A Counter - Productive Policy

The latest deterioration of Albanian-Greek relations is being followed carefully in Kosovo. Political parties rallying ethnic Albanians and local media give prominence to statements on the trial of five Albanians of Greek origin in Tirana. The Greek authorities are carrying out drastic measures such as the deportation of tens of thousands of Albanian immigrant workers, who are often subject to police abuse (which has resulted in several murders). The Albanian authorities view such behavior as state-organized revenge and pressure on Albania's young democracy. The Kosovo public supports Albania's policy unreservedly and condemns the Greek policy which they link to the anti-Albanian policy of the regime in Belgrade.

The latest deterioration of Greek-Albanian relations is not viewed as very dramatic and it is not thought that the situation could escalate and result in war. Greek aspirations in Northern Epirus are considered illegal, unfounded and unfeasible. The international community and Greek allies in the EU and NATO would not have much understanding for the expansionist ambitions of some extremist political and church circles in Greece who were openly courted by leading Greek politicians - Andreas Papandreau, whose PASOK is currently in power, and Constantine Mitsotakis, who heads the opposition New Democracy.

The ethnic Albanian public in Kosovo is greatly concerned about the effect a deterioration of Greek-Albanian relations could have upon the Balkan crisis and the resolution of the Kosovo issue. It is believed that the current crisis in the southern Balkans has been created by certain local power centers in order to divert attention from the Bosnian problem, and in order to create a strategic counter-balance for the next hot spot in the Balkans - Kosovo. Greece has opened the question of Northern Epirus and the position of the Greek minority, not because it believes that there is a realistic chance that the region might be taken over or gradually Hellenized, but because the issue could be used in present and future diplomatic actions as a direct counter-balance to Albania's aspirations in seeking an independent Kosovo. Greece opposes independence for Kosovo because this would strengthen Albania's influence in Balkan politics and bring about a new power balance in the region. An independent Kosovo would quickly ensure an equal position for Albania in Balkan affairs, and this is something that both Athens and Belgrade wish to prevent. It is believed that Athens and Belgrade closely coordinate their policies and that this anti-Albanian policy is strongly supported from outside (Russia, and according to some speculations, the United Kingdom). Greek political and strategic concerns with regard to Macedonia and Northern Epirus are based upon the possibility of Greece being surrounded by an area with a majority Muslim population in the region of the former Turkish Rumelia (Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, Sandzak and Bosnia). This region would probably be economically, politically and militarily dominated by Turkey, the strongest regional power and one which the new world order gives the greatest chance of partly re-establishing its old dominion. Greece, with Serbia's tacit support, is exerting strong pressure on Macedonia in an attempt at nipping in the bud any possibility for the setting up of a Turkish/Islamic transversale. As far as Greece is concerned, Macedonia is not as great of a problem as the ethnic Albanians, who, in the event that they gain in strength and establish their state (or states) in a broader ethnic region, could set up a strong Western buttress for the Turkish/Islamic transversale, thus cutting off all links between Greece and Serbia and the Orthodox East.

This paranoid anti-Turkish, i.e., anti-Albanian and anti-Macedonian policy, has produced counter-productive results so far. Macedonia and Albania have found a joint political, economic and strategic interest in insisting on the old Rumelian transversale as one of the shortest routes in linking Europe and the Near East. Plans include the building of modern highways and railway lines which will link Istanbul and Skopje and reach down to ports in Albania and Italy. Greece, however, does not have the strength to embark on a high-risk war strategy in order to break up this inconvenient transversale, as Serbia did with the war in Bosnia, using the excuse of resolving the Serbian question in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia in general. Greece lacks such an excuse in resolving the ethnic Greek question because there are no Greek minorities in the controversial areas, with the partial exception of Northern Epirus. This is the reason why Greece insists so much on the Northern Epirus issue, deliberately creating confusion among the international public by proclaiming all Orthodox believers in Southern Albania members of the Greek minority, even though the majority are ethnic Albanians and feel as such. It is said that around 400,000 Greeks live in Albania; this fact is often repeated by the Serbian media, even though this is only a rough estimate of the number of Orthodox believers in Albania, of which only 15% (around 60,000) are ethnic Greeks, while the rest are ethnic Albanians who have an autocephalous church and throughout history have gone through many phases of resisting Greek assimilatory projects. Greek anti-Albanian policy is very vulnerable and counter-productive in another important aspect - it is unprincipled because it does not recognize national minorities in Greece itself. Albanians, Macedonians and Turks living in Greece cannot declare themselves as such. What right does Greece then have in bringing up the issue of protecting minority rights in Northern Epirus? Albanian press and television are increasingly bringing up the question of ensuring a reciprocity of rights with regard to the issue of Southern Epirus which was populated by Albanians in the past and where Albanian villages are still to be found, including the semi-assimilated Albanians in Yannina, Kostur and other larger settlements. Finally, the third counter-productive aspect of Greek policy is its failure to destabilize Albania. President Sali Berisha's administration has not been weakened by the latest souring of relations with Greece, nor was it affected by last year's; in fact, the opposite is true. Greece fell for Berisha's provocation over the minority trials and signals from certain opposition circles in Albania who thought that a new conflict with Greece and a new expulsion of Albanian workers from Greece would affect Berisha's authority. However, it turned out that Berisha profited doubly from the crisis because he organized public trials and therefore won support both at home and abroad. He organized a campaign aimed at awakening national awareness and the homogenization of Albanians, thus winning a political and national battle in the south of the country, which has become increasingly economically and culturally dependent upon Greece. Opposition leaders have been called puppets who are "flirting with Belgrade and Athens at the expense of finding a solution to the question of Kosovo", i.e. that they are showing a readiness to "follow those who are prepared to sacrifice Kosovo, the Albanians in Macedonia and Southern Epirus". In some nationally-sensitive circles in Kosovo there is talk of an Orthodox-Communist conspiracy opposed to the recognition of the Albanian national question in the Balkans. Political divisions in Albania are much the same as they were before, but the present democratic authorities have received more credibility for their national policy and their insistence upon the prominence of the question of Kosovo. Even though Berisha has not followed policies proposed by extremist nationalists, his latest statements concerning Kosovo are more compromising. In Albania, Berisha is considered to be a "pro-Kosovo" politician, one who considers the issue to be of great national interest. In many circles Kosovo has been and still is regarded as the Piedmont of Albanian nationalism.

It can be concluded that Greek-Albanian relations in all areas reflect the current Balkan situation, with its deep national and state conflicts. So far, Albanian nationalism has not followed the warpaths of Serbian nationalism; but it is on the rise and it is impossible to forecast where it will end, especially if rational Albanian politicians such as Sali Berisha and Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova were to be replaced by other, less rational, politicians.