Unwiling Bedfellows

The Serbian opposition has scored no victories in its duels with the authorities and some people feel it has never faced a worse situation. On the one side it is faced with an uninterested public. "People are engulfed by extreme apathy, made stronger by the fact that the opposition has taken away four years of hope for many people,"according to sociologist Ratko Bozovic. On the other side lie the increasingly aggressive authorities. Add to that the divisions within the opposition, not only over methods but also over who the opponent is, and you get a clear picture of the upcoming autumn which many said would be very hot, at least politically.

The basic rift in the opposition couldn't be avoided this time. The moment Slobodan Milosevic openly changed his strategy and turned his back on the Bosnian Serbs, previously less important matters became major issues for the opposition. Cooperation in drafting a law on state TV, new regulations for the Serbian parliament and combatting state crime gave way to a clear and fierce rift over the main problem of war and peace in Bosnia.

The next moves were almost simultaneous. Draskovic accused the rest of the opposition and the Serbian Orthodox Church of obstructing the easing of the international sanctions. Vojislav Kostunica called anyone who now supports Milosevic`s peace plan a capitulator. The other two strong party leaders (Seselj of the Serbian Radical Party and Djindjic of the Democratic Party) have not played their trump cards yet, but the basic directions taken by Draskovic and Kostunica can be said to be the two main directions that the divided Serbian opposition will follow.

Interestingly, both directions are not natural courses. Draskovic was forced to repeat a step he took in 1990 when he called the opposition to rally around Milosevic and defend Kosovo and draw nearer to the authorities for two reasons. The first is the fact that he advocated peace for a long time and couldn't abandon his stand even at the cost of supporting Milosevic. He solved that problem by saying "Milosevic drew closer to Vuk, not the other way around". And second, well-informed sources say the reason is the increasingly clear international community position towards the Serbian President.

Namely, if Milosevic really is the man the world will count on in the future, then Draskovic should, understandably although unnaturally, climb aboard.

Whether the two men have met is not yet known. Rumor has it that they met on Tuesday and SocialistParty sources are neither denying nor confirming the rumor. Milan Bozic, a member of Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), is the only explicit source: "There's no need for a direct meeting with Milosevic". Other SPO leaders told VREME that Draskovic just mumbles when party members ask him about the meeting. Some say they met; some say they didn't.

The Draskovic-Milosevic meeting hasn't been confirmed, but hectic haggling between the SPO and ruling Socialists has. A high-ranking SPO member told VREME that the two parties had had preliminary contacts regarding the group of DEPOS Federal Parliament deputies that had separated from Draskovic and all the ministerial posts in the federal government, excluding the Prime Minister's job.

SPO members say that the contacts stem from Milosevic's need to secure a majority in the Federal Parliament to implement his peace policy. He prefers the SPO to any other party that could secure that majority. Draskovic's peace option is firm and unchanged and Milosevic will obviously be able to count on it in future.

The Serbian authorities certainly do not have a problem with making concessions to Draskovic; the rumor about a deal on ministerial jobs in the federal government is debatable. No one should think that Milosevic would have anything against having several members of the strongest oposition party, the SPO, in the federal government. "We are too good a bargain," Milan Bozic says. In other words, Draskovic won't accept one, two or three ministerial posts. Milosevic won't give him any more than that. The whole thing will most probably fade away.

In that case, federal elections are a sure thing. The Democratic Party believes that December is the date. The Radicals think they will be next spring. "Nothing is certain," Vojislav Kostunica says. If there's someone who doubts the Milosevic-Draskovic deal, then it's Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic Party (DS). They think that federal elections are coming and believe the Socialists will try to secure a majority with their Montenegrin Socialist friends. Draskovic has clearly broken away from the rest of the opposition over the Bosnia issue and has, probably unwittingly, done what Milosevic has been doing to him for years - he got a few steps` head start. He clearly stated what he wants and now he can fight on two fronts. He can deal with Milosevic on one side and call the oppostion to act together on the other. He also has the quiet support of the regime (and eventually even a government position) and the support of the opposition with regard to everything except the Bosnia issue. If he loses on one side, he can turn to the other. He gained a lot of points overnight and if he doesn't use them, he should finally leave politics. This time he can't blame anyone for possiblemistakes.Draskovic's newpositionandMilosevic's determination to disregard any criticism of his policies have brought the rest of the opposition into an embarrasing position where they have to wait for a blurred future. The DS, Radicals and Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia know the authorities will aim their main strike against them. They's not sure how to resist. Together, singly, with the help of the Bosnian Serbs, or in some other combination?

Kostunica would like to see Seselj, Djindjic and Karadzic at his side, as well as anyone else who would oppose Milosevic over Bosnia. He heads the weakest and smallest opposition party and he desperately needs a wide front against the authorities. He knows that Karadzic could turn out to be a spent force, a possible bad investment, and he would most like the current rift to become not just ideological, but so wide that it will last forever. Everyone who capitulated on one side, and eveyone who wants to fight for a just goal and peace on the other.

His basic problem now is that he can't choose his allies. He has to wait to see which of them wants him on their side.

Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj would certainly like to side with Kostunica. He'd like Djindjic at his side as well, but he's justifiably unsure whether the DS wants him. He has to be optimistic and play the only card left in his deck - Milosevic's possible weakness. In Seselj's case, that's the collapse of the Avramovic economic program and the authoriies overburdened by their duties. "The regime is weakest when it has to have control over everything," Seselj told VREME and added that Milosevic was in that position now; he has to control everything personally. If he drops something, the opposition gets its opportunity. The pragmatic SRS leader always keeps up the pressure and hopes the authorities will stumble. He initiates demands to topple the federal government, demands the dismissal of Federal Parliament Speaker Radoman Bozovic, Serbian Parliament Speaker Dragan Tomic and the ousting of Milosevic himself.

Although he's under considerable pressure, Seselj doesn't need any allies. He flatly rejected any joint activity with other parties and, interestingly, he didn't rush into Karadzic's arms. Obviously, he would prefer to use Karadzic instead of having it the other way around. He'll probably try to force Djindjic and Kostunica firmly into his camp, not because they like him, but because they can't avoid him. And that could create problems.

The problem is Zoran Djindjic. He's encouraged by recent Socialist polls that put the DS firmly into second place, right behind the ruling party. Djindjic has no intention of playing with the Radicals` leaders. The DS feels everything Seselj does is damaging to the opposition and think he should be avoided at any cost.

Djindjic will only want to side with Kostunica if he thinks that the he isn't overdoing it with support for the war option. That will cause problems for all three leaders: Seselj will have to wait and see where Kostunica goes; Kostunica will have to decide on only one of two strong allies and ignore all of his smaller potential allies; Djindjic could easily find that Kostunica doesn't suit his needs, but be forced to accept him because he can't go it alone.

"It seems we need elections," Djindjic's cabinet chief Goran Vesic says; "That's the only way we'll find out where we stand and only then will we be able to speak of a united opposition."

Djindjic would also like to avoid the regime-imposed division: Karadzic or Milosevic, peace or war. He'd most like to side with both, as the situation demands: to support Milosevic in ending the Bosnian war and support Karadzic in the union of all Serb lands, taking what belongs to him and ending the embargo. This is much more difficult than avoiding the eccentric Seselj.

In the end, the entire opposition still has one basic problem: Milosevic's almost unlimited possibilities. The huge state apparatus and media allow Milosevic to doeverything they can't do. Choose peace today, wartomorrow, war again,peace again. Hecan say the international community tricked him (if they dither over the easing of the sanctions) and then order a general mobilization. He can also, just as easily, proclaim the crossing of the Drina a crime.

And that's the whole stroy; the opposition doesn't know which way Milosevic will turn. And a little knowledge can be dangerous, the samurai concluded after he cut the last of his 60 opponents.

Appeal

Studio B and Borba daily were the media enterprises which carried the "Appeal to the Public" by 70 Serbian academics, university professors and parliament deputies who condemned the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia and Milosevic's official policy towards the Bosnian Serbs. The appeal said: "most citizens of Serbia and Montenegro do not agree with the official policies of FR Yugoslavia, personified in the figure of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic" and warned that the Contact Group plan "cannot bring peace without a clearly defined right for the Bosnian Serb Republic to a confederation with FR Yugoslavia, as was given to the Muslim-Croat federation in their relations with Croatia, with no previous corrections in the maps especially in the corridor zone... and with no clearly defined borders, that is the recognition of the borders between the Serb Republic and the Croat Muslim Federation."

All these positions are explained in the Appeal (guaranteed borders area guaranteefor allthree peoples;pressures leadto destabilization of the entire region; Muslim fears that they would lose out in the exchange of territories are unjustified...). The public in Belgrade was more excited by the fact that Djindjic signed the Appeal and the fact that Seselj didn't than by anything else.

DS sources told VREME that Djindjic's signature was there because the Appeal was in total accord with their policies, but added that that doesn't mean the DS has joined a new Karadzic-national democrat anti-Milosevic block. "That's out of the question," Goran Vesic said. Seselj also has a short explanation. "I have no intention of being in the company of a lot of small parties which should be banned. They're only winning Milosevic votes," he said. He was referring to the Liberals, DEPOS rebels and other similar parties.