Taming The Bullies

The reports of the killing of Oliver Denis Baret, gunned down in front of his Novi Beograd home on August 28 by unknown assailants, as the police put it, seem to fit into the image of Belgrade's sad reality. But the fact that Baret was a Chetnik Vojvoda, head of security in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and a founder of that organization, makes you think about the motives behind the murder, especially if you know that Mihailo Ulemek, a colonel in Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard (Zeljko Raznjatovic, alleged war criminal, leader of the Party of Serb Unity and renowned paramilitary commander in both Croatia and Bosnia), was arrested just five days earlier.

Many feel that the two events are linked to someone's intention to silence the ``turbo patriots'' in Serbia.

A shakeup of the nationalists was indicated earlier in statements by leaders of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, and the Partisan-Chetnik (Communist-Royalist) clash intensified after the Serbian authorities decided to punish their disobedient Bosnian brethren.

Seen in that light, the Baret killing and Ulemek arrest make the picture somewhat clearer. But we should wait for the police to complete their investigation before drawing any conclusion about the Baret killing. The Ulemek arrest is a bit clearer. The police arrested a group of armed men on the Belgrade-Novi Sad road near Indjija on the night of August 23-24. They had kidnapped Dobrosav Nikolic, owner of the Merks DM company. The kidnappers drove Mitsubishi Pajeros, a favorite among the Serbian police and Arkan's men. The kidnappers included Ulemek, owner of the Trojstvo restaurant in Stara Pazova.

Ulemek's arrest is interesting because he is the strongman in Stara Pazova, a colonel in Arkan's guard who was decorated for bravery, and Arkan's good friend. But the most interesting aspect is that Arkan's men, because of their patriotic services, enjoyed a privileged status in the eyes of the law. A Serbian Volunteer Guard ID card was as good as a diplomatic passport to the Serbian police; no one dared inspect their cars. The complete disappearance of Iso Lero ``Dzamba'' two years ago shows the extent to which the police were willing to turn a blind eye.

Ulemek's arrest is an indication that things are changing. There were similar indications earlier; for example, previously multiple murderer Marinko Magda was assisted by three of Arkan's officers who were never arrested. Also, the Guard ID doesn't pull the same weight it used to. On the contrary, police patrols love rummaging through their cars. The police were forced to turn a blind eye to criminals for too long to let an opportunity like this pass them by.

The new rules don't apply to Zeljko Raznjatovic yet. His position hasn't been shaken yet. Red Star (Belgrade soccer team) forward Darko Kovacevic said recently that Arkan helped him obtain a car which had been stolen. But if the rumors of a police task force set up to gather evidence on Arkan are true, speculation about an impending arrest might sound more convincing. There are also unconfirmed reports that the deputy Serbian police minister, Radovan Stojcic ``Badza,'' will be quietly retired and that a well-known Belgrade policeman will be reinstated. Add to that a statement by Bosnian Serb Information Minister Miroslav Toholj to Progress East that the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (RS) former police minister Mico Stanisic (the man who toppled Vladimir Lukic's government and who was accused of being Milosevic's man and the enemy within) now lives in Belgrade, and the pieces of the puzzle fall into place.

The Bosnian Serb leaders have disobeyed Milosevic regarding the Contact Group peace plan and the international community set October 15 as the deadline for them to accept the plan. Milosevic now has a month and a half to force the Bosnian Serbs to sign the plan. The blockade on the Drina border could be effective, but only in the long term. And if the accusations from Pale are right, Stanisic did his job, but the plans intended to get General Mladic's support probably went wrong. If Milosevic wants the sanctions eased, he has to allow the deployment of international observers on the border. Naturally, the public has to be prepared for such an unpopular step. Karadzic, Krajisnik and the other Bosnian Serb leaders have to be discredited through accusations of war crimes, profiteering and other things which won't be believable unless they're well documented. So the opening of certain archives to public scrutiny could come soon.

The problem is which of the war crimes can be mentioned without compromising people in Serbia. We know that Arkan and his Guard and Seselj's volunteers were involved in many of the war operations in Bosnia. Serbia has seen the formation of an armed and dangerous class of people whose financial power and political influence stems from war operations and which won't easily accept its intended role of scapegoat. Understandably, the Serbian authorities are trying to limit the influence of armed men who aren't under their direct control. It's hard to believe that the ultranationalists have the strength to oppose Milosevic, but he is known to be sensitive to his monopoly on force and certainly won't leave anything to chance, especially when risky political decisions are being made.

Also, the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague announced that it would raise the first charges towards the end of this year. The Tribunal could easily demand the extradition of Seselj, Arkan and others. That provides an excellent opportunity for Milosevic to get rid of a dangerous rival (Seselj) and would create the image of the Serbian President as a cooperative politician.

But will Milosevic do just that and will Arkan be treated the same way as Seselj. Arkan could be removed without much trouble. All that the authorities have to do is pick a crime from the thick files on him, issue a warrant for his arrest and send a team of police veterans to get him.

Seselj, however, is different. Even if you disregard the fact the Seselj is a federal Parliament deputy with immunity (which doesn't mean much around here), he heads one the of the largest (and heavily armed) political parties in the country. Also, Seselj relies on an ideology which still has a large number of followers, many of which are ready to fight for this ideology. Seselj is also very popular among the Bosnian Serbs and he has connections in both the army and police. His influence on the men in uniform has fallen drastically since he fell out of favor with the Socialists but still...

The Radicals don't have the power to put Milosevic in serious danger, but their leader can't be arrested just like that. So the Serbian authorities have been forced into a cold war against the SRS using political methods and fearmongering. The arrest of several SRS members just before the last elections seems to have been intended as a warning to the electorate. SRS spokesmen say the arrested members were quickly released, that no evidence was found and that the weapons the police displayed were planted and that there were no criminal charges. They say that the police haven't stepped up their pressure on the SRS, if you forget about that increasingly frequent visits by the financial police to companies owned by SRS members. So the authorities seem to be trying to keep things legal; this allows the Radicals to compromise the judiciary (the disappearance of a video tape in the Seselj court case, the removal of SRS deputy in Montenegro Acim Visnjic's immunity and charges raised against him immediately).

The Radicals can still undermine Milosevic's efforts to distance himself from the policies of war by reminding everyone who exactly started it. That's why the battle is raging in the media. The nationalists haven't been seen on state controlled TV for a long time.

The purges in Politika should be viewed from that perspective. The loyal Tijanic and Antic found themselves without jobs in Politika TV. They were replaced by the infinitely obedient Slobodan Ignjatovic. Obviously, the authorities intend to increase their control of the media prior to events which Politika Chairman Zivorad Minovic described best: ``A new eighth session (Serbian Communist Party session in 1987 at which Milosevic usurped power) is looming.''

Milosevic is becoming more predictable. His departure from nationalist policies has already won him some diplomatic points and if he decides to deal with the Bosnian Serbs or reject them he is almost guaranteed a long period in power. The great powers never had anything against even banana dictators if they could keep their region stable. Milosevic could become the favorite Balkan ruler of the West who wouldn't be criticized for occasional human rights violations and a system of controlled democracy. With the support, or at least neutrality, of the West things will certainly be easier for him at home.