at least the three most important ones---Martic, Babic and Mikelic have shared out responsibility, so that'll know which card to play.

Endeavoring to put off decision-making for as long as possible, Martic has offered to play the role of peace broker and intends to meet with the top RS and Serbian officials and tell them that the current situation is not conducive to ``an exacerbation of stands.'' This is interpreted as a warning to Milosevic that a change of authority in Krajina is possible (Babic's Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina---SDS and the Serbian Radical Party---SRS who are not to Milosevic's liking, but hold a majority in the Krajina Parliament, could topple Mikelic's government of national unity) and that it could annul all Milosevic's efforts at keeping everything firmly under control, i.e., to Karadzic that if he didn't yield a little, then sanctions against the RS could be proclaimed. For the time being there are no signs that Martic's initiative is showing any results. Martic earlier, unsuccessfully, offered to mediate between Pale and Knin during the consecration of the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul in Petrovac by Patriarch Pavle (on July 17), which was attended by Karadzic, Bosnian Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic and Bosnian Serb Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik. Martic insisted then that ``Serbs had never lacked courage,'' but that what ``was needed today was wisdom, and unity, more than ever,'' which were supposed to serve in finding some means for preserving the present state of affairs between Serbs on both sides of the Drina River. Cynics claim, that Martic as the mere executor of orders, i.e., a politician without vision, isn't capable of coming up with a different solution, and that as such, really isn't of any use to anybody.

In the meantime, Babic has tried his hand at negotiating---just enough to refute those who have marked him down as an irreconcilable nationalist hawk, i.e. he has shown that he can follow Belgrade's current policy, and also, that as far as he is concerned, there won't be any ``bartering with Serbian national interests.'' If Karadzic succumbs, he can say that he had been cooperative and a ``peacemaker'' during the most difficult moments. If, however, he manages to stay in office, he can say that, as everybody knows, he and Sarinic did not agree on anything in particular, not even the place and time of the new round of negotiations. Well, he did what a man in his position had to.

On the other hand, Krajina PM Mikelic, as a man of trust, has taken it upon himself to test the ground in Belgrade. He was present at the meeting between Milosevic and UNPROFOR civilian sector director Sergio De Mello (also present was head of the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade Zvonimir Markovic, but not the representatives of the Bosnian Serbs) when some maps were discussed. It has been learned from informal sources that the possibility of UNPROFOR's deployment on the Yugoslav Bosnian border and the border between Krajina and the RS was discussed, something long demanded by Croatia. The message is clear: no one can say that Milosevic is doing something behind the back of the people in Krajina, which is very important for public opinion there. Mikelic has done his best to make sure that the unpopular moves against the Bosnian Serbs, such as the stopping of all payments transactions (unofficial explanations claim that this has been done because of the possibility of undermining Yugoslavia's monetary stability) come from his cabinet---so that everyone knows who has the best connections in Belgrade. On returning to Knin, Mikelic met with outgoing RS (``Republika Srpska'') Prime Minister Vladimir Lukic in Bijeljina. They allegedly didn't discuss politics, but means of preserving economic cooperation and a joint fate. Cynics claim that the place for the meeting was not chosen accidently: Lukic quickly learned what the message from Belgrade for Pale was, after the meeting with Sergio De Mello, and others, while Mikelic avoided having to justify himself for defeatism before the hard-line lobby in Banja Luka. Thanks to Bijeljina's special position, Belgrade had total control of the meeting. (A special ``Panther'' unit under the command of Major Mauzer, a close friend of Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan is in command of Bijeljina).

The economic problems discussed in Bijeljina are precisely what ails the people of Krajina most. Their only link with Serbia passes through a corridor which was personally ``liberated'' by Martic. As has been learned at the RSK Bureau in Belgrade, payments transactions with Belgrade are proceeding as usual, while trucks at the border crossing in Sremska Raca undergo more thorough checks. If the situation deteriorates further, and the RSK leaders are forced to back Milosevic, it could easily happen that the Bosnian Serbs take advantage of stepping up control of the corridor as the best means of ensuring a show of ``solidarity'' from the Serbs in Serbia. In other words, should Belgrade persevere in its blockade of the RS, it is perfectly possible that RS state organs will start demanding racket money from Krajina trucks passing through the corridor. It can also be expected that Serbia will then limit Krajina's purchase of strategic raw materials to the level at which they stood before the break, in order that they might not re-sell them to the Bosnian Serbs. In that case, anything is possible in Krajina; another ``unification,'' this time uncontrolled. That would mark a total failure of the Vance-Owen plan and the Zagreb agreement, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the rejection of the ``Cyprus model'' so dear to Krajina negotiators. The consequences would be unforeseeable, and would place Milosevic in a very delicate position both at home and abroad. An indication of something to this effect can be found in the statement issued by the Serbian Radical Party of Krajina which demands Mikelic's resignation (``he can go back where he came from'') because he has ``denied the RSK Assembly's decision which gave full support to the leadership and people of the RS.''

There are assessments that Milosevic, along with Karadzic cannot dismantle Krajina without bringing his political credibility into question. However, because the matter of controlling Krajina is only a matter of controlling its supply routes (the Zagreb daily ``Vijesnik'' believes that the Krajina leaders have agreed to negotiations because of chronic shortages which have resulted from the blockade of UNPROFOR in Croatia, i.e., the ``blue helmets'' have been prevented from smuggling) there are serious assumptions that Belgrade is prepared to open up an ``alternative corridor'' which would evade all Bosnian problems. The matter concerns an agreement on the opening of the highway in Croatia through Okucani on condition that traffic from Krajina to Serbia, and vice versa, is possible. Such a solution would be satisfactory to all. For Croatia, because it could use the road, and the international PTT cable, the oil pipeline, the railway line, and the Sava River if anyone were brave enough to sail down it. This solution could also be presented to the public as the start of a peaceful reintegration of Krajina. The leaders in Knin, after having been given an ``offer they can't refuse,'' are being given the chance of prolonging the survival of their nation-building ambitions---they will not be blamed for sabotaging Vance's plan, and will be shown as being cooperative with regard to the initiative for an economic linking up with Croatia. In the end, Milosevic will be the one who will gain most. Earlier, after negotiations in Zagreb, in a total stalemate of Serbian-Croatian relations, he noticed that there was no point in opening up the highway, if one side, Yugoslavia, could not use it. With the announcement of an easing of sanctions, he could negotiate its use. Karadzic would be the only loser, and that is what Belgrade and the international community are hoping for.

All this however, will not come about very quickly. Krajina politicians will keep a wary eye on all that takes place on the Knin-Pale line and according to the balance of power, take stands. Pressure is being exerted from both sides, and nerves are frayed. It should come as no surprise that many believe that Krajina's fate will be decided at the long-awaited meeting between Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and played according to the rules of the game approved by the big powers, which both sides have had to accept with their backs to the wall. In this context, Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik and their deputies are absolutely irrelevant.