The All-Serb Derby

NATO is certainly not prepared for failure, but it is characteristic that, during a debate on NATO's future role, NATO pilots are being given very delicate, practically impossible, tasks: intimidate the Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina, but don't disturb Milosevic, the Russians, or Mummy back home. To deter the Serbs in Krajina from sticking their noses in Bosnian affairs, to make Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic sick at hearing the name Bihac and make him think once more about the map proposed by the Contact Group for Bosnia, not to encourage Croatian President Franjo Tudjman too much, and to not allow Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to make any hasty moves. To act in the spirit of American pride, strength and faith, as well as in the spirit of European fear and suspicion. To show decisive indecision.

This is how some forty odd planes managed to make a hole in the runway of the improvised airport in Udbina and return home gloriously after having successfully completed a dangerous mission. Later, during their second attempt, they hit one of Bosnian Serb Commander General Ratko Mladic's rocket batteries and avenged the shooting down of British planes.

These actions seem unconvincing and clumsy only when viewed from faraway in the world, while those who found themselves on the spot will probably shake for years at the sound of airplane motors. NATO is just trying not to hit as hard as necessary, bearing in mind the complex and contradictory political goals. We must believe them when they say that they will continue to hit harder and that things will become more serious until the Serbs say that they have had enough and abandon Bihac.

Unbiased "Serbian supporters" unanimously claim that therefore, while NATO and the UN had previously quietly watched the Muslim offensive from this same Bihac, it is obvious that they are now taking one side. And because of this surplus of impartiality, they have forgotten that these two world organizations did not react for more than two years while the Serbs conquered and cleansed all that they had conquered. "Serbian supporters" now find it scandalous that some still support the peace plan that Karadzic turned down, and that he who holds a great surplus of land is not being regarded in the same light as those with a great shortage of land, not to mention the equally unjust attitude to victims and other damages.

Now that NATO bombs are starting to drop, what does it mean to be a "Serbian supporter"? This term, which Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic coined to describe himself, would also be fitting for Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj, but neither of them is rooting for those bombs. They would like for the bombs to miss the Serbs because it is unjust that anyone should be targeting them in the first place. And if the matter concerns "supporters", it is normal that they should not think that Serb bombs should miss and that they are equally unjust. When one is cheering from the sidelines the war seems like a big game and the dead should be counted as points and goals.

I assume that local "Serbian supporters" want the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia to get the best possible deal, to get more, or at least to get off as cheaply as possible. Does this inevitably entail unconditional support for Radovan Karadzic? They answer in the affirmative, which means that they believe that he is managing Serb affairs well. If they thought Karadzic would be defeated, they would probably try to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to abandon him. They therefore believe that NATO can't touch him. Or perhaps they are not sure about any of this, but believe that cheering him on can't do any harm.

However, "Serbian supporters" are not in a position to affect NATO decisions and they don't know how many more planes will take off, how many bombs will be dropped and how many people will be killed. All they can do is tell you and me that it is not just and tell the Bosnian Serbs that they are on their side and that they must stick it out. Until when? Well, until the planes get tired of flying and the bombs of falling. Apart from this, local "Serbian supporters" give Bosnian Serbs the hope that they will come to their aid one day, as soon as they manage to get rid of Milosevic. Until that time, they'll just have to go on getting killed and be patient about it. And this is where the difference between sport and war crops up, and between the public at the stadium and opposition parties in Serbia. These fans keep saying that they might run out onto the field and help their team, especially if things start going badly. If there are more deaths, things will look bad for Milosevic, and their chances will be better.

In this phase of the war the situation on the Serbian side of the front is as follows: they in Bosnia, on the front lines, are challenging NATO and screaming, all in the hope of getting Serbia to react or at least lift the blockade on the Drina River. Milosevic is concealing and minimizing their losses on television and trying to lull the Serbs into a sleep. I think that for the first time his logic has become normal: get out of the war, especially when you see that you're losing. Contrary to hopes nurtured by Bosnian Serbs, the more that they die the more Milosevic will be convinced that it is none of his business.

Of course, this hadn't been the agreement and this is treason. But if two people make a deal to beat up and rob someone, then it must be clear what kind of men they are, and in that case, is it really such a big thing if one of them bails out when the going gets rough? Those who believe this treachery to be Milosevic's greatest sin seem to think that he was supposed to stick to the pan-Serb cause as to some Mafia code of honor, whereby Serbs owe each other total loyalty in the face of non-Serbs.

It was precisely these national mafiosi who gave Milosevic the mandate of the leader of all Serbs, but he finally returned it this summer. Now they complain and curse each other for having made the wrong choice and for trusting a Communist. He, however, did all he could, i.e. more than he should have, and he gave up after he had convinced himself that something such as a pan-Serb mandate did not exist. There are none with so little moral credibility as "Serbian supporters" and they have no right to criticize Milosevic. Milosevic led their policy with inhuman persistence and, besides mass crimes, it brought the country to the brink of national suicide. But they condemn him for having stopped there.

Milosevic is now looking around and wondering if someone has a different program. But the circle of people has shrunk and the ideas have dried up, so that it seems that he has decided to listen to his wife and follow that old Communist song "he who says something different is a slanderer and a liar..." Like thirty years ago, Ms. Markovic (Milosevic's wife) is talking about a third road, without noticing that the second road has in the meantime fallen into disuse, is ruined and overgrown with weeds, and that no one uses it anymore.

But this is a story about some future dead-end street, and while the war lasts and new bombs are dropping, I am more interested in the position of the "Serbian supporters". All of them, including the Radicals, have already realized that Serbia will not enter this war. They also know that the story of unification into a pan-Serb state doesn't stand much better. They are now trying to prove that it hadn't been necessary to introduce the blockade on the Drina River, because then NATO wouldn't have dared drop the bombs. But none of this really interests them anymore, nor do they know what else they could do now. They irritate the regime when they can and remind it of unfulfilled promises, which is as it should be.

Some of the Bosnian Serbs still look across the Drina River and hope for something in the event that Seselj or Kostunica or Djindjic come to power. Some may die with this crazy hope. Do these gentlemen really think that they deserve to have someone die believing in them?