The President's Three Letters

The first letter was addressed to the Republic of Serb Krajina President at the time, Milan Babic, on January 9, 1992 and concerned Vance's plan. The second letter was co-signed by former Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and addressed to the Bosnian Serb Republic Assembly deputies on April 26, 1993 and concerned the Vance-Owen peace plan. The third time Milosevic gave a statement to Belgrade daily ``Politika'' director Hadzi Dragan Antic on July 31, 1994. The statement refers to the current peace plan put forward by the Contact Group for Bosnia, and concerns the Bosnian Serbs. Speakers on state television first read out the statement, after which it was forwarded to the other media.

The treatment of the letters in ``Politika,'' Belgrade's oldest and most influential paper, is interesting. They were always placed on the right side of the front-page alongside Milosevic's photograph, while the next day's issue brought a photograph of Milosevic shaking hands with the then Chairman of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord Carrington, and in the last case, a photo showing him shaking hands with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. To what extent did Milosevic manage to achieve his intentions?

The letter to Babic was a success. Not long after its publication Babic was relieved and UNPROFOR arrived in Krajina. The letter to the Bosnian Serb Assembly was a total failure, even though it was believed to be foolproof: the Vance-Owen plan was rejected and the authority of the signatories brought into question. The results of the latest, third letter, still can't be determined. There are interpretations, because of the form in which it was made---a statement---not addressed directly to anyone in particular---that Milosevic has left the Bosnian Serbs to face the future on their own, a future which certainly doesn't look very rosy. However, even though the three letters were written under different circumstances, they have many common places.

Why the President writes: ``I find myself obliged to express disagreement with your stand...'' (letter to Babic), i.e., ``Having been informed of the irresponsible stands of some participants in the debate in the Bosnian Serb Republic Assembly, I consider it necessary to address you...'' (letter to the deputies), and finally, ``our public is inundated with reasons pro and contra which often go into minute detail, thus making the whole issue unclear...'' (statement to ``Politika''). He goes on to say that this is nothing other than what stands clearly in the letter to the Bosnian Serb government of August 3, 1994: ``You should not overlook the fact that the Serbian people have only one president, chosen directly by the people and with a fully legitimate mandate.''

What has been defined as controversial: ``If the preservation of peace and security has been placed in the hands of the whole world and embodied in the United Nations, the question which crops up is, is it possible to demand additional guarantees...'' (letter to Babic). ``I'm simply saying that you must be reasonable in your demands,'' (letter to the deputies), and... ``a decision of this importance cannot be based on details...'' (statement to ``Politika'').

In other words, it is being made clear that there are no essential and real reasons for disagreement and rejection, but that the matter concerns a very dubious demand for ``better bread than is made of wheat.''

Would the President have written if he had any choice: To all intents and purposes, no. ``Even though you informed me personally that you would accept entirely the Presidency's decision with regard to the arrival of UN forces (...) you have ignored...'' (letter to Babic); ``From talks we have had with Owen in the past few days (...) all the real and great fears of the Bosnian Serb representatives have been removed,'' which in the presence of the three presidents was ``announced in detail and officially to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik'' (letter to the deputies) and ``We presented these questions openly, responsibly and in a brotherly manner to the most responsible Bosnian Serb representatives, and reached, with them, a high degree of understanding and agreement'' (statement to ``Politika'').

Even though everything had been agreed and arranged, the Bosnian Serb leaders did not prove responsible and fair in difficult times; ``... I believe that your negative stand to be a very irresponsible act'' (letter to Babic); ``This is not the time to vaunt patriotism'' (letter to the deputies), and ``... the demand for even greater self sacrifice by the citizens of Yugoslavia and the whole of the Serbian people cannot be defended with any single moral reason'' (statement to ``Politika'').

What the President demands: Briefly: What he himself has already decided on firmly, and agreed to, thanks to the pressure of various arguments.

``... The citizens of Krajina should know that thanks to your actions, you have lost all trust and that in future, relations with the Republic of Serbia, must delegated to persons to whom the interests of the people will be above their personal political prestige'' (letter to Babic); ``we want you to accept our categorical stand and accept the Plan'' (letter to the deputies); ``... accept the proposal of the international community...'' (statement to ``Politika'').

Why: ``... the people should not have to make sacrifices because of the egoism of any single politician'' (letter to Babic); ``The importance of the remaining open questions cannot be compared with the enormous human and material sacrifices which are made with the prolongation of the civil war'' (letter to the deputies) and ``... creating conditions for the lifting of sanctions at this moment is the least that the citizens of Yugoslavia can expect from the Bosnian Serb Republic citizens and leadership'' (statement to ``Politika'').

And one more explanation: ``The fact that Serbia is giving extensive and unselfish aid to Krajina, does not mean that you have been given the right to decide about the lives of its citizens'' (letter to Babic); ``... you do not have the right to make ten million Yugoslav citizens face international sanctions...'' (letter to deputies); ``... from the point of view of obligations to Yugoslav citizens who have shown immeasurable solidarity with the Serbian people across the Drina River, and without whose solidarity the Bosnian Serb Republic would never have been possible...'' (statement to ``Politika'').

Does this mean that the President has made an admission of defeat: Certainly not. In fact, he insists on a military victory.

``Tens of thousands of Serbian citizens (not just Serbs but all nationalities) responded to the mobilization call of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) which stood in the defence of the Serbian people in Krajina, and as can be seen, succeeded...'' (letter to Babic); ``... in Bosnia Herzegovina the Serbian people have achieved equality and freedom and preserved their territory for the greatest part'' (letter to the deputies), i.e. ``With the great sacrifices of all the citizens of Yugoslavia and the whole Serbian nation and the heroic struggle of the Serbian people in the Bosnian Serb Republic to be free and equal in these areas, this goal has been achieved'' (statement to ``Politika'').

Then what is it all about: Every war must end some time. The matter concerns the right moment for the legalization of interests which were achieved during it, and the exclusive right to their interpretation.

``Rejecting the protection of the UN peace forces, brings into question the most vital interests of the Serbian people...'' (letter to Babic); ``We have taken the liberty of deciding what is good for our country and the whole of the Serbian people, and what is bad. This is a question of war and peace, and that is why we choose peace'' (letter to the deputies); ``A decision of this importance cannot be based on details, but on one key issue: what is the greatest Serbian interest right now, and the answer is that it is peace'' (statement to ``Politika'').

What is necessary for the Serbian interest to be achieved: ``Between war and peace anyone with any sense will choose peace'' (letter to Babic); ``... This is a moment for making a deliberate, far-seeing and courageous decision'' (letter to the deputies); ``At this moment it takes more courage and moral strength to decide on peace than on a war which is still on...'' (statement to ``Politika'').

It turns out that President Milosevic is the one who is reasonable, circumspect, far-seeing, courageous and has moral strength. It would be inconceivable for him to demand of others what he himself does not have.

What are the alternatives: ``If you were to continue with such a policy, you would push many citizens throughout Yugoslavia into war. And if this policy were to survive, then it would be the same policy, with the same consequences as a genocide of the Serbian people'' (letter to Babic); ``The other option is an unnecessary war which now (...) cannot bring anything other than evil, suffering and violence to oneself and others'' (letter to the deputies) and ``The escalation of just such a war and sanctions would result in unforeseeable tragic consequences for the whole Serbian people and their historical interests, because it would put us back by several decades'' (statement to ``Politika'').

What will the President do if they don't listen to him: ``Serbia's aid to the people of Krajina will never be brought into question in peace...'', but ``I believe and hope that the citizens of Krajina will withhold their support from you'' (letter to Babic); ``The citizens of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro have shown the greatest degree of solidarity with you, even more than their circumstances allowed. They will continue to show this solidarity...'' (letter to the deputies). When considering Milosevic's statement to ``Politika,'' there are many places where he points out that the Bosnian Serb Republic could not have come into existence or survived without ``the immeasurable solidarity with the Serbian people from across the Drina River.'' It is interesting however, that there is no mention of continued aid and solidarity, but a turning to the ``economic restoration and building of the country,'' and a reintegration with the international community.

Legible Letters

The signature is legible to the last letter of the surname, which is big and ends legibly and is clear. Since the first letter of the signature is very large---practically childlike---this marks a person with clear intentions, very ambitious, lucid and shrewd. It however, also denotes a great idealist.

The large first letter of the surname shows will and energy, the vitality does not decrease to the end. However, these large and legible letters point to two things: a wish for domination, generosity and a tendency towards protectiveness. The line at the end of the Cyrillic letter ``ch'' in the surname, just like the letter itself, denotes independence.

(This graphological analysis of Slobodan Milosevic's signature was made by Leposava Markovic, and published in VREME, no. 48, September 23, 1991.)

Referendum

A referendum does not serve only to say ``Yes.'' When others schedule a referendum, it serves to be boycotted or condemned. When in early 1991 a referendum on independence was scheduled in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs boycotted it. However, over 63% of the voters in B-H at the time, voted for an independent state.

In mid May 1991, a referendum was held in Croatia on secession and the proclamation of an independent state (94.17% voters voted). Serbs in the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina boycotted the referendum. They were not to blame, considering the way the questions were formulated. An answer had to be given to the following: ``Do you want the Republic of Croatia to remain in Yugoslavia as a single federal state, as is proposed by Serbia and Montenegro?''

Serbs and ethnic Albanians easily found a common language in Macedonia, in September 1991. They boycotted the referendum on an independent Macedonia jointly. Official Serbia was greatly dismayed over a referendum calling for the political autonomy of Sandzak, which has been scheduled for October by the local Party of Democratic Action (SDA).

In late February 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence was confirmed at a referendum which the Serbs, naturally, boycotted. The Serbian side demanded the ethnic division of B-H, and recently got it.