War in a Test-tube

The clash between Belgrade and Pale, the controversy over the eventual lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the announcement and cancellation of Pope Paul John II's visit to Sarajevo distracted public attention for a moment from, what is during negotiations euphemistically called, "the situation in the field". And in the field the bullets are flying, as usually happens while important political moves are being awaited (which the lifting of the arms embargo certainly is), the warring sides are doing their best to preserve their gains and if possible win some more to bring to the negotiation table. This is the light in which the joint offensive of the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) in the Bihac pocket should be viewed. On the other hand, the victory of the B-H Army 5th Corps over Fikret Abdic's forces is beginning to look like a defeat.

Tens of thousands of refugees from Velika Kladusa whom the Serbian authorities have "generously" settled in RSK territory have ignored all calls by UNPROFOR and the government in Sarajevo to return home; the people believe Abdic, who tells them that Atif Dudakovic's troops will avenge themselves upon those who return. In the meantime, RSK forces have recovered from the defeat they suffered in early September in Banija when the 5th Corps managed to enter several kilometers into Banija

territory. An agreement was reached with Bosnian Serb Army Commander Ratko Mladic and Bihac found itself in a classic pincer situation. Krajina went as far as introducing a "no fly zone" for UNPROFOR and NATO above Bihac and opened fire on UNPROFOR helicopters and British "Harriers". According to Mladic's old tactic, the artillery started pounding away immediately. On Monday, September 12, UNPROFOR recorded that 900 shells had been fired on the village of Otoke in the eastern part of the Bihac pocket. That the matter concerned an offensive and not "returning fire" is proved by the fact that earth earth rockets were used. The Serbian side does not have many of these rockets and uses them sparingly.

It is interesting that UNPROFOR's reactions were rather mild, even though Bihac is one of the six protected zones in Bosnia. Officials gave contradictory statements on Serbian attacks: UNPROFOR spokesman Eric Shaperont spoke of a "Serb offensive" at a press conference in Sarajevo; his colleague from Knin, Paul Rusli accused the 5th Corps of provoking the Serbs. In the meantime, the intensity of the fighting has abated. This, however, does not mean that the break will last long - both sides are concentrating troops, while Abdic said that a reconstruction of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia's defence was under way. If they manage to turn the battles over Bihac into a Muslim-Muslim conflict, the Krajina Serbs and especially the Bosnian Serbs will greatly improve their situation for the time being. In that case, the term "the protected zone of Bihac" will become absurd, while Atif Dudakovic's army will be prevented from undertaking any actions in the direction of Bosnian Krajina for some time. Croatia would also find it convenient to have a buffer zone with "tame Muslims" around Bihac, especially if the Croat-Muslim Federation starts running into trouble.

Abdic's comeback and the eventual pacification of the Bihac pocket would score Karadzic points in the diplomatic game. The authorities in Sarajevo gave great psychological and symbolic importance to Dudakovic's victory in Velika Kladusa. In the event that this first big victory over "occupational forces and domestic traitors" comes to nothing, all illusions of the B-H Army's ability to stand up against the enemy would be lost. It would be a great moral blow to B-H soldiers and encourage the so-called world community to leave Bosnia's fate to an agreement reached by the Serbs and Croats, casting the Muslims to the waters. This is why the Bihac pocket is a test tube in which Bosnia's fate is currently simmering. All are curious as to the outcome. The Muslims must prove that they are capable of defending themselves - if they don't succeed, no one will help them anymore. An important military victory would also mean a lot in relations between Belgrade and Karadzic: he would have proved that he was better off without Milosevic and this would encourage many vacillating Serbs to take his side.

Another strategic move by the Bosnian Serb leadership lies in the direction of Grude. One of Karadzic's close associates said recently in private conversation that a good part of Bosnian Serb Republic activities were directed at breaking up the Croatian-Muslim alliance. Reports from the battlefields speak of intensive activities by Mladic's army in central Bosnia where the Croat-Muslim alliance has greatly deteriorated since the start of the war. Serbs attack Muslims in those places (Konjic, Olovo, Vitez, Kiseljak, Vlasic) where the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) should be helping its nominal ally, but is not doing so for some reason. There is reason to believe that a gentleman's agreement has been reached with the Croats, who for most of last year fought hand in hand with their "Christian brethren" against the "Turks".

According to reports, the Serb-Croat oil trade is flourishing in Kupres and two "hotlines" have been set up between the Bosnian Serb Army and the HVO. UN observers say that Croat-Muslim relations are currently reminiscent of the period before the outbreak of conflict between Croats and Muslims.

Last Saturday's assassination attempt on Mostar's German Mayor Hans Koschnik is an indication that the Federation is in danger. Only a day after he had announced the return of refugees (mostly Muslims and some Serbs) to Mostar in an interview in the Zagreb weekly "Danas", and the night before the opening of the new bridge built with European Union (EU) money, members of the Croatian police fired an LAW into Koschnik's bedroom.

Koschnik bravely stated that he would remain in Mostar, but he also expressed great concern about the general state of affairs in the Federation. "If UNPROFOR withdraws because of the lifting of the arms embargo in Bosnia", said Koschnik, "the Croat-Muslim alliance will not last long. In that case I am not sure that my presence in Mostar will be of any significance."

With or without UNPROFOR, the disintegration of the Croat-Muslim federation would throw Bosnia into a new cycle in Hell. Alija Izetbegovic has just returned from Zagreb with assurances from Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's that the Croats are faithful allies. Izetbegovic also brought with him a number of agreements which will not be easy to implement. Because of his reliance upon the Herzegovinian war lobby in the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Tudjman has painted himself into a corner and will have great problems in fulfilling his promises to Izetbegovic. His position is now reminiscent of Milosevic's just before his "Copernican turnabout"; however, Tudjman would find it far more difficult to survive without Herzeg-Bosna's support. It would be a good thing if the Contact Group for Bosnia, which is currently preoccupied with monitors on the Drina River, turned its attention in the direction of Bihac, central Bosnia and Grude. If they take their time, there won't be much to observe in Bosnia soon.