The Bombing of Udbine

Last week it was clear that something was coming when the big powers lost their patience and extended air support for UNPROFOR troops to the areas they call UNPA's and we call the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK). Udbina airport, the auxiliary airfield of the former airbase at Bihac and now the RSK's only airport, has an interesting history.

It was used for many things: as a hub for commercial flights by the "Opera Orientis" airline early in 1992; since the war began in Bosnia and the Bihac air base was destroyed, Udbina gained in military importance as a joint airbase for the RSK and Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), an unknown detail but important for later events.

Early in March of this year, NATO fighters downed a combined force of four Jastreb and Galeb ground attack aircraft over western Bosnia. The four were violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia and had bombed a populated area. Interestingly, no one claimed the loss of the planes, even though everyone in the region possesses such planes. It turned out that they were no one's planes, although some newspapers published death notices for some pilots. It later turned out that the planes had taken off from Udbina, but the RSK denied that report.

Udbina airport became a public secret in March and NATO's surveillance extended to the airfield. The RSK army never let UNPROFOR or UN observers near the airfield although it formally promised to allow them in on several occasions. The status quo held up to mid-November, when the airfield was used to launch air strikes as part of the Bosnian Serb counteroffensive against the Muslim 5th Corps in Bihac.

Udbina airport is almost on the border between the RSK and the RS. That means that fighter bombers require just five to seven minutes from takeoff to target in the Bihac area. The proximity of the border formally complicated things: planes and artillery could bomb the 5th Corps from RSK territory or airspace without crossing into Bosnia. And that's just what happened.

The straw that broke the camel's back came when the Krajina Serbs bombed Bihac and Cazin with artillery and antiquated SA-2 antiaircraft missiles, and especially on November 10 when an Orao fighter-bomber bombed Bihac (the RSK said it had no Orao's). Air strikes had been launched from RSK airspace earlier, at least according to reports from the area that the UN never managed to document since the pilots who fly out of Udbina have perfected low-flying techniques in order to avoid radar. On November 18, two Orao aircraft dropped napalm and cargo bombs inside the Bihac safe-area. The UN sent a sharply-worded protest to the authorities in Knin and threatened an appropriate response against the Bosnian Serbs. The RS army said the attacks were fabrications because "NATO controls the skies and all flights". The Belgrade daily "Vecernje Novosti" said that UFO's were attacking Bihac.

The next day the UN Security Council discussed Britain's draft resolution allowing air strikes against Krajina planes if they continue bombing Bihac and against Udbina airport if the need arises. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman demanded the same and approved NATO flights over Croatian territory (including, of course, the RSK). RSK President Milan Martic made an interesting statement: "We took no part in it", but he failed to say who was flying out of Udbina. "Any act of aggression against the RSK with Security Council backing at the request of Tudjman will be treated as Croatian aggression and the UN siding with Croatia. We will be forced to react militarily", he said.

Martic finally understood where all of this was leading and on November 19 he called the UN to deploy observers at the airport. That same day, at 3:50 PM, two aircraft hit civilian targets in Cazin with at least four bombs. One Orao was shot down and its pilot, Boro Novic (30), was killed. The final outcome stood at nine dead and three unexploded bombs.

The Security Council adopted a resolution that night. Resolution 958 allowed NATO aircraft to attack "Croatian territory" in support of UN troops in the Bihac safe-area.

It later turned out that the Udbina airport would have been attacked on Sunday, November 20, but weather conditions were unfavorable. Something else happened instead. While the Security Council was in session, the RSK parliament held its session in Vukovar "to celebrate three years of freedom" ("Vecernje Novosti"). Some sources said the session was moved to Vukovar to prevent RS guests from coming to the session. The parliament met behind closed doors, but a later report said that Internal Affairs Minister Ilija Prijic was dismissed and public security service chief Nebojsa Pavkovic was appointed to replace him.

Things became interesting from that point on. First, Martic left for Knin before anyone else. The next day, most of the parliamentary deputies (including Foreign Minister Milan Babic) came to Belgrade to spend the night in the "Majestic" hotel. VREME discovered that none of them were there that night. They left for Krajina late at night via the Posavina corridor, a route they would never use unless it was absolutely essential. What did they find out in the meantime? Who told them?

November 21 was a sunny day that NATO used to strike at Udbina airport and its anti-aircraft batteries in the biggest air operation in Europe since World War II.

A combined force of 50 US (F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18D), French (MIRAGE 2000 NK2, JAGUAR), Dutch (F-16A) and British (JAGUAR, Sea Harrier) combat, surveillance and support aircraft took off from five bases in Italy (Aviano, Istriana, Gioia del Cole, Trapani and Pizza) and the British aircraft carrier Invincible in the Adriatic. The combined force took off at 12:15.

At 12:30 they were grouped into several formations over Udbina: some bombed the runways while others took out the antiaircraft batteries. Sources on the ground said that UN trucks had been deployed along the runway (UN spokesman in Knin) as a final effort to show good will following Martic's offer to allow observers in.

The operation was over at around 13:30. The runway was pockmarked with craters caused by Durandal bombs created to destroy runways.

Airport commander Colonel Ratko Dopudja later said they had used cargo bombs which sowed hundreds of mines around the airfield. Both sides (UNPROFOR and the RSK) agree that there were two fatalities and several wounded. NATO said it had taken pains to inflict as few casualties as possible and hadn't targeted planes on the ground. Sources on the ground said antiaircraft gunners had run off in time. NATO said that all of its aircraft returned home safely without going through any anti-aircraft fire.

On the other hand, there was no indication that the RSK army's attacks on Bihac would stop or at least ease off. On the contrary, they continued with the same ferocity and the 5th Corps was slowly pushed back to its original positions around Bihac while thousands of refugees fled.

The reactions were no surprise: Croatia bragged that the Udbina attack would never have taken place if they hadn't initiated and approved it. Croatia's UN ambassador Mario Nobilo even said that the attack prevented "a possible legitimate attack by the Croatian army". Babic was astounded that Great Britain had submitted Resolution 958. Martic called it an arrogant attack by vandals and added that the RSK had made no provocation. He also threatened the international community "which has taken the side of Croatia and rejected the peace option". Martic also appealed to his population to leave UNPROFOR alone, but that didn't stop some of his men from temporarily abducting two Czech officers. In Belgrade, rightist nationalist parties raised an outcry over the attack in the republican parliament, but to no avail. Yugoslavia's federal government issued a statement on Monday night condemning the attack and leaving official reactions at that. The choice of words is interesting: the protests linked two arguments several times. Those two arguments are politically and logically mutually exclusive: any flights from Udbina were denied and the UN were accused of implementing Resolution 958 retroactively. RS President Radovan Karadzic voiced the greatest indignation. He threatened retaliation against the international community and total war against the UN over an attack on an airport that wasn't even on his territory.

The most important reaction from Yugoslav sources came from Belgrade "Politika" daily editor-in-chief Hadji Dragan Antic. Antic explained the NATO air strike in an editorial and said: "we can say with full responsibility that the main people to blame for the NATO attack on Udbina are the people who allowed Serb planes to fly from there over the past two weeks, launching three air strikes, including napalm, in the Bihac safe area". The message is clear and its source can be guessed.

The Udbina airport story has a specific and complicated background which has more to do with Serb internal affairs than with the UN and NATO.

First, Martic, theoretically seems to have been right when he said that his planes weren't flying over Bosnia in March or now. Obviously they weren't Yugoslav Army planes, so that doesn't leave much space for guesswork. A plane can easily be packed into crates and shipped from the RS to the RSK. RS combat pilots are known to have trained in the RSK because of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Udbina airport was jointly used by RS and RSK air forces. Was that part of the union of all Serb lands that the RSK Serbs never seemed to favor?

The next question is: why the air strikes in Bihac when there was no tactical need (compared to the possible ensuing damage)? Both Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb troops on the Bihac war front are stronger than the 5th Corps. The behavior of the Serbs gave the impression that they didn't care about the UN and international community.

What does that mean and who's trying to get who into what? Hadji Dragan Antic explains: "The leaders of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs must understand that by intentionally provoking air strikes they can't change Belgrade's and Yugoslavia's policy of peace, but can instead only do more damage to their own people".

So can the Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina present Milosevic with a fait accompli in the form of total war against the UN and the world? What's behind a statement by Slobodan Jarcevic, Martic's foreign policy advisor? Jarcevic told Independent Television Studio B on Monday night that entire villages had been levelled and added that the people were organizing themselves and demanding an eye for an eye (never confirmed). The western media said that Karadzic and Mladic were trying to force Milosevic into the war on their side.

Finally, recall the delicate relations between the RS and RSK after Milosevic imposed the blockade on the Drina river. So what does the price of gasoline have to do with the bombing of Udbina airport? RSK companies started importing gasoline, beer and cigarettes (the most profitable merchandise) for the RS. Yugoslavia's customs service put an end to that because of the international observers. The RSK decided to stop supplying the RS and shipped its supplies directly to Knin and the RS imposed heavy taxes on those shipments. Martic and Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic had to turn to Pale. It turned out that gasoline sells for 2.5-3 DEM a liter in the area between Bijeljina and Prijedor and for 6 DEM in Benkovac in the RSK. In order to ease that grip, they began cooperating on the Bihac front, including a concession to use Udbina airport. Mikelic tried to get out of the story by saying that the only way out was to sign an economic treaty with Croatia and get back to negotiating, which would leave the middlemen and tax collectors empty-handed.

So it's no surprise that the Vukovar parliament session rejected that option. On the one hand, there are just too many local power brokers, and on the other, the treaty would do damage to those politicians who promised a completely independent state. There's also some tension along the Babic-Martic-Mikelic line.

The whole thing is threatening to spin out of control and pass the point of no return. The issue now is whether the players in the game realize that NATO has suddenly gotten to the point of no return, even for its more moderate members. NATO had a crisis of identity and if someone declares total war on it now, the organization will grasp that straw greedily. Huge international bureaucracies don't die off that easily.