What's Behind the Ceasefire?

To wage war effectively in winter you need winter coats, blankets, boots, sweaters, fuel and strong food; the German Wehrmacht just barely had enough of these things when it charged the forests and mountains of Bosnia chasing after WWII partisans. The Bosnian scum on all three sides do not.

War is a matter of money most of all: the classics advise us to look into our pockets before going to war. Slobodan Milosevic was warned of that on time and on several occasions. It seems his plans were too optimistic: finishing Bosnia-Herzegovina off quickly (like Croatia) and leaving a fait accompli with the internationalization of the Bosnia issue (similar to the Vance plan for Croatia). It turned out that Milosevic's fait accompli was neither quick enough nor perfect enough, nor was the Bosnian state thrown to its knees, nor did Karadzic's Serbs manage to create a state that can survive in the long term. That was the reason why the two Serb leaders clashed so fiercely.

Now it's too late: Milosevic's time is running out, Karadzic and his people feel they have been abandoned and the project for all-Serb unity seems a greater illusion than ever before.

Milosevic, pressured by the sanctions, tried to get Karadzic and his people to see reason twice, offering them international plans he bargained hard for. On Jahorina Mountain, in May 1993, Karadzic rejected the Vance-Owen plan and humiliated the FRY elite (which Milosevic hasn't forgiven). This summer he rejected the Contact Group plan and there were fierce arguments.

After August 1994 it became clear that nothing can be done quickly in Bosnia through Milosevic. In simple terms, his interests and Karadzic's were essentially different. Karadzic is a prisoner of his own ideology of ethnic purity and Milosevic is a victim of his own uncompromising attitude. The solution for Karadzic lies in any kind of union of all Serb lands which would draw the rest of Serbdom into his troubles. Milosevic has to save what little he has by replacing Karadzic with his puppet or amputating the Serbs from the other side of the Drina river.

Since nothing could be done directly (Karadzic learned a lesson from the fate of the first Krajina president Milan Babic), as was explained to Douglas Hurd and Allain Juppe, things had to be done the long way around in order to save face if nothing else. Through the joint efforts of both Karadzic's and Milosevic's people, former US president Jimmy Carter came to Bosnia. The stand of the US administration was so obviously duplicitous that the trip was suspicious: most probably agreement was reached with the White House first (if it succeeds - good, if it fails - it's your own fault). That's how it turned out in the end.

Carter got a ceasefire signed on December 23 and flew home and the main actors got down to business. Yasushi Akashi, the UN special envoy, and UNPROFOR's Bosnia commander General Sir Michael Rose submitted a draft four-month agreement on a full end to hostilities first to Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, then to Alija Izetbegovic and General Rasim Delic. After two to three days of ritual wrangling, the agreement was also signed by the Croats and Fikret Abdic. State-controlled Borba published a front page article titled Peace in Bosnia Has Begun on January 4. That exaggeration was to be expected: court propaganda experts couldn't wait to show their pharaoh that we finally have a peaceful Bosnia and that the sanctions will be lifted immediately. That's an opinion shared by FRY president Zoran Lilic who added the following explanation in an interview for Hungarian radio: "I want to stress that the former Yugoslavia included Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, because all of the Serbs and all of the Croats lived in one state".

The ceasefire agreement envisages a complete end to hostilities on all front lines over a four month period and can be renewed if the warring sides agree. This ceasefire has been taken more seriously than all the previous ones and that is proved by the efforts invested in overseeing it: a central joint commission will meet at Butmir airport first to form regional commissions; liaison officers will be exchanged in two weeks.

The text of the agreement shows some of the experiences gained in previous ceasefire agreements were used as well as new elements. It insists on banning the use of "explosive ammunition", "weapons that fire explosive ammunition" and includes 12.7 mm machine-guns in the "heavy weapons" category. The obvious intention is the same as the February 1994 ultimatum: the elimination of all hand-held misside launchers, guided missiles and similar weapons that have inflicted damage on Sarajevo over the past 11 months. Heavy machine-guns have also proved extremely dangerous.

The most interesting is article 9 (the withdrawal of all troops): all four warring sides (including Abdic's troops) agreed that there are "foreign troops" in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they will cooperate in their withdrawal. This means that they all took on an embarrassing obligation if one considers the repeated assurances by neighboring states that they do not have any troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most interesting position is that of Croatia, which first denied but then admitted the presence of its regular troops in Bosnia, which it justified with the Washington agreement.

Does the text of the agreement also mean that regular Croatian troops have to withdraw from Bosnia regardless of the possible interpretations of the Washington agreement? The new year's agreement does not get into those details because it is carefully formulated in "principled ways" similar to other agreements, mainly the former Yugoslav Presidency order of January 9, 1991 to disarm all paramilitary formations.

The Bosnian Muslims are relatively comfortable with this article because they can't be accused of having foreign troops on their territory (if you don't count the several hundred Mujaheddins). The Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) and Abdic's Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia (APZB) face uncomfortable situations since Western intelligence sources are persistent with reports of the presence of "volunteers" and regular professional military and police forces from Yugoslavia and the Krajina in the Bihac war zone. Those claims will be hard to prove because, even if they are true, the men in those formations would have no documents, uniforms or anything else that would prove their origin.

Bear in mind the nature of the political problems facing the neighboring countries. Milosevic seems to be taking seriously the rightist threat to his regime - seriously enough to do away with Borba and NTV Studio B in an effort to shut up Karadzic in the Serbian media. The impression Milosevic seems to be trying to give to the West and Russia is that he has to help Mladic a little because the warmongering nationalist lobby is pressuring him and also it's unwise to alienate the RS army because they'll be a good ally once he gets to grips with Karadzic. The West and Russia are buying the story that the three main nationalist parties have great influence with the electorate because that fits into the built-up stereotype about the Serbs as nationalists. That's the context they'll view any possible presence of Serb troops on Abdic's side through: Bihac is important because it controls the railway linking Banja Luka and Zagreb to Knin, Sibenik and Split. If that railway is under Serb control and not under the control of the Muslim 5th Corps, things will be different. Milosevic has a story he can sell to the great powers: the overall, abstract Serb interest has become a political fact that everyone takes into account over the past four years. The fact that it's a self-fulfilling prophecy (Milosevic's strategy from the start) doesn't help anyone. Milosevic will use this ceasefire to get the sanctions lifted as soon as possible (which is his primary goal) regardless of the abstract Serb interests and price Karadzic is paying.

The Croatian side is paying ever more dearly for Tudjman's hesitation in finally choosing who to side with honestly: Milosevic or Izetbegovic. An alliance with Milosevic is useful in the short term because it solves the Krajina problem in any possible way. An alliance with Izetbegovic would bring a long term strategic advantage over the Serb side, but includes a rift and elimination of rightist extremists in Croatia who are getting too powerful.

So the ceasefire gives everyone time until May 1: time for thought for some, time to regroup for others, time to buy more weapons for the third, time to rest for everyone. Milosevic has to do something which is of long term significance: get the sanctions lifted for example.