Hands in the Bihac Pocket

When he announced the arrival of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to Sarajevo two days ago, top UN official Michael Williams said that Ghali was coming with "definite conditions" for the continuation of the UN's peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that he would be very disappointed to leave Sarajevo without some significant progress in these regions. However, Bosnian Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic refused to meet him at Sarajevo's Butmir airport and demanded that Ghali visit him in Pale (Bosnian Serb political center). The Bosnian Serb leadership showed that it didn't give a damn for Ghali's statement that the UN has reached the bottom line of patience with regard to the treatment of UNPROFOR and talks of a general ceasefire. The Bosnian Serbs believe that they hold all the cards in their hands (military success, the rift in the international community, and peace troops as potential hostages), so that they now stipulate their cordiality at the negotiating table with the practical recognition of their state.

Karadzic's advisor Jovan Zametica said that the Bosnian Serbs' offer of a meeting with Ghali in Grbavica, since he wouldn't go to Pale, was a sign of "goodwill and readiness to compromise", but that the UN Secretary-General had turned it down and shown that the "UN did not wish to face the reality of the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic".

B-H President Alija Izetbegovic embarrassed Ghali publicly when he said that he hadn't come with a new peace proposal for B-H, and the UN Secretary General was met in front of the Presidency building in Sarajevo by a group of demonstrators shouting "Boutros - Chetnik" (Serb guerrilla).

As far as the Bosnian Serbs are concerned, the UN has become just one more powerless side involved in the trade of land and people, and susceptible to threats and blackmail. The Muslims regard the UN as a very dubious organization which has no right to neutrality, since according to Izetbegovic the matter concerns a clash between a "normal government" and those who "recognize only one nation, one faith and one party, and demand that all others be exterminated". A dejected Ghali could only conclude that if there is no cooperation with both sides in the conflict, it will become increasingly difficult to persuade the UN Security Council that the peace forces should remain in Bosnia.

But few believe that UNPROFOR could withdraw in the near future. Events of the last fortnight have shown the numerous announcements and promises to be a very relative thing. NATO's air strikes against Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb positions were first interpreted as a determination to stop the Serbian advance in Cazinska Krajina and a warning of what would happen if Pale and Knin did not "come to their senses". It ended the way it did: with the most bitter quarrel in NATO since the Suez Crisis and US Defence Secretary William Perry's resigned acknowledgement, after the UN had vetoed further air strikes, that these attacks were not leading anywhere and that the Serbs had demonstrated their superiority on the ground and could capture Bihac whenever they wished to. A similar thing happened with the Contact Group for Bosnia's peace plan. The confederal links between the Bosnian Serb Republic and Yugoslavia, which the West had earlier interpreted as the creation of so-called Greater Serbia, will now get a green light if Karadzic and his associates agree to the plan. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that it was logical that the Serbs should get the right to enter into a confederation with Serbia, since the Bosnian Croats and Muslims have been given the go-ahead to link up with Croatia. But it remains an open question whether Pale will be satisfied with this now. If the Bosnian Serbs agree to the 49:51 division of Bosnia, the demilitarization of the Bihac pocket and a general ceasefire, then there is a possibility that they will then not have to withdraw from the controversial territories under their control until a bilateral agreement on mutual boundaries is reached. It turns out that Karadzic got all that he wanted: the ethnic division of B-H, territories and good prospects of remaining on his feet with regard to Belgrade. Serbian quarrels and Serbian reconciliations are proverbial.

"The only way of persuading the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Geneva plan is through Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic", said Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev after meeting with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. That Milosevic's peace policy is being counted on very much was confirmed during his meeting with the Contact Group's experts in Karadjordjevo (refer to "Ghostbusters" in this issue). Regardless of the embargo and UN observers on the Drina River, it is believed that Belgrade can still influence Pale. Namely, the interests are mutual: Milosevic would be proving that he had conducted a wise and the only correct policy, while the Bosnian Serb leadership would retain real power. They will settle accounts between themselves one way or another, but this is absolutely irrelevant to the international mediators. NATO and the UN would not be left alone in dealing with Karadzic, who has demonstrated very clearly that he is no longer interested in playing by the rules. This is where the two organizations cannot follow without unforeseeable consequences.

Of course, the Bosnian Serbs are not the only warring side on whose stand peace in B-H depends. There is Sarajevo, but also Grude, i.e. Zagreb. As far as the first are concerned, after Perry's statement that the war has practically been decided from the military point, they have been left high and dry by those they expected much from. When it comes to Croatia, matters are starting to take on interesting connotations.

Croatia did not rush in to help the B-H Army's 5th Corps because it had NATO's firm guarantees that Croatia's strategic interests would be defended with a decisive action. These are the words Croatian Sabor (parliament) Vice-Speaker Vladimir Seks used while explaining Croatia's nonchalant stand towards the agony of Bihac, when speaking before the Association of Croatian Refugees last Saturday in Osijek (Slavonian city near Vukovar). What game is being played, and how does one explain Zagreb's lack of interest in the dramatic events in its neighborhood - something which is publicly described as a "strategic interest", but over which nothing is being done? Part of the answer as to why Croatia has "forgotten" its confederal partner lies in a secret diplomatic mission between Zagreb and Belgrade, with numerous mediators, negotiators and messengers. It has become very obvious that the Zagreb-Knin negotiations which were frozen for months suddenly thawed during the Bihac crisis and that talks between the head of the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade, Zvonimir Markovic, and Milosevic have revived in the last few days. Certain circles in the Croatian leadership view the resurrection of Fikret Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia as a marvelous alibi for Herzeg-Bosna's (Croat statelet in B-H) smoldering statehood and its difficulties in reconciling itself with joining the Muslim-Croat federation. When the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia is completely independent of Sarajevo, and if Karadzic's plan for a "Western Serbian state" succeeds, which after the international community's concessions seems all the more probable, then Herzeg-Bosna will not be without prospects. Unification with Croatia is then a small step. The Serbian-Croatian "Yalta", when speaking of B-H, could prove far stronger and more durable than the world's best diplomatic teams thought possible, while doing their best in the past four years in finding an acceptable solution to the problem of the former Yugoslavia.

"It was a suicidal action from the political standpoint and it wasn't much better from the military angle", said Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak, commenting in the "New York Times" on the B-H Army 5th Corp's earlier offensive, after having signed a "Memorandum on cooperation" between Croatia and the US with Perry. In the same interview, Susak said: "If the fall of Bihac becomes inevitable - if the soldiers there don't wish to fight anymore or their commanders decide to surrender, Croatia will intervene." As a reaction to this statement, France and the US cautioned against the involvement of Croatian troops, so that Zagreb had a very good alibi for its policy in B-H and for evading the Washington Agreement.

The situation in Bihac is described as terrible. The city has no electricity or water, there are over 2,000 wounded in the hospital and there is a shortage of medicine, while refugees from the surrounding areas keep pouring in. Even though Izetbegovic sent messages to hold out and "to not listen to enemy promises which are being made with the idea of destroying our resistance" and that "our army is active on all fronts", all with the aim of loosening pressure on Bihac, the general impression is that the 5th Corps has been pulverized. This will have serious consequences for the Muslims' morale. After victory over Abdic's troops in the November offensive against Bosnian Serbs, General Atif Dudakovic came to symbolize the change in Sarajevo's luck. At the time, B-H Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic claimed that Dudakovic had been the first to show that the "Serbs were not invincible", and in a personal message to B-H Army Commander Rasim Delic, said that Dudakovic's "decisiveness and persistence" were "truly heroic".

The real situation in Bihac and the scope of the tragedy cannot be determined. UNPROFOR claims that there was no shelling in the last 48 hours and that the lines of contact are quiet. On the other hand, Bihac Mayor Hamdija Kabiljagic claims that thousands of shells are pounding the city - "one every six seconds". There is no longer any hope that NATO planes will intervene. NATO statements claim that the Bosnian Serbs have concentrated so much anti-aircraft artillery, making all further actions impossible without prior "strategic bombing", for which an international consensus cannot be reached.

From the political standpoint, Bihac is less important to Sarajevo than Velika Kladusa (city in the Bihac enclave previously ruled by Fikret Abdic). Namely, even if the Serbs were to enter the city, they would have to leave it some time. However, when talking about Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, in the event that he sets up power again, the B-H controlled government in Cazinska Krajina is finished. This was best seen in the bloody street fighting in Velika Kladusa and the 5th Corps' tenacious resistance. According to UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler, it is impossible to remove the dead - "they lie where they've fallen".

The fall of Velika Kladusa seems imminent. Abdic will slowly spread his authority towards Cazin and Bihac, and according to many assessments, the goal of Bosnian Serb Republic Army General Manojlo Milovanovic's offensive around Bihac is to exhaust the members of the B-H 5th Army corps in order to enable Abdic to take over. Zagreb would not be opposed to this. The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was a very good and discrete mediator in all sorts of trade arrangements and transactions. Also, the Una railway and the highway would then come under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, which is all the more important if we consider speculations on territorial exchanges according to which Krajina would be divided into two: the part with the railway line and the highway would become part of Croatia, which would be strengthened with Western Herzegovina, while all the rest would become part of "Western Serbia" where Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia would be a "federal unit".

However, peace does not seem to be likely in the near future, even if the warring sides become pawns in the game of settling scores played by the big powers. It is as if the consequences of the war have become more important than the removal of the causes of war.