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November 28, 1994
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 166
The Bosnian War

Karadzic On His Own

by Milos Vasic & Filip Svarm

NATO air strikes against Serb positions at the request of the UN have become frequent over the past week. So much so that they'll begin to draw the same attention as shells landing in Sarajevo, Doboj or Bihac. Where is this speed in the NATO and UN military approach to the Bosnian war coming from? What are its goals? What is the sudden motivation?

The western press says that the offensive against the Bihac safe-area wasn't stopped with the strike against Udbina airport. Moreover, the fighting over the Muslim 5th Corps' last remaining strongholds intensified; thousands of refugees fled into Bihac; Velika Kladusa fell and Fikret Abdic returned home triumphantly; Bihac is under pressure from the east and north. There seems to be some confusion about the goals of the strikes because no one has taken pains to prove that the strike against Udbina was just aimed at neutralizing the airfield.

Everyone seems to have expected the strike to have an effect on Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, general Ratko Mladic. They don't seem to have been impressed (but Krajina leader Milan Martic was), which is logical since the attack was not in the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). The next day, two British Sea Harriers patrolling the skies over Bosnia reported that SA-2 missiles were fired at them. They released radar lures and easily maneuvered out of range. The SA-2's are hopelessly antiquated. They were made to combat high-flying strategic bombers with radio guiding systems which have to be switched on from launch to impact.

That incident seems to have pushed things forward. On Wednesday, November 23, at 10:30 AM, NATO used a strategy that was first used in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Two scout planes flew out as lures. Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft gunners took the bait and turned their radar systems on. Part of the 22-plane NATO strike force then turned on their guidance systems and activated their HARM missiles which home in on radar beacons. Three radar locations were hit in the first strike: Otok, the vicinity of Bosanska Krupa (both northeast of Bihac), and positions near Dvor Na Uni (Krajina). According to an official statement, a second strike in the early afternoon destroyed remaining missiles and some more anti-aircraft batteries. Serb sources reported many killed and wounded in the raids. They said that eight people died (including civilians), bringing the total death count to nine.

Since the no-fly zone was imposed (Security Council resolution 816 - March 31, 1993), NATO pilots have been locked on in the sights of Bosnian Serb guns thousands of times and no one reacted.

The rules of the game seemed to have changed as that number grew. NATO first lost a British Sea Harrier over Gorazde, two more planes escaped from SAM-7 missiles last month and the Udbina message wasn't understood, while the UN and NATO can't send a different message.

New rules of engagement were introduced, the same rules as over Iraq: if missile radars are turned on, the batteries will be attacked.

The question is what is the game? The war on the ground continues regardless of whatever happens in the air. Nothing has been accomplished in the air. Bosnian Serb antiaircraft defences haven't played too prominent a role in this war. But UNPROFOR troops in Bosnian Serb territory are important. From the very beginning, everyone saw them as potential targets and hostages.

Before the Bosnian Serb batteries were attacked, Karadzic's spokesman Jovan Zametica phoned UNPROFOR's Bosnian commander, General Sir Michael Rose and said: "Attack us and it's total war. That's President Karadzic's message and he's very angry."

Then Bosnian Serb troops blockaded 350 UNPROFOR troops around Sarajevo, but let them withdraw into the city later. 55 Canadians were captured in Visoko and Breza, along with 150 French troops and 50 UN civilian staff. That wasn't the first time and the UN troops were always released without being harmed. If all of this continues, the rules of the game could change again. The UN withdrawal from the Krajina could cause a war with Croatia; new pressure on Bihac from either side could mean more NATO air power; Milosevic has washed his hands of the war and that leaves Karadzic; the ball's in his corner and he can risk total war with everyone, but at his own expense.

In complete awareness of the speed of events, a meeting was held in Belgrade between Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary General's special envoy to former Yugoslavia, Krajina President Milan Martic and Serbian President Milosevic. After a few hours alone, they issued statements. Martic said that the two Krajina Serb planes that had taken off on November 19 to strike at Bihac had done so without permission and that the people responsible had been dismissed, and added that Krajina would not engage its military in Bosnia. Milosevic personally asked Martic and everyone in the Krajina to "resist pressure to draw Krajina into the war now that intensive Zagreb-Knin talks are underway and to sign the economic treaty". All three called for an immediate ceasefire in Bosnia.

Akashi then went to Zagreb and later to Pale, which means we'll have to wait for the results of this peace initiative during which Milosevic never said a word to the Bosnian Serbs.

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