Flexing Muscles

The Croatian leadership took advantage of the last days of 1994 to make final policy adjustments which would be carried on into 1995, and judging by statements made by two top men, we can expect to witness a lot of cacophony rather than harmony. In his New Year's message, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said that the country was entering 1995 with the "hope of ending the war crisis, the liberation of occupied Croatian territories and a just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations, and a still better understanding between Croatia and the other nations of the world."

A day before this statement, Croatian Defence Minister Janko Bobetko made a statement that can be considered anything but peace-oriented. At a special press conference, Bobetko said that attacks by the Croatian army aimed at liberating all parts of Croatia could be expected in 1995. This is not the first statement of its kind, but Bobetko made an interesting departure when he announced not only Croatia's plans, but also anticipated those of the Serbs. He said that if the Serbs attacked the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, Croatia would not write to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, but that Croatian units would ensure the security of the highway, and that this was no longer a diplomatic issue.

The four-month cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in barely concealed suspicion and dissatisfaction among the Croatian leadership and it is certainly no accident that this is the first agreement which the Bosnian Croats were the last to accept; and now that they have signed it, it is hard to guarantee that they will also uphold it.

Croatian politics take as their starting point a fixed idea, or if you prefer, a doctrinaire precept: that the key to the former Yugoslav crisis lies in Bosnia and that the war in Croatia cannot be brought to an end before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over. There are many who view this as an arbitrary claim, thanks to which many chances have been passed up in reaching an agreement with Knin (the second such claim is that the keys to peace with Croatian Serbs are held by Belgrade). However, now that some kind of a possibility for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be discerned, the Croatian leadership has reacted reflexly, in accordance with this precept, not hiding its fear that the Bosnian knot might be unraveled while Croatia would be allowed to fall into oblivion, i.e. left to an unproductive hairsplitting between Zagreb and Knin which could go on indefinitely. It is interesting that the same fear can be discerned among the Knin Serbs. They seem to fear the fact that the Bosnian Serbs could end the war and leave the Serbs across the Una River to fend for themselves or even use them in a trade-off with Zagreb, something that has been quite topical lately.

We are now witness to an unusual situation: the main warring sides have agreed to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the agreement of Knin and Mostar (read Zagreb), sides which played only a peripheral role in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war and were not the main protagonists, must be sought subsequently. In fact, it is possible to speak of a turnabout in the "Bosnian key" to the war, because, if it was believed until recently that Croatia's fate was being resolved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the time, it could be said that the key to the Bosnian situation lies in Croatia.

Bearing all this in mind, if we return once more to Bobetko's statement, we are probably closest to the truth: by flexing its muscles, Croatia is reflecting the state leadership's stand that it won't allow an end to the B-H war, at least for as long as there are so many unresolved issues with regard to Croatia or until firm guarantees are received that they will be resolved. It can be assumed that this could accelerate events in Croatia, but whether it will all happen quickly enough to satisfy the Croatian leadership remains a moot question.