Reviving the Dead

VREME: Can we begin with the observation that you have decided to mount a non-stop campaign?

DJINDJIC: That observation is correct. Our party suffered a crisis caused by external events from January to April of this year. First there were the unsuccessful negotiations regarding possible DS appointments to the Cabinet. That cost us a month. The guesswork threw an unfavorable light on the DS. Then the vote for Assembly Speaker followed and misunderstandings over those four votes which enabled (Serbian Socialist Party member) Dragan Tomic to be elected to the post. Due to our carelessness it was all attributed to us, and I admit that we did behave somewhat naively in the whole thing. In the end, two of our members entered the Government despite the party's disapproval. Because of all of this, we had to work on consolidating the party. We tried to find a way out of a situation in which we, who profess "honesty" (1993 campaign slogan), found ourselves being suspected of acting dishonestly. We found the solution in defining the party's program more clearly. We said: we know how to resolve the problem of foreign currency savings, we know how to resolve the problem of pensions and privatization, we know what to do about the state-sector economy and crime. In May we began a non-stop campaign because we believe that elections in Serbia have not yet ended. From 1990 to this very day a true election has not taken place. Serbia has not given birth to a new system and that is why it keeps making unsuccessful attempts. It failed in 1990, then in 1992 and in 1993, and nearly happened this year. That's why we'll have elections in 1995.

VREME: Many accuse you of calling early elections, which could mean the total defeat of the opposition.

DJINDJIC: Nonsense. The opposition was never so bad that it would collapse, and we are lucky that the Serbs are so patient with the opposition. I can say quite freely that the opposition is like a ballot box wrapped up in cellophane in which the people cast as many ballots as they don't wish to give to the ruling party. From 1990 to 1993 the opposition kept getting more and more votes, even though one couldn't say that it was getting any better. It wouldn't be possible to claim that it was good in 1990 when it won half of the votes. We have, in principle, a very opposition-minded nation. It's never happened that half of the people have voted for changes during conditions of war, isolation, and government/party monopoly of work places, salaries, oil and flour. It's an old truth that it's not polite to be in opposition during war. It's the opposition's fault that it didn't manage to turn all these wishes and votes into a political instrument. It's our fault if we win over two million votes and then remain in the minority. Stories of a collapse are unfounded, and I'm sure that the opposition here will always win at least half the votes no matter what it's like.

VREME: What did you find in southern Serbia, the traditional strong-hold of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)?

DJINDJIC: The only shortage there is a shortage of the opposition. I believe that the problem doesn't lie in the influence of state television. The people there are very shrewd, much more than we in the big cities, and they are very good at reading between the lines. They have no illusions. They regard the state media as a barometer of authority in Serbia. Appearances on state media score certain points with them. If someone appears on television it doesn't mean that they believe him, but they do realize that he is powerful. They are not stupid and they are well informed of all that is happening. They know just as much as Studio B viewers or those reading the Belgrade daily "Borba" or the weekly VREME. But the problem they face is that our local people are not sufficiently strong. The SPS has the strongest people. Ours are mostly teachers, lawyers, doctors, people in private professions. The directors and people powerful in the state structure are all SPS. This is how they reason: all of the power is in Belgrade, we only see the important people on television, and the authorities here are powerful. Keep quite and show respect, but that doesn't mean that you have to agree.

VREME: So how can all this be changed without television?

DJINDJIC: The ice can be broken only by making frequent trips and having a presence there. When we go down there, the police are courteous and everybody is polite. The people who support us see that we too have some kind of authority and say: "Our officials are also important. See, they don't want to lunch with the Mayor even though he has invited them". Until the people become convinced that we also enjoy a certain status, they will continue to look upon us as naive vegetarians who are trying to beat wild beasts.

VREME: There was a time when you weren't very far from the idea of entering a coalition with the Socialists - on certain conditions?

DJINDJIC: The Socialists want to talk about a division of ministries, but when you say: "Why don't we lease gas stations in Serbia to private businessmen and channel the money into the pension fund?", they get hot under the collar. The more resources are taken from the authorities, the poorer they will become, and the more willing they will be to compromise. There is another road - through institutions; you take five ministries and try to change something from the inside. However, experience with such options is bad. The temptations of such an option are great, as are the possibilities for corruption. To avoid exposing our people to such temptations and later blaming them of corruption, we have decided to cut out all such opportunities of corruption by the authorities and then work on changing them.

VREME: Does this means that you've definitely abandoned the idea of serving as new blood for the regime?

DJINDJIC: The Democratic Party got closest to getting into power. The Socialists negotiated with various sides, but we conducted the most serious negotiations because we had the most serious intentions. Our condition was that two or three parties reach a political agreement on changes and come out with a program of changes, some kind of a coalition protocol which would contain the government's political program. The Socialists weren't prepared to agree to this. They said that Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic's program existed and that it was enough. We came closest, but our conditions were the most difficult. It is a fact that the Socialists could have accepted them because we didn't demand the dismissal of any single person. They found the conditions difficult with regard to the system, because it would mean that they would not have the final say in the allocation of work places, cadre policy, credit, decisions on interest rate and the quantity of money in circulation for two years. Not just they; no one would any longer be able to say - you either vote for me or you lose your job.

VREME: In the last few weeks you have often pointed out various cases of misconduct, but you have never presented any evidence...

DJINDJIC: I've heard about that. The thing is, I don't wish to turn public prosecutor or have the DS acting as the Public Prosecutor's Office. In that case we would be collecting documents and showing them and the people who gave them to us would be under pressure. We would narrow down the number of people willing to collaborate with us in the SPS, people who are not happy with the fact that Dragan Tomic, a privileged person, is using his political connections to further his business deals. We get all of this from the SPS. I have these documents. I wouldn't be talking about these things otherwise. If I hand over a document which shows that "Simpo", or, in other words, Dragan Tomic received the dinar equivalent of 13 million DEM to import frozen meat, which was a credit present because "Simpo" was never involved in frozen meat imports, then I'd be revealing my sources. Of those 13 million, 11 million were profit. Even after that he didn't want to sell the meat through the network, but forced BIM Slavija to ask for credit in order to buy it. I recently also received exhaustive documents regarding the business affairs of Smederevo Steelworks Director Dusan Matkovic who was proclaimed Manager of the Year, which is a very prestigious award. In reaction to this award, I received documents on how Matkovic tricked several sugar refineries in Serbia, how he blackmailed them into buying coke from him, but didn't deliver it even though he received advance-money, and then delivered coke unfit for use... Instead of going public with these documents I have chosen to draw public attention to such occurrences. We choose symbols, not people. As far as I am concerned, Dragan Tomic as a person is not important. I regard him as a problem because he is cited as an example of socialist success. If a man can be a successful socialist manager in this way, then my position is wrong. If, in conditions of a socialist economy, someone achieves such great success as he has, then I'm in the wrong, and perhaps socially-owned property really is successful, and socialist managers are better than those in the West. Or, take for example, the Braca Karic Corporation. I regard them as symbols because they have become wealthy thanks to development funds, because they transferred their capital abroad, and because they are not producing anything. Ask thousands of people what it is that this corporation produces and no one will be able to tell you. They produce hot air. They are symbols of deceit in this society. There's a lot of that. Take for example the city of Bor (mining center) and gold exports. Everybody knows who is in charge of exporting gold - the son of a top minister in the Serbian Government. It's not up to me to go into those channels. I'm just pointing out that an enormous quantity of gold and copper is leaving Bor and that the control is not as it should be, and since there is no control there are many possibilities for abuse. The DS has been noticed by people as a party which points out these misdoings and links them to certain people. Fortunately, we haven't yet received a single convincing denial, one which would prove that we were wrong.

VREME: Until recently Serbian Radical Party (SRS) members used to wave various documents about in the assemblies.

DJINDJIC: We don't want to do what the Radicals did. If it hadn't been for SRS leader Vojislav Seselj's incessant waving around of papers, we might have been tempted to do the same from time to time. I must admit that it can be very tempting, especially if you have a hot document in your hands. But we don't want to do that.

VREME: You said they wished to remove you, that there was a scenario for destroying the DS. Who wants to do that? The SPS or the SK-PJ (League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia)?

DJINDJIC: The SPS. Four years ago it became clear to the SPS that some power shifts in Serbia had to occur. After the initial euphoria when they thought that the generals would win in Russia, that the Eastern bloc would be revived and that the SPS would remain in power in Serbia for the next one hundred years with the help of the army and the police, they then realized that some changes in the distribution of power would have to take place. For a while they tried another trick. The first one was with the 8th session of the League of Communists of Serbia (when Milosevic rose to power) - by changing the elite within the framework of the same party they created the impression that the system had undergone a radical change. It was then that they showed a great capacity for regenerating the system, or rather, in changing the tires on a car going 80 km/hr. The second trick was the attempt at sharing power without giving up power or monopolies. They decided to share with others only the sector of power consumption.

VREME: You had problems before because you showed a disgust and distance towards national concepts, borders...

DJINDJIC: True. I didn't have much understanding for such questions in the beginning. I thought that the power of a state or a nation lay in its economy. A nation with good organization and economy can achieve its goals and doesn't have to define them. I have always supported expansionism. I'm not one of those who shy away from saying: we have our spheres of interest, we want to expand, we want to be colonizers. I support that. All who produce something, who want something, must expand. I think it correct to say so. I thought that if we changed the authorities in Serbia, if we had a good economy and state, then we would naturally become a magnet in the Balkans. At the time I summed it up metaphorically: do we wish to conduct policy according to the theory of the magnet or the steam engine. Will we dominate by becoming attractive to those surrounding us, or in some other, rougher way. We cannot be attractive if we don't have a good organization. I'm a fanatic about organization. I don't hold much with claims that good people will do good things, I believe in organization. We suffer the misfortune of all Slav nations -organization is not our strong point. In the past, when we lived in very badly organized empires, bordering with Asian nations which are hopeless at organization, we also had a Church which was not exactly famous for its organizing talents. I returned from the West full of ideals on how the economy and the state can be organized, and how with a well-organized economy we would be kings among badly organized nations such as the Croats, the Bulgarians, the Macedonians. We don't need to say we want this, that all we have to do is show that we are capable of solving their problems and they'll come to us and beg to be part of a sphere of interest which resolves problems. With time I realized that this was idealism. In order to achieve this, one needs organization. With time I have become a realist, leaving this for the future and have turned to what can be done today.

VREME: Meaning the theory of the steam engine?

DJINDJIC: Yes. Or better still, a combination of the two theories. I don't think that we should abandon our goals. Without good organization we will never become competitive. My ideal is Serbia as a super-organized state with a small, professional, incorruptible administration, an efficient economy and good laws. The we will be superior in the Balkans.

VREME: What are your relations with Pale (Bosnian Serb political center)?

DJINDJIC: Good. We've had good relations since September 1993. We don't pretend we're not rooters. We do avoid putting our personal relations into the forefront. We told Karadzic and his people that we weren't rooting for them personally. As far as they personally are concerned, we are at a great distance. We agree with and support the right of the people living there to getting a state of their own. We are aware of the fact that over half the population does not wish to live in such a Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs and Croats obviously prefer Serbia and Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means that it has to be partitioned. If it has to be divided then we believe that the Serbs must get their part. They are the representatives of those Serbs who want that and we support them. If someone else were in their place, we'd support them. Therefore, there are no personal biases.

VREME: You were among the first to rid yourself of the fixation with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. You realized that he was too strong and left him alone. You even started giving him compliments, that he was "a good politician, but on the wrong side".

DJINDJIC: I still think that he is an exceptional figure. In politics it's a bad thing to underestimate the competition. We all made a mistake when we persisted in repeating that he was a communist and old Bolshevist. We were competing in trying to prove why he was a Bolshevist. Or that he was a clown popping in and out of acts, and that it was just a matter of time before the tide swept him away. Today I admit that he has great ability - independent of his party. This is something that we have to admit as his rivals, or we will never find an efficient way of opposing him. This is no longer a controversial issue. International mediators and many others have said the same. In the meantime, they have moved from the stand that he was a candidate for the funny house to the belief that he is a very capable man urging the wrong idea, but that he is sufficiently capable of preserving this idea. In mid-1993 I had the courage to admit as much on Studio B. I faced a slew of protest from viewers and quakes in my party. I said then: I won't mention him any more as of today. I'll only do so when we have presidential elections. Until then, I am not interested in him. Let us instead see what the Director of the Federal Customs Office Mihail Kertes is doing, and others like him... The radical opposition attacked me because of that. But it is a pleasure to note that at last December's election all had abandoned this obsession with Milosevic, except for the SRS, and I think they made a mistake there. They wanted to take over an empty chair, but the time wasn't right. Now that I know Milosevic personally, after having met him, I can no longer speak of him the way I did in 1990 when I considered him a socialist bureaucrat, an apparatchik who had made it. This just isn't true. What I'm saying now isn't part of any marketing strategy or tactics, it's my personal opinion. I believe that Milosevic is one of the more capable politicians in Europe. His bad luck lies in the fact that he is trying to revive a corpse. He's a superdoctor who has made a bet that he will bring back to life someone who has been dead for six days, and is now calling on world science to help him, and there is no help. None can resurrect the dead, not even this doctor.