Becoming Tito

Last year, one of the most popular courses at Harvard was the one that taught "leadership". I failed to find out how this skill was studied and practiced, not so much because of my aversion to the role of leader, but because the whole thing reminded me of the one-time ambitions of the children here to "study for Tito". Although I had gradually got out of the habit of making fun of American pedagogical optimism, I remained somewhat suspicious about the possibility of turning everything into rules that can be learned.

Slobodan Milosevic was probably one of those boys who wanted to become Tito when they grew up and he was undoubtedly one of the most persistent and most talented ones, judging by how far he has gone. There must be children today who want to become him or Radovan Karadzic. To become the president is the favorite dream of children in America too; however, this dream is most often not linked to, for instance, Bill Clinton himself, but to living in the White House and all the fringe benefits. The shortage of leadership in the West is practically chronic and the very idea of a Great Leader appears grotesque and a bit primitive. The type of leader most sought after is a cautious reformer who may sound like a visionary but his vision must not be too grand, nor is it propitious that he believes in anything too seriously. It is also well-known that, as a rule, the best visions are costly and risky. Nothing revolutionary is striven for and, in principle, order and continuity are believed in. This is why the present Western leaders seem unconvincing, like mediocre actors, because they are expected to merely create the impression of statehood, not to make dramatic decisions and bring their personal will to the fore.

Inviolable leaders can still be found only in small and miserable countries, either as the result of or the cause of that misery. It once seemed that the magnitude of a country and its people could be measured by the magnitude of their leader. This had been true at times, but today it is mostly the other way around. Namely, one of the chief directions of a predominant civilization lies in the making of an increasingly finer and tighter institutions which let through less and less robust arbitrariness as well as leadership.

Many local advocates of the theory of the West's decline will say that the perfection of the system there makes people superfluous and weak and they will triumphally cite as the crucial proof of our superiority Milosevic and Karadzic, since all the Western leaders put together are not fit to wash their feet. There is some truth in that, particularly when the qualities judged are the readiness to and facility in reaching the crucial life-or-death decisions. So, the war in Bosnia is here increasingly frequently interpreted as our victory over the West, i.e. over the decaying and powerless civilization which has nothing more to teach us and should be forgotten.

I regret spoiling the party by reminding us that the West has never accepted the war in Bosnia as its own and that it has merely tried, hesitatingly and without success, to discourage us from ruining our own future. Our leaders showed the Westerners what the words courage, determination and persistence mean, but we have lost all other contests. With the exception of our leaders, we have nothing. Everything has been sacrificed for their magnitude.

Unfortunately, that is a product we cannot export, but domestic demand continues to grow. After one all-Serb leader, we now undoubtedly have another one, equally inviolable, whose ambitions may be just as big. More precisely, by withdrawing to within Serbia's and Montenegro's borders, Milosevic admitted that a tacit Serb-Serb war had been waged in Bosnia, a war which he failed to win and that is why he is no longer interested in an all-Serb state. Karadzic, on the other hand, reckons he is definitely getting a state in Bosnia, a better one than the Contact Group had drawn for him, and then he just might make a run over the Drina.

That Karadzic is doing well is best confirmed by the regular visits Djindjic, Kostunica and the Serbian Radical Party are paying him. That Milosevic believes he's doing well is evident in his refusal to let that very opposition anywhere near power. That the opposition is not faring well is obvious due to the fact that they are prepared to go anywhere and, if need be, draw a contract with the Devil himself, if Mr. Satan pledges he is not on Milosevic's side. Finally, that none of us have it good is manifest because we cannot do anything to change that anymore and because we are no longer interested even in saving our own skins. It seems to me that the people here have never been so exhilarated by bad news from the outside world and that they have never hoped so much for overall destruction and ruin. There is a widespread opinion that a global apocalypse might ensue, if not because of us, then because of our small war. As if we'd be satisfied, as if we'd be somehow redeemed if the idea of a united Europe failed or if NATO disintegrated.

It is characteristic that this malice is above all directed at the West. For instance, not too many people here would lose sleep if the war in Chechnya should expand and continue. For, as much as they turn to Russia, Serbia and Montenegro are unable to stop looking at the West, and the story of the West's ruin is not so much a matter of malice as of fear of completely losing contact with civilization. They won't go on without us as if nothing had happened, will they? If we have tripped, they should at least pause.

The East and Russia have always been reserve and emergency exits, spiritually and intellectually weaker and farther away than the West. I cannot see that anything will change quickly in that respect, even if all writers of the local dailies become members of the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

It may seem crazy, but it might turn out that the best chances of regaining balance are concealed in Milosevic's wish to become Tito. Permitting ourselves minor bizarre parallels, he is now at the point at which Tito had found himself after the revolution, when he began establishing relations with the world, particularly with the West.

Milosevic may be forced to rely on the Russians for a while, but he will soon find out how this closeness galls him. The doors to some of the European capitals are now ajar and I believe that he will soon get his foot in the cracks. Whoever considers himself a part of the democratic opposition in Serbia should have to take into consideration even this foreign political reason for the divorce from Karadzic. I can't understand how anyone can hope democracy will be established in Serbia in an atmosphere of total confrontation with the democratic world. I can't understand how someone can be an anti-Western diplomat and how Djindjic and Kostunica will prove that they are greater democrats than Milosevic if he nevertheless receives the West's support in the end. Just as Tito managed to, despite Communism. And, judging by the road he has embarked on, Milosevic might even dream up something like the Non-Aligned Movement at the end.