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September 5, 1994
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 154
Bosnian Thunder

Bosnian Rwanda

by Filip Svarm

It has not yet been established exactly how many refugees have fled the Velika Kladusa region. Organizations linked to the United Nations estimate the number to be approximately 25,000; Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) organizations in charge of refugees estimate between 70,000 and 80,000, with new arrivals daily. But, regardless of which of the drastically disparite figures are correct, a large and significant problem has arisen which all interested parties have been confronted with for the first time during the three-year old war in the former Yugoslavia.

Namely, members of one nationality are fleeing from their compatriots and, thus far, all assurances and appeals for them to return have fallen upon deaf ears. Even though Croatia has closed its borders to them and third countries do not want to accept them, they remain intrepid in their refusal to return. Many interpret this as due to their faith in Abdic, who advises them not to return at any cost. It seems that Abdic is already registering certain successes. The American ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, and UNPROFOR official, Sergio de Mello, pressured by developments, have made an agreement in Velika Kladusa with representatives of the Sarajevo goverment regarding ``repatriation'' of the refugees. The agreement foresees the creation of a camp near Bihac (it is unclear whether or not on the territory of the RSK), under UNPROFOR supervision, with unrestricted mobility during the day, a six month amnesty from military obligations, etc., all under the protection of armed peacekeepers.

This is enough to cast a shadow upon the victory of the Fifth Division and the complete restoration of Sarajevo's authorityin the Cazin Krajina; under such conditions, Abdic would without a doubt easily find room for political activity and obstruction of Dudakovic's authority. But, estimating that the persistence of such a refugee situation could benefit him more, Abdic smoothly rejected the aforementioned plan. ``He wants to discuss longlasting political solutions for the Bihac pocket, but for the international community to assume the responsibility of caring for his people in the meantime,'' said Joachim Von Stuelpnagel, the European Union ambassador to Zagreb, after a meeting with him in Topusko. Namely, the refugees listen to him, and when pictures of the escalating tragedy in Turanj, Vojnic and other places begin to circle the globe, it will not be easy for Dudakovic and the government in Sarajevo to explain what qualitative difference exists between them and the Bosnian Serbs. Additionally, the latter have been given an unforeseen ``argument'' for rejecting the Contact-Group map; how can they withdraw from and leave behind ethnic Serbs in the occupied territories when the Muslims are persecuting and terrorizing their own people?

Even though militarily defeated, Abdic remains a tenacious opponent of the Sarajevo government. Because of the ``rwandan'' imbroglio that began after his flight from Velika Kladusa, it is believed that the continuing Muslim tragedy in the Cazin Krajina cannot be ended unless he is given political concessions. Many see Abdic's meeting at the Zagreb airport with United Nations representatives and Hrvoje Sarinic, Croatian mediator for delicate questions, as well as the meeting between de Mello and Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic in the context of the search for appropriate concessions.

At the moment it is hard to say exactly what Fikret Abdic can count on. It is unrealistic to expect the restoration of his entity under peacekeeper protection or a reconciliation with Sarajevo. However, since the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet ended and the Krajina problem in Croatia remains, all sorts of combinations are possible.

The joint appearance of Martic and Abdic clearly indicates that Krajina, despite all of its troubles, has great use for the refugees from Velika Kladusa. It was pointed out that the UNPROFOR mandate would soon run out and the question of the return of displaced persons from Croatia (one should not forget their blockade of peacekeeper posts) was evaded. Namely, how to solve that problem when Krajina is overcrowded with refugees? Their stay, regardless of its length, is temporary; the return, then, of those who left their homes in these regions, is the beginning of the realization of the Vance plan and, the international community's disposition being what it is, for all practical purposes the reintegration of Krajina into Croatia. The crossing of the refugees into Croatia is also beneficial to Knin. Not only are the opponents of the Washington agreement, referring to their fate and making analogies with the Croats in central Bosnia, given the opportunity to obstruct the Croat-Muslim federation, but Croatian public frustration with the refugee situation is thereby strengthened---for three years refugees have been pouring in, but none have yet returned to their homes. All of this is enough to additionally destabilize an already turbulent political scene. Many therefore think that Zagreb's insistence upon the return of the refugees is much more the result of the above considerations than a show of solidarity with Sarajevo.

A possible Croat-Muslim conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in Abdic's interest. Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, in his last interview for the Sarajevo-based daily ``Oslobodjenje,'' expressed skepticism about the readiness of the Croatian side to preserve the Croat-Muslim federation; meanwhile, the federation's president, Kresimir Zubak, strongly condemned the Muslims for violating the civil rights of Bosnian Croats. If things lead toward a conflict, Abdic may be given an opportunity for action and accomodation; is it possible that the Herzegovinian Croats will ultimately propose that Abdic become the federation's president?

Finally, in the event of an escalation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina accompanied by an interruption of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, it would not be surprising if the number of refugees in Krajina from the Bihac enclave who claim that they have fled from Dudakovic's terror grows larger. It is therefore possible that Abdic, with the aid of substantial military enforcements, could triumphantly return to his tower in Velika Kladusa. It is clear that the refugee tragedy has ensured that Abdic remains a prominent political figure and has even made him stronger.

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