Approaching Pristina

Yugoslavia will have peace only when the International Monetary Fund takes over the National Bank of Yugoslavia. In over 50 countries from all over the world the central monetary authority is placed in the hands of the monetary teams under the supervision of this Washington fund. A Yugoslav fund will not be possible until Belgrade stops printing money for Serbian political aims for the deficit financing of the federal army, for covering the losses of the railways in Serbia, for the Smederevo steelworks and for supplementing state insurance. The war in Croatia served only as a preamble for the real conflict which concerns dinar. It has yet to begin.

The salaries in Montenegro are being paid out in part from the sale of "Marlboro" and alcohol which were seized from the free customs warehouses near Dubrovnik. This war is to do with looting, where the reservists are the looters. The year of 1940 was the best one for Germans too. They had at their disposal Danish cheeses, flowers from Holland, Austrian sausages and cakes. Today Belgrade samples the wines which were stolen in Slavonia. Serbia will pay for it one day, since when all of it has been consumed it will either have to dispel with the principles of economic socialism or it will have to resort to the war communist principles of distribution of flour on the borough level. The midway would mean inflation which does not pay off since it is short lived.

Considering that Belgrade has granted the right that the Serbian krajinas be turned into international protectorates under the armed protection of the United Nations, the makeup of the present Serbian government is weak. If Belgrade wants peace in Yugoslavia, then Serbia needs new elections for forming the international economic experts' government and not a government made up of pathetic yes men.

Opening a front in Kosovo is unnecessary. A conflict with the Albanians would only serve to strengthen the international reputation of Albania. That country is poor but that is the precise reason why it can hold out longer than the Serbs.

The problem of Kosovo can be solved. There are Albanian political groups in Pristina (the capital of Kosovo) which are interested in surviving within the Yugoslav community. Instigating an armed conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs would bring Kosovo closer to Tirana. If Belgrade in the end resorts to force, it would mean throwing a million and a half Albanians out. The Croatian experience confirms that half a million people can quickly be expelled from their homes. It is enough that the hero air men bombard for months the Vukovar property and the people are left with no choice, they have to leave. Belgrade could, however, strike Pristina with a tactical blow with no final solution: it could attack by intoxicating Serbs with their mythology, kill 100.000 Albanians out of revenge and then leave the demolished Kosovo to the United Nations which would then be turned into a protectorate. In the meantime, the socialists are still in power, while Serbia is in shambles. That way, however, they are more at risk of the national unrest in Serbia and less at the risk of the triumph in Pristina.

Kosovo can immediately be offered at least two solutions which do not involve an armed conflict: an international protectorate for 25 years and turning Kosovo into a federal unit which would have the same status as Serbia and Vojvodina within the Serbian federation. The second option is infinitely better, but too daring for the Belgrade politicians. And it is important that precisely at this moment Kosovo be economically and politically separated from Albania. It is important that the weakened Serbia and Vojvodina be spared the financial burden from financing Kosovo and that the Albanians from Kosovo be encouraged towards independence, with regards to both Tirana and Belgrade.

The independent Kosovo within the Serbian federation satisfies both sides: Albanians would get an autonomy with a separate bank account and Serbia is freed from the financial burden of the disastrous dictatorship it had over Pristina. That could be the best solution since very few would have cause for mass demonstrations. The interconnection between the parts of the Serbian federation would be ensured by the common dinar area, the customs union, railways and road network, an armed force and a common agricultural policy. That would be the connection for the new Yugoslav association as well. Belgrade is aware that the Albanians will be coming down from the Albanian mountains to Kosovo. There is no better way for Serbia to protect the inner Serbs from the influx of the Albanians from Kosovo than to turn them into its own buffer zone towards Albania. It could be that the Albanians from Kosovo are inferior to the intelligentsia from Tirana, but they represent the economic magnet for them. They represent the developed north for Tirana, the area where private enterprise is allowed. If Belgrade continues to stifle Kosovo with its military rule and political lawlessness, all Albanians will unite against it. If, on the contrary, Kosovo is turned into a Serbian federal unit, in time the rivalry between the Albanians from Kosovo and from Tirana will rise. That rivalry will probably never bow down to Belgrade but it will lead to the weakening of nationalist tendencies among the Albanians and strengthen the desire for keeping their autonomy for fear of getting under the Tirana's thumb. It is important that the Albanians should be politically separated from Tirana and not to unite them against Belgrade. The way the illusion of united "Serbianhood" failed with the acceptance of Serbia of the Vance's and Hague peace plan, the illusion of great Albania should be dispelled.

Before Serbia is turned into a federation it would even now have to ask for international recognition. With that recognition it would make sure that Kosovo stays within Serbia and would discard with the idea of the independent "Kosovo-republic". Whoever recognizes Serbia within its present borders is directly preventing the cessation of Albania from it. With the international recognition Serbia would protect itself from the possible loss of territories in case it loses any future war. According to international law, the state which loses a war pays the war reparations but does not lose the territory. That could happen now, since Serbia is in war and it is officially rejecting that it has borders. If there are no borders, it stands to lose both Kosovo and Vojvodina. That is the reason why it should not rely so strongly on the Berlin congress from 1878, since it was then recognized in half of its present territory.

To the Serbs in Kosovo Belgrade is obliged to ensure at least a privileged personal autonomy.

That means that there should be proportionately more of them within the organs of power than within the population. The Albanian negotiators from Kosovo would understand that. But nothing can be done in Kosovo until Belgrade lifts its emergency status and police anarchy. Kosovo is a big claim on the Serbian budget. It is time that it should stop being a political claim too.